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Abstract
Mathematical models of infectious disease such as Markov models, dynamic compart-
mental models have been increasingly utilized in medical decision making. Most studies
primarily focus on assessing the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness of policies, interventions
by balancing costs and direct health benefits (often in qualify-adjusted life years gained,
or disability-adjusted life-years averted). There are challenges with this classical ap-
proach. First, it may overlook the future impact of current decision. For example,
in treating bacterial infections, antibiotic over-prescription is an increasingly urgent
healthcare issue to be addressed. Second, previous works focus less on incorporating
individual response and heterogeneity effect into an infectious disease control policy
optimization setting.
In Chapter 2, we address the antibiotic over-prescription in febrile illness manage-
ment, by formulating the problem of minimizing the weighted average of antibiotic
underuse and overuse to inform the optimal diagnostic test and antibiotic treatment
options for given occurrence probabilities of several bacterial and viral infections. The
model accounted for multiple infections simultaneously and incorporated test, treat-
ment, and other direct and indirect costs, as well as the effect of delays in seeking
care and test turnaround times. We used the Markov models to numerically estimate
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), pre-penalty costs, and the likelihood of antibi-
otics overuse per patient for fifteen different strategies in Thailand settings (a typical
viral and bacterial endemic setting).
In Chapter 3, we formulate a Markov decision process to address patient adherence
heterogeneity by optimizing viral load monitoring strategies for HIV-infected patients.
In Chapter 4, we provide a framework to optimize public health control policies in
responding to an infectious disease outbreak like COVID-19 pandemic. We use a multi-
nomial discrete choice model to characterize an individual activity level and integrate it
iii
into a repeated game-theoretical model with a SIR disease transmission dynamics. We
derive a few insightful structural properties from these models and conduct numerical
studies based on representative data for COVID-19 in Minnesota.
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To assess the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of health strategies, policies, and
interventions, mathematical models of infectious disease have become increasingly pre-
ferred over the last few decades. This is partially due to the advancement in computing
powers, and particularly because randomized clinical trials are often time-consuming,
expensive, and sometimes unethical. The medical community has been using models
like Markov models, dynamic compartmental models to evaluate costs and health bene-
fits for candidate interventions. However, most studies have focused on balancing costs
and direct health benefits (often represented in quality-adjusted life-years or disability-
adjusted life-years). Few studies have explicitly considered either the impact of proposed
policies in the long run.
On the other hand, due to the rise of personalized and precision medicine in the last
decade, there have been many studies supporting the existence of patient heterogeneity
in different contexts. However, much fewer works have focused on incorporating the in-
dividual heterogeneity preference/behavior into an optimization problem. Overlooking
these factors might result in myopic, greedy (that is to say, only focus on the immediate
benefits without considering the future), ending up in the one-size-fits-all type of poli-
cies. Last, to design an optimal public health intervention, it is equally important, if not
1
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more, for decision-makers to consider how individuals change their behaviors according
to the development of the pandemic and public health interventions enacted.
For my dissertation, I propose and apply a few novel stochastic modeling techniques
to optimize patient health outcome in three settings. First, we use Markov models to
assess cost-effectiveness of test-and-treat strategies for acute febrile illnesses (an acute
infectious diseases setting) by taking possible future harm due to current decision into
consideration. Second, we optimize monitoring strategies for HIV patients by con-
sidering the patient heterogeneity in adherence behaviors (a chronic infectious disease
setting). Last, we optimize the timing and intensity of public health interventions (in
responding to an infectious disease outbreak) such as lockdown and social distancing by
explicitly considering human responses to these policies (an infectious disease outbreak
setting).
Antibiotic resistance has become an increasingly pressing public health issue. Nev-
ertheless, both in the literature (i.e., the cost-effectiveness analysis for treating bacterial
disease), and in clinical practices, the negative impact of antibiotic over-prescription is
frequently overlooked. It is an even more urgent problem in tropical countries facing
a growing number of febrile illness patients due to climate change and the increasing
counts of weather-related disasters. There is, therefore, a great need for screening and
treatment policies that consider potential long-term side effects of antibiotics treatment.
Meanwhile, in chronic disease management, as many as 40% of patients fail to ad-
here to treatment recommendations ([92]). Poor adherence leads to a waste of medical
resources, higher treatment failure rates on designated therapies and worsened health
outcomes. Both the frequentist and Bayesian model on adherence data provided evi-
dence of adherence heterogeneity. One-size-fits-all treatment plans might not be optimal
in this setting, and personalized treatment plans adapted to heterogeneous patient ad-
herence patterns might yield better health outcomes. With this motivation in mind, we
constructed an optimization model to assess the benefit(i.e., the value of information)
of differentiating HIV-infected patients by adherence types.
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Last, the COVID-19 pandemic calls for an urgent investigation of strategic public
health interventions to minimize their socioeconomic loss while effectively containing
infectious disease outbreaks [163]. Strategic planning of public health interventions re-
quires central planners such as regional governments and health departments to optimize
the timing, and intensity of these interventions. Central Planners should calibrate these
decisions according to the disease dynamics (e.g., number of infections and infection
rate) and the socioeconomic impact of interventions (e.g., estimated financial loss). On
the one hand, an intervention that comes too late, lasts for a too short period, or lacks
the necessary intensity (e.g., requires businesses to operate at 50% capacity instead of
25% capacity) may fail to contain the pandemic and cause an unaffordable disease bur-
den (or cost of infection). On the other hand, an intervention that is initiated too early,
lasts for an extended period, or is too stringent could cause excessive economic burden
and severe disruption to social activities [171, 115].
Both antibiotic over-prescription and treatment non-adherence and infectious dis-
ease outbreaks are increasingly pressing public health problems nowadays. In this dis-
sertation, we present the stochastic modeling frameworks that we developed for acute,
chronic infectious disease setting, or an outbreak. We use these examples to illustrate
how to make more informed, responsible, and efficient medical decision by incorporating
a long-term perspective considering future harms (Chapter 2), a differentiated care per-
spective (Chapter 3), or a game-theoretic perspective (Chapter 4) . We also quantified
the “when-and-where” regions for optimized policies to gain more health benefits in all
settings.
1.1 Dissertation Overview
In Chapter 2 (“Optimal Test-and-treat Strategies for Acute Febrile Illnesses”), we
formulated the problem of minimizing the weighted average of antibiotic underuse and
overuse to inform the optimal clinical management strategy of diagnostic test options
4
and antibiotic treatment for given occurrence probabilities of several bacterial and viral
infections and diagnostic test parameters (sensitivity and specificity). Detailed Markov
cohort models of febrile illness progression were used to estimate the weight of antibi-
otic underuse. We modeled the weight of antibiotic overuse as a monetary penalty
per unnecessarily administered course, which we vary in the case study, and sensitivity
analysis. The model accounted for multiple infections simultaneously, incorporate test,
treatment and other direct and indirect costs, as well as the effect of delays in seeking
care and in test result wait times. We then discussed and analyzed the generic problem,
and numerically evaluated fifteen different strategies in two example settings in Thai-
land based on existing literature, one with a higher prevalence of bacterial infections
(Northern Thailand, Scenario A) and one with a higher prevalence of viral infections
(Bangkok, Scenario B).
In Chapter 3 (“Monitoring Policy Optimization for HIV patients with Heteroge-
neous Adherence Types”), we develop a stochastic (i.e., a Markov Decision Process)
model framework to optimize the monitoring interval for HIV-infected patients on the
first-line regimen in resource-limited settings, where we assume there exist only two
available antiretroviral therapies (ARTs). We present a Markov decision process mod-
eling approach where we incorporated adherence heterogeneity explicitly in the disease
progression model, and provided 1) structural analysis of the model (optimal value
function) and the optimal policy; 2) the exact equation to directly compute the optimal
policy. Then, we present a case study (an economic analysis quantifying the benefit of
differentiating adherence type) using a previously well-calibrated simulation model in
[106]. We also provide several possible extensions of the model towards the end.
In Chapter 4 (“No Panic in Pandemic: The Impact of Individual Choice on Public
Health Policy and Vaccine Priority”), we use a multinomial logit choice model to char-
acterize an individual activity level and integrate it into a disease transmission model
(SIR disease transmission dynamics) in a game-theoretical setting. We derive a few
insightful structural properties from these models and conduct numerical studies based
5
on representative data for COVID-19 in Minnesota. We compare the effectiveness of
lockdown and social distancing, and numerically characterize the vaccine priority under
different circumstances.




for Acute Febrile Illnesses
2.1 Introduction
Clinical manifestations such as the sudden onset of acute fever, chills, and headache
are the common features among several tropical and emerging diseases, including dengue,
Zika, yellow fever, leptospirosis and scrub typhus ([140]). Depending on the specific eti-
ology, if untreated, patients could experience respiratory distress, multi-organ failure,
and even death ([78], [113]). Due to climate change and the increasing counts of weather-
related disasters ([69], [49], [50]), healthcare providers are facing a growing number of
febrile illness patients, especially in low-resource settings ([120]). The global annual
burden of diseases under the umbrella of febrile illness is estimated to be on the order
of millions of cases ([38], [16], [35]).
There are currently no evidence-based guidelines to inform diagnostic and treatment
strategies and the necessary health care investments ([127]). Early diagnosis of bacterial
infection is essential since antibiotic therapy is more beneficial when initiated early
([78]). Moreover, early diagnosis could avoid unnecessary antibiotics administration to
6
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patients with non-bacterial infections such as dengue ([126]). Due to limited laboratory
services, low quality of test results and prohibitively expensive diagnostic test costs,
current World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines recommend for malaria-endemic,
resource limited regions the use of rapid malaria screening, and prescribing antibiotics
to those with signs of severe illness or specific bacterial infections ([41]). Studies have
also shown that empirical antibiotics prescription to suspected leptospirosis patients is
cost-effective when not considering antibiotic overuse ([139]).
Nevertheless, antibiotic overuse has been recognized as the key driver of antibiotic
resistance development, which is an increasingly pressing public health issue. In the
U.S. alone, antibiotic resistance causes more than 2 million infections and 23,000 deaths
per year ([29]). Additional mean hospital charges due to the presence of antimicrobial-
resistant organism (i.e., methicillin-resistant S. aureus) is around $ 86,400 USD (after
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation adjustment) according to a study in the U.S.
([53]). The social impact might still be underestimated due to the transmission of
antimicrobial-resistant organisms.
Most existing research in the domain of assessing the cost-effectiveness of protocols
managing acute febrile illness has focused on either a single cause of infection or a specific
strategy. As pointed out by [40], the literature on comprehensive cost-effectiveness
assessment of clinical management strategies for non-malarial acute febrile illnesses is
scarce. [154] conducted a prospective observational study to investigate the causes
of acute undifferentiated fever and concluded that pathogen-specific rapid diagnostic
tests could inform the correct use of antibiotics and improve antimicrobial stewardship
in their setting. Under the same stream of work, [87] conducted a cost-effectiveness
analysis of the management of scrub typhus and dengue in rural Laos setting comparing
the approaches of using pathogen-specific diagnostics and biomarker tests. However,
potentially crucial assumptions such as illness progression, health-seeking behaviors,
and diagnostic test accuracy in relation to the stage of illness were not examined in these
studies. On the other hand, studies have shown that empirical antibiotics administration
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might be the most cost-effective strategy in resource-limited settings when treating
suspected leptospirosis patients [139]. However, this may lead to poor outcomes for
non-bacterial infections, which are subsequently treated inappropriately with antibiotics
([41]). Moreover, antibiotic overuse has become a significant health issue worldwide. As
a consequence, the extent to which diagnostic and treatment strategies may be cost-
effective under given scenarios remains unknown.
The objective of this study was to inform the optimal diagnosis and antibiotic treat-
ment strategies for patients with undifferentiated febrile illnesses. We determined the
optimal decision by considering the tradeoff between antibiotics underuse (i.e., higher
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) and health care cost) and antibiotics overuse (i.e.,
unnecessary courses of antibiotics prescribed). We selected Thailand as an exemplary
setting because it is endemic for several of the pathogens of interest, including dengue,
leptospirosis, and scrub typhus at varying occurrence probabilities and present avail-
ability of published data for model development ([140], [89]).
2.2 Methods
Overview
In order to understand the degree to which different strategies achieve the balance
between antibiotics overuse and underuse, we seek to quantify the expected consequences
and proportions of patients falling in both categories for each strategy. To capture the
consequences of antibiotic underuse, we developed a Markov cohort model that describes
febrile disease progression with and without treatment. The long-term consequences
of antibiotic overuse, such as the development of bacterial resistance, are much more
difficult to estimate. Consequently, we assign a monetary penalty (weight) to every
patient unnecessarily prescribed a course of antibiotics in order to capture how different
values for this weight might drive optimal decision-making.
Balancing Antibiotic Overuse and Underuse
9
We first consider a simplified setting where patients presenting with fever can suffer
from one of four causes:
1. A specific bacterial infection for which a test exists, and which is treatable with a
commonly prescribed antibiotic (i.e., doxycycline) ([139], [41]);
2. A bacterial infection for which no test exists, but which is also treatable with
doxycycline;
3. A specific viral infection for which a test exists (and which is not treatable with
doxycycline);
4. Other infections for which there is no test and are not treatable with doxycycline.
We consider three strategies:
1. Empirical doxycycline treatment (antibiotic treatment for all patients, without
any tests);
2. Testing all patients using the bacterial infection test (with sensitivity sensb and
specificity specb, and administering antibiotic treatment to patients with positive
results;
3. Testing all patients using the viral infection test (with sensitivity sensv and speci-
ficity specv, and administering antibiotic treatment to patients with negative re-
sults.
We denote by pbac the probability of presenting with bacterial infection for which
a test exists, potherbac the probability of presenting with bacterial infection for which
no test exists, pviral the probability of presenting with a viral infection for which a
test exists, and pother the probability of presenting with infections not treatable with
doxycycline for which no test exists. We assume that all test sensitivities and specificities
fall between 50% and 100% , and that any test’s sensitivity is less than or equal to any
specificity.
If the penalty (weight) for each patient with a bacterial disease not prescribed an-
tibiotics is wunder, and the penalty (weight) for each patient with non-bacterial disease
prescribed antibiotics is wover, then we would like to choose a strategy that minimizes
10
the expected total penalty per patient: wunderProb(no antibiotics, bacterial disease) +
woverProb(antibiotics, no bacterial disease). The first and second term corresponds to
antibiotic underuse and overuse penalty, respectively, associated with each strategy. We
rewrite this objective as
wunderProb(under) + woverProb(over) (2.1)
Strategy list P(under) P(over)
1 “no testing” 0 pviral + pother
2 “bacterial test” pbac (1− sensb) + potherbacspecb (pviral + pother) (1− specb)
3 “viral test” (pbac + potherbac) (1− specv) pviral (1− sensv) + potherspecv
Table 2.1: Analytical expressions of antibiotic overuse and underuse percentage for a
given strategy
We show the analytical expression of antibiotic underuse and overuse under each
strategy in Table 2.1 above. We then evaluate the strategy performance by comparing
the weighted average of P (under) and P (over) . (Equation 2.1). Strategy “bacterial















potherbac ≤ 1 (2.2)
Similarly, Strategy “viral test” gives a smaller objective value compared to “no
testing” when the following condition is satisfied:
(
wover ∗ sensv









pother ≥ 1 (2.3)
We have also compared the two testing strategies. “bacterial test” provides a smaller
objective value compared to “viral test” when the following condition is satisfied (by
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We simplify the first two inequalities above to determine the disease distribution
condition (such that the two testing strategies outperform “no testing” ) for any given
weights. We note that the left-hand side (henceforth LHS) of Inequality 2.2 is bound

















Then, we have the following simplified condition:




Similarly, we simplify the Inequality 2.3 to




In addition, note that pbac + potherbac + pviral + pother = 1 . Then, we can rewrite
Condition 2.8 as: 1− wunderwover+wunder ≥ pbac + potherbac , which is the same as Condition 2.7.
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We then derived sufficient conditions (without test sensitivity and specificity re-
quirements) for “bacterial test” to outperform “viral test” , and vice versa. We have
the following observations on the LHS (the same for Inequality 2.4, 2.5):
1. sensb has a non-positive coefficient.
2. sensv has a non-negative coefficient.
3. if wunderwover (Potherbac + pbac) ≤ pother (denoted as ∗ henceforth), the coefficient of
specv is non-positive (otherwise positive).
4. if wunderwover (potherbac) > pother + pviral (denoted as X henceforth), the coefficient of
specb is positive (otherwise non-positive).
We claim that (∗) and (X) are mutually exclusive. To see this, first note that all




(potherbac + pbac) ≥
wunder
wover
(potherbac) > pother + pviral ≥ pother,
which leads to wunderwover (potherbac + pbac) > pother. This is a contradiction to (∗). Similarly,






(potherbac + pbac) ≤ pother ≤ pother + pviral,
which leads to wunderwover (potherbac) ≤ pother + pviral , a contradiction to (X).
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Now, suppose (∗) is true. Then, from the LHS of inequality 2.4, we have
LHS = −wunder
wover































































The first inequality follows because pviral (sensv − specb) ≤ 0 , the second inequality
follows by setting sensb = specb = specv = 50% (i.e., smallest possible values) since
they all have non-positive coefficients.
Then, under (∗), we have the LHS of 2.4 bounded above by 0. Thus, (∗) is a sufficient
condition to 2.4.
We also derive the sufficient guarantee of “viral test” outperforming “bacterial test”
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. Now suppose (X) is true. From the LHS of inequality 2.5, we have
LHS = −wunder
wover



























































The first inequality follows since −wunderwover pbac (sensb − specv) ≥ 0 , the second inequality
follows by setting sensv = specb = specV = 50% (similar reason as before). Then, we
conclude that the LHS of 2.5 is bounded below by 0 given (X). Thus, (X) is a sufficient
condition to 2.5.
To briefly summarize, we derived analytical expressions of antibiotics overuse and
underuse probabilities for each strategy, estimated the weights, and evaluated all three
generic strategies using the objective defined in Equation 2.1 in order to understand
the role that overuse penalties, along with disease probabilities of occurrence and test
accuracy parameters, play into determining the best strategy among the three options.
Notably, we found simple conditions involving only the probabilities of disease occur-
rence and the ratio wunderwover that guarantee that administering a specific test leads to a
lower total penalty than administering the other test or no test at all (and administering
antibiotics to all patients).
Viral- versus bacterial-endemic settings: a case study for Thailand
After gaining intuition from analyzing the simplified version of the balancing prob-
lem, we turned to a more realistic setting in order to account for multiple bacterial
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disease scenarios, incorporate test, treatment and other direct and indirect costs, as
well as the effect of delays in seeking care and in test result wait times. We categorized
sources of infections into the following five types based on whether they are bacterial or
viral, and whether they are treatable with doxycycline:
1. Leptospirosis (bacterial, treatable with doxycycline);
2. Scrub typhus (bacterial, treatable with doxycycline);
3. “Other bacterial”, treatable with doxycycline, such as spotted fever group rick-
ettsioses ([139]);
4. Dengue (viral, not treatable with antibiotics); and
5. All other possible causes of infection as a general category of “others” which are
not treatable with doxycycline.
Settings Leptospirosis Scrub typhus Other bacterial Dengue Others
Scenario A (Northern Thailand) 52.80% 4.60% 4.50% 12.20% 26%
Scenario B (Bangkok, Thailand) 6.80% 1.70% 8.50% 67.10% 15.80%
In Scenario A (Northern Thailand), bacterial disease is predominant; in Scenario B (Bangkok, Thailand), viral
disease is predominant. Values obtained from [140].
Table 2.2: Disease Prevalence
We assumed that all cases are malaria negative, which is consistent with current
practices of screening with highly accurate rapid tests for malaria first ([61], [68], [4]).
We selected two contrasting settings in Thailand with varying infection prevalence (Ta-
ble 1): Northern Thailand, where leptospirosis, scrub typhus (bacterial infections) are
more endemic – Scenario A ([140]), and Bangkok, where dengue (viral) is the most
common cause of acute fever – Scenario B ([89]).
The Disease Progression Model
We developed detailed Markov cohort models to capture each febrile disease’s pro-
gression and used the model outcomes to evaluate alternative clinical management
strategies. We modeled a hypothetical cohort of 40-year-old adult patients (age varied
in the sensitivity analysis) with acute but undifferentiated fever since symptom onset
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(first day of illness). We set the time horizon to 45 days since most patients would
be either recovered or deceased by then. We tracked patients’ health states daily. On
each day, patients may recover, progress to severe disease stage or die. We considered
cases when patients present to hospitals on their first, fourth or tenth day of illness,
which captures the minimum, average, and maximum of time for patients presenting
to hospitals seeking care. We simplified the health states for any infection type to four
core states: Mild, Severe, Recovered and Death. The exact daily transition probabilities
depended upon the specific infection etiology, as well as the corresponding treatment
(i.e., with or without antibiotics). We assumed that all Severe patients were imme-
diately hospitalized and assigned to a diagnostic and treatment strategy if it was the
first hospital visit (no prior testing). We also assumed that deaths during the 45-day
time horizon were caused only by severe complications of infections. Details on model
parameterization and calibration can be found in Appendix A.
Diagnostic and Treatment Management Strategies
In the two Thai settings, we evaluated fifteen strategies with different test and treat-
ment options towards febrile disease management (Figure 2.1). Treatment for leptospiro-
sis and scrub typhus was assumed to be a one-week course of antibiotics (commonly
doxycycline). There is no specific treatment for dengue and many other viral infections
with supportive care as standard practice. A positive bacterial test results or a negative
viral test result would generally lead to the prescription of antibiotics. Diagnostic test-
ing considered pathogen-specific rapid diagnostics tests (RDT) and Polymerase Chain
Reaction (PCR) tests for leptospirosis, typhus, and dengue. Although still not widely
available in health care settings, we also considered the use of multiplex nucleic acid
amplification for all three pathogens in a single test (multiplex PCR) ([151], [59]). We
assumed RDT results could be obtained within a day whereas PCR tests take up to two
days. For this reason (and to limit the total number of possible candidate strategies),
we did not include typhus-led testing strategies (i.e., single typhus RDT/PCR). We
assumed all Mild state patients received outpatient care (with or without antibiotics
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prescription), where practices such as follow-up of patients, adequate bed rest and fluid
intake are common. Patients who progressed to Severe state (i.e., demonstrate various
clinical signs in severe febrile illness) were hospitalized. Empirical antibiotic treatment
of Severe patients is the current protocol recommended by the WHO in resource-limited
settings ([41]). In this study, we considered an expanded empirical treatment strategy
that includes treating Mild and Severe patients with antibiotics without any diagnostic
testing. Lastly, we also considered a “No Antibiotics” strategy to monitor natural dis-
ease progression, where no test and no antibiotics were given to patients, but patients
in Severe states were hospitalized. We sketched the patient flow through our model in
Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Test and treat strategies evaluated in the cost-effectiveness analysis for acute
febrile illness.
Each strategy consists of testing options from no testing to testing using: Rapid tests (RDT), polymerase chain
reaction (PCR), and Multiplex PCR for leptospirosis, typhus, and dengue simultaneously, Sequential (S): run
tests in sequence; Parallel (P): run tests simultaneously.
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Figure 2.2: Patient Flow Diagram.
Patients present to the hospital (in either Mild or Severe state) for the first time will be prescribed one of the
strategies (say Strategy X) listed in Table 2. Patients who progressed to the Severe state (i.e., they demonstrate
various clinical signs in severe febrile illness) are assumed to be hospitalized. We assumed that antibiotics would
only be prescribed to patients when all pending test results (if any) were obtained. A positive bacterial test
result or a negative viral test result would generally lead to the prescription of antibiotics, whereas a negative
bacterial test result or a positive viral test result would not.
Outcomes Measured
Outcome measures included: 1) costs and health outcomes: direct and indirect
healthcare costs incurred and health burden (in DALYs, definition and calculation pro-
vided in Appendix A), 2) antibiotics underuse and overuse. For a given strategy, we
tracked the proportion of presenting patients over- and under-treated with antibiotics
(Prob(over) and Prob(under)). To account for antibiotic overuse when evaluating the
strategies, we first considered the three-dimensional outcome space consisting of DALYs,
costs, and Prob(over) instead of the standard two-dimensional outcome space consisting
of only DALYs and costs (details on the methodology for finding a three-dimensional
Pareto frontier are in the next section). Secondly, for each strategy (say Strategy X),
we assigned a penalty per unnecessarily prescribed course of antibiotics (wover), and
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monetize DALYs by assigning a willingness-to-pay (WTP) per DALY averted. DALY
averted is the DALY difference between strategy X and “No Antibiotics”. We define
incremental costs and incremental P(over) similarly. In our main analysis, we set the
WTP value to be Thailand’s GDP per capita in 2016, $5,907.91 USD ([167]). Then for
each strategy, we compute its resulting net monetary benefit (NMB), where
NMB = (DALY s averted)WTP −(incremental costs)−wover(incremental P (over)).
By considering a range of values for willingness-to-pay per DALY averted, and for
penalty per unnecessary course of antibiotics, we quantify the ranges of net monetary
benefit of each strategy, and conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis comparing the different
strategies.
Linear Program to identify 3D Pareto Frontier
In this section, we develop a method to identify whether a given strategy output is on
the three-dimensional Pareto Frontier in terms of DALYs, costs, and antibiotics overuse.
Previous work on cost-effectiveness analyses tends to focus on two-dimensional problems
by considering only the tradeoff between health benefits (i.e., QALYs or DALYs averted)
and costs) ([56]). For our problem, without considering the dimension of “antibiotics
overuse” - a primary focus of our study, Strategy 2 (Empirical to All – initiating antibi-
otics treatments right upon clinical visits) will dominate all other strategies by incurring
the least DALYs and costs. However, when considering the trade-offs in three dimen-
sions – costs, DALYs and antibiotics overuse, different strategies may appear on the
Pareto frontier.
To identify the three-dimensional Pareto frontier, we employ the idea that a given
point (strategy output) is on this frontier if and only if the convex set formulated by
perturbations of this point in one improving direction (i.e., smaller DALYs, costs or
antibiotic overuse) is disjoint from the convex hull determined by the original set of
points (including the point from which the perturbation was obtained).
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We define ej as the unit vector along jth dimension in R3 (i.e. e2 = (0, 1, 0) ).
Let pi,j represent the model output from strategy i along j th dimension (“DALYs”
, “costs” , and “antibiotics overuse” ) and pi be the three-dimensional output. De-
note P as the set of all outputs. We then define the convex hull formulated from
P as Conv (P ) = {
∑n
k=1 αkpk|(∀k : αk ≥ 0) ∧
∑n
k=1 αk = 1, n = |P |} in the “DALYs”,







i ) where q
(j)
i = pi – εej , j = 1, 2, 3: subtract a sufficiently small posi-
tive ε from “DALYs” , “costs” and “antibiotics overuse” dimensions respectively (i.e.,
ε should be much smaller than the minimum pairwise difference in any dimension:
ε < min|pi,j − pi′ ,j |, ∀i, i
′
= 1, . . . , n, j = 1, 2, 3 ). Denote Qi = {q(j)i |j = 1, 2, 3} .We




i |(∀l : βl ≥ 0) ∧
∑3
l=1 βl = 1
}
.
The intuition behind Conv (Qi) is to construct a convex set contains points in the
space that dominates pi in one or more dimensions. By separating hyperplane theo-
rem (see [19]), we know that if two convex sets are disjoint, there exists a hyperplane
G =
{
x ∈ R3 : zTx = z0
}
that separates one set from the other.
We formulate the following feasibility testing linear program to find a separating
hyperplane between Conv (Qi) and Conv (P ) . This hyperplane (defined by decision
variable (z0, z) with z0 ∈ R, z ∈ R3 ), if exists, restricts Conv (P ) to be at one side (i.e.
satisfying the first inequality), and Conv (Qi) at another side (i.e. satisfying the first
inequality) of the hyperplane.
Theorem 2.2.1. Strategy output pi is on the 3-D Pareto Frontier if and only if there
exists (at least) one feasible solution (z0, z) such that a separating hyperplane could be
found, given Conv (P ) and Conv (Qi).
22
Proof. We apply the definition of Pareto optimality from (35), page 177: Given a set of




∩ P = {pi}




can be interpreted as the set of values that are better than or equal to pi . The above
condition states that the only value that is better than or equal to pi should be pi itself.




∩P = {pi} is equivalent to Conv (Qi)∩Conv (P ) =
∅.























/{pi} ∩ Conv (P ) = ∅ and





Conv (Qi) ∩ Conv (P ) = ∅ is true.




/{pi}∩P 6= ∅ . Let
pj be one of the points in the intersection. Since we restricted ε should be smaller than
the minimum pairwise difference in any dimension (i.e., ε < min|pi,j − pi′ ,j |, ∀i, i
′
=
1, . . . , n, j = 1, 2, 3 )), then the line segment λpi + (1− λ) pj , 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 intersect with
Conv (Qi) . Also, λpi + (1− λ) pj ⊂ Conv (P ) (by definition) leads us to Conv (Qi) ∩




/{pi}∩P 6= ∅⇒ Conv (Qi)∩Conv (P ) 6= ∅ , we have




∩ P = {pi}. This completes the proof.
Sensitivity Analysis
We conducted univariate and probabilistic sensitivity analyses where we varied the
disease occurrence probabilities, the delay in patients presenting for care, as well as other
parameter values including the test sensitivities and specificities, test and treatment
costs, health utilities and disease progression parameters.
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2.3 Results
Balancing antibiotic over- and underuse
When minimizing the total weighted penalty of antibiotic under- and overuse (Equa-
tion (1)) in the initial setting where there are only four types of infections and three
treatment strategies (empiric doxycycline to all patients, bacterial test and if positive
administer doxycycline, viral test and if negative administer doxycycline) we found the
following conditions:




, then both the bacterial and the viral test
strategies have a smaller overall penalty than the empiric doxycycline strategy.
Here, pbac+potherbac is the probability of presenting with bacterial disease treatable
with doxycycline, whether or not a test exists for this infection, and wunder/wover
is the ratio of the penalties per patient under/over treated with doxycycline. This
condition states that, when the prevalence of bacterial disease is low, or when the
penalty for overuse of antibiotics is large, using a strategy that tests for either
viral or bacterial disease before prescribing antibiotics is preferred to the strategy
that distributes antibiotic treatment to all patients.
• If wunderwover (pbac + potherbac) ≤ pother, then the strategy administering the bacterial
test incurs a smaller overall penalty than the strategy administering the viral test.
This condition states that, when the probability of presenting with doxycycline-
treatable infection is low, or when the penalty for over-treating is high, then the
bacterial test strategy outperforms the viral test strategy.
• If wunderwover (potherbac) > pother + pviral, then the strategy administering the viral test
leads to a smaller overall penalty than the strategy administering the bacterial
test. This condition states that when the probability of presenting with infections
non-treatable with doxycycline is low, or when the penalty for under-treatment is
high, then the viral test strategy outperforms the bacterial test strategy.
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Numerical Results: Bacterial- versus Viral-endemic settings in Thailand
We now turn to evaluate health outcomes, costs and antibiotic overuse outcomes
in the more realistic bacterial-endemic setting (Scenario A) and viral-endemic setting
(Scenario B) in Thailand. The per-patient costs incurred (in USD), health burden (in
DALY) and antibiotics overuse (Prob(over)), underuse (Prob(under)) for each strategy
are shown in Table 2.3 for patients seeking care on the fourth day of illness (average
day of hospital presentation). Results for patients seeking care on the first, and tenth
day of illness can be found in Appendix A.
We note that, under a standard analysis that considers only the dimensions of health
benefit (DALY averted) and incremental costs, without penalizing antibiotic overuse,
empirical antibiotic treatment to all patients (Strategy 2) always dominated all other
strategies regardless of when patients present for care or which endemic scenario we con-
sider. Empirical antibiotic treatment incurs the lowest cost: $100.6/patient in bacterial-
endemic Scenario A and $108.7/patient in viral-endemic Scenario B when patients delay
in presenting for care to day four of illness. This strategy also incurs the lowest DALYs:
0.9 DALYs/patient in Scenario A and 0.7 DALYs/ patient in Scenario B. If patients
delay in presenting for care to day ten of illness, both costs and DALYs increase (com-
pared to day four), but remain the lowest for Strategy 2: $149.5/patient (Scenario A),
$122.1/patient (Scenario B); 1.7 DALYs/patient in Scenario A, and 0.9 DALYs/patient
in Scenario B. For patients presenting to hospital on the first day of illness, both costs
and DALYs decrease (compared to day four), again still being the lowest for Strategy 2:
$47.5/patient (Scenario A), $94.1/ patient (Scenario B); 0.2 DALYs/patient in Scenario
A, and 0.5 DALYs/patient in Scenario B.
However, Strategy 2 resulted in the highest likelihood of antibiotic overuse per pa-
tient (Scenario A: 38.1%, 19.3%, 7.5% for patients presenting on day one, day four, and
day ten respectively; Scenario B: 82.9%, 42.1%, 16.3% for day one, day four, and day
ten respectively). In the bacterial-endemic Scenario A, Strategy 2 became suboptimal
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Strategies / Scenarios Scenario B: Viral-Endemic Scenario B: Viral-Endemic
Costs DALYs P(over) P(under) Costs DALYs P(over) P(under)
1 No Antibiotics *º 216.166 2.911 0 0.394 138.978 1.258 0 0.109
2 Empirical All *º 100.576 0.964 0.193 0 108.692 0.721 0.421 0
3 Empirical Severe* 137.058 1.44 0.055 0.248 118.573 0.851 0.119 0.068
4 Dengue RDT 137.329 1.546 0.102 0.085 119.048 0.881 0.144 0.023
5 Dengue PCR *º 122.947 1.254 0.102 0 116.484 0.801 0.095 0
6 Lepto RDT *º 160.5 1.94 0.003 0.163 133.291 1.127 0.007 0.072
7 Lepto PCR * 148.763 1.696 0.007 0.086 133.176 1.089 0.015 0.056
8 S: Lepto RDT, typhus
RDT º
155.767 1.859 0.006 0.28 131.57 1.097 0.012 0.125
9 S: Lepto PCR, typhus
RDT *º
152.117 1.627 0.009 0.143 138.125 1.063 0.019 0.096
10 S: Lepto RDT, typhus
PCRº
152.708 1.844 0.008 0.254 129.575 1.092 0.016 0.113
11 P: Lepto PCR, typhus
PCR
165.897 1.581 0.014 0.063 154.246 1.04 0.03 0.046
12 P: Lepto RDT, typhus
RDT
163.842 1.838 0.007 0.143 140.368 1.089 0.014 0.064
13 P: Lepto PCR, typhus
RDT
159.399 1.612 0.01 0.069 146.815 1.055 0.021 0.049
14 P: Lepto RDT, typhus
PCR
175.228 1.881 0.01 0.121 148.564 1.085 0.021 0.055
15 Multiplex PCR*º 184.539 1.524 0.007 0.052 176.346 1.042 0.015 0.047
Table 2.3: Strategy outcomes: patients seeking care on the fourth day of illness
For each scenario, we identified the strategies that were on the three-dimensional effectiveness frontier, where the
three dimensions are DALY, cost and antibiotic overuse. * = strategies on the cost-effectiveness frontier (econom-
ically efficient) for Scenario A (bacterial-endemic); º = strategies on the cost-effectiveness frontier (economically
efficient) for Scenario B (viral-endemic).
for net monetary benefit (with WTP = Thailand GDP per capita) when the antibi-
otic overuse penalty was larger than $12,800/course, $18,400/course, $23,900/course
for patients presenting on day one, day four, and day ten respectively. In the viral-
endemic Scenario B, Strategy 2 became suboptimal when the antibiotic overuse penalty
was larger than $1,100/course, $1,500/course, $1,600/course for patients presenting on
day one, day four, and day ten respectively. The effectiveness of the current protocol
recommended by WHO guidelines (Strategy 3, empirical antibiotic treatment to only
severe patients) was sensitive to the disease probability distribution: Strategy 3 was on
the three-dimensional effectiveness frontier only in Scenario B for day one, and in Sce-
nario A for day four. Compared to Scenario A, we observed that single test strategies
(Dengue PCR, and Lepto RDT) had the highest NMB for a much wider range of WTP
and penalty values in Scenario B than in Scenario A. These findings were consistent
with our analytical results: testing strategies are more likely to be optimal when the
probability of presenting with antibiotic-treatable disease is smaller. Multiplex PCR
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test (Strategy 15), with sensitivities >= 90% for each disease component, dominated
other strategies for penalty >= $13,000/course in both settings when the WTP per
DALY averted is set to Thailand’s GDP per capita. More importantly, when we set the
penalty (wover) and the WTP to Thailand’s GDP per capita, we found that empirical
antibiotic treatment (Strategy 2) was only cost-effective in Scenario A (not in Scenario
B), which is consistent with the analytical results (details in Appendix A).
Figure 2.3 shows the optimal policy (with highest NMB) at varying values of WTP
on the y-axis and antibiotic overuse penalty on the x-axis, for patients presenting on
day one of illness (Figure 2.3a), fourth day of illness (Figure 2.3b) and tenth day of
illness (Figure 2.3c). For Bacterial-endemic Scenario A on day four, we did not show
the cost-effectiveness region for Strategy 3 since it is only cost-effective for a tiny region
around the left corner. Policies with highest NMB for patients presenting on the fourth
day of illness are similar to those for patients presenting on the (Figures 2.3a and 2.3b).
RDT-led strategies had higher NMB when patients presented on the tenth day of illness
(Figure 2.3c).
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(a) Presenting on first day of illness
(b) Presenting on fourth day of illness
(c) Presenting on tenth day of illness
Figure 2.3: Optimal Policies with highest NMB
Sensitivity Analysis
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The general structure of the optimal strategy sequence did not change when consid-
ering two additional disease probability distribution scenarios in Thailand, and conclu-
sions remained consistent with the analytical and numerical results: first, test strategies
were more likely to be cost-effective with a lower prevalence of bacterial diseases, and
higher penalty (wover). Second, RDT-led strategies stood out for patients presented on
the tenth day of illness. Third, patients are always encouraged to present early to avoid
worsened health outcomes.
We performed one-way sensitivity analysis for all other variables, where we fixed
the disease occurrence probabilities to the ones in Scenario A, and assumed patient
present on day one. We found that the empirical antibiotic treatment strategy has the
highest NMB, or equivalently, gives smaller ICER compared to Multiplex PCR (Figure
A.2) with younger patient age, lower leptospirosis-component sensitivity, higher disease-
specific mortality rate, and longer test wait time. The remaining parameters like test
and health costs, disability weights were not sensitive to variation.
Lastly, we conducted a probabilistic sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simula-
tion (details in Appendix A). Our analyses indicate that when the penalty on antibiotics
overuse is between $0 to $15,000/course, empirical treatment is most likely to be cost-
effective, while strategies with single dengue tests (Strategy 5 Dengue PCR and Strategy
4 Dengue RDT) could be alternatives to reduce antibiotics overuse. Another key ob-
servation is that PCR-led strategies (Strategy 15 with at most 40% chance, Strategy
11 with at most 30% chance) had a much higher chance of being cost-effective than
RDT-led strategies even when patients’ delays (0 – 10 days) in seeking care and test
wait times (0 – 3 days) were randomly sampled, suggesting that PCR-led strategies are
more robust under parameter uncertainty.
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2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Febrile illness presenting similar symptoms has become a pressing public health
problem worldwide. Empirical antibiotics administration without testing is the most
cost-effective clinical management strategy if antibiotics overuse is not a concern. How-
ever, antibiotics misuse/overuse has become a significant health issue all over the world,
and has been identified as the critical driver for antibiotics resistance ([131], [9], [150]).
In this paper, we proposed a simple framework to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
different clinical management strategies to balance antibiotics overuse and underuse.
Our analysis suggests that empirical antibiotics treatment will always be the best strat-
egy when antibiotic use reduction is not a concern. However, as the priority of reducing
antibiotic overuse increases, strategies with tests stand out. Our three-dimensional
cost-effectiveness analysis with case studies in Thailand has confirmed that disease
prevalence, test sensitivity and specificity are highly influential to the choice of op-
timal strategy. By varying patients’ delay in seeking care, we conclude that patients
should be encouraged to present to hospital in the earlier stage of disease (i.e., first a
few days of illness) to avoid worsened health outcomes.
In addition to disease prevalence and test parameters, sensitivity analysis shows
that the choice of the optimal strategy was also sensitive to cohort age, the amount of
resources available (WTP) and the level of importance of antibiotics reduction (overuse
penalty) in the respective setting. In all cases, empirical antibiotics administration was
the most cost-effective strategy when antibiotics overuse is not a concern. However,
strategies involving diagnostic tests (i.e., multiplex PCR tests) produced higher net
monetary benefit than the empirical treatment strategy once the decision makers started
penalizing antibiotics overuse.
In both bacterial-endemic Scenario A (Northern Thailand) and viral-endemic Sce-
nario B (Bangkok), for patients referred to hospitals on their first day of illness, we
found that PCR-led strategies are more likely to be on the cost-effectiveness frontier
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rather than RDT-led strategies. This is because that test sensitivities of PCR tests are
higher than RDT tests when patients present to hospitals early (see Appendix Table
A.1). However, if patients presented to hospitals in the later stage of diseases (i.e., >=
fifth day of illness) RDT-led strategies perform better. Nevertheless, when all param-
eters were varied simultaneously (probabilistic sensitivity analysis), PCR-led strategies
are more likely to be cost-effective than RDT-led strategies. This suggests that PCR-led
strategies such as prescribing multiplex PCR, or parallel test of leptospirosis and scrub
typhus are relatively robust under parameter uncertainty.
Our analysis has several limitations. First, we assumed that the underlying disease
probabilities are known to policy makers. In practice, it might be difficult for clinicians
to estimate the true underlying prevalence of competing source of infections. Second,
we did not model the transmission of diseases, as the focus of this present study was
to address the critical questions of what diagnostic test to use and when to administer
antibiotics to already infected patients. However, the optimal strategy structure remains
the same through various sensitivity analyses performed.
Our study can better inform clinical decisions about when to administer antibiotics
and which diagnostic tests to apply for undifferentiated febrile patients. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a decision-making framework balancing
antibiotic overuse and underuse in order to optimize the choice of clinical management
strategy. Besides, our disease progression model captures essential features such as
multiple competing causes of infections, patients’ delays in seeking care and the illness-
stage-dependent accuracy (of diagnostic tests). Our analysis highlights the importance
of diagnostic tests in helping reducing antibiotics usage in the clinical management of
febrile illnesses, although the choice of strategy depends on the disease distribution and
diagnostic test parameters (sensitivity, specificity).
Chapter 3
Monitoring Policy Optimization
for HIV patients with
Heterogeneous Adherence Types
3.1 Introduction
Over the last a few decades, a trend of increasing total expenditure in healthcare has
been witnessed worldwide [46], the cost associated with wasteful, inefficient healthcare
delivery has risen sharply in the meantime [112]. Estimates of hospitalization costs
due to medication nonadherence are as high as $13.35 billion annually, in the U.S.
alone [92]. The uncertainty in patient adherence to medication regimens for chronic
conditions results in wasted medical resources, a higher chance of treatment failure on
designated therapies and worsened health benefit of patients [129].
In the context of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) management, antiretroviral
therapy (ART), which aims at suppressing viral load in patient body, is recommended
worldwide. In order to be effective, ART regimens require 70 - 90% adherence from
patients [103]. However, current estimates of ART treatment adherence varies from
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a mean of 55% to 75% in different studies [169, 80, 30]). For HIV-infected (HIV+)
patients on ART treatment, viral load (henceforth VL) monitoring is recommended by
the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline [166]. Timely detection of virologic
failure (i.e., failure to suppress HIV VL in the patient body) can help improve patient
health outcomes and reduce the chance of HIV transmission by switching to a to a
second-line ART. However, frequent clinical visits, VL tests are often prohibitive due to
its high cost [75], especially in low-resource settings.
The fundamental trade-off in this context is to balance “over-monitoring” and “under-
monitoring” of HIV-infected patients. Frequent monitoring might incur a higher healthcare-
related cost but ensures patients are in the preferred health states (i.e., virally sup-
pressed), however, it might be too costly for patients in low-resource settings. On the
other hand, infrequent check-up might incur fewer VL test costs, but patients might
spend longer time in unfavorable health states, and transmit HIV virus to potentially
more people.
Previous literature has shown that patient adherence differs from each other in
different chronic disease contexts [12, 137]. Thus, one might expect HIV patient to hav
heterogeneity effect in adherence behavior. If this is the case, one-size-fits-all monitoring
policies might not be optimal. Although adaptive, and personalized care using VL test
has been studied in the literature [118, 106], the extent to which monitoring policies that
differentiating patient adherence type that might be cost-effective remains unknown.
The preceding discussions give rise to a few important research questions in HIV
management: First, how the decision maker could optimize monitoring policies utilizing
a patient adherence information up to date? More importantly, would the optimized
monitoring policy outperform the status quo?
Our work could be viewed as a one key step further toward answering these ques-
tions. We first formulate a stylized HIV disease progression model, and used the model
to identify optimal monitoring interval. We derive theoretical results and structural
properties of the optimization model. We provide an equation where the exact optimal
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policy can be directly computed. We also present extensions of the base model which
captures a unique, important feature of HIV disease: opportunistic infections. Second,
we present a case study using representative data [106] for Uganda (an African county
with GDP per capita at $615 USD in 2016 [167]). We numerically proved that the
optimized policies are all on the cost-effectiveness frontier, and in certain circumstances
dominates the fixed policies.
Our contributions in this work are threefold. First, we provide policy-relevant struc-
tural properties of the stochastic model that allow our framework to be useful in contexts
of the particular application of HIV management. Our analyses lead to theoretical guar-
antees which allow us to interpret the model and derive optimal monitoring interval for
any patient demographic distribution. Second, we validate our approach with a rep-
resentative numerical study using Uganda’s HIV patient profile. Our study can help
make better monitoring decisions to improve patients outcome, save costs, and reduce
transmission in the presence of heterogeneous adherence behavior.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We present the base model in
Section 3.2, Then, we performed structural analysis on the base model, and provide the
equation to compute the exact optimal solution in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we extend
the base model to incorporate opportunistic infections, and discuss the relationship
among all models introduced in this work. In Section 3.5, we present a case study with
a benchmark in Uganda, where the societal resources are limited. We conclude our
study in Section 3.6.
3.1.1 Literature Review
There is a rich literature on adapting Markov Decision Processing modeling frame-
works to optimize for better informed medical decisions. For example, [11] used a
POMDP to personalized mammography screening decisions for breast cancer patients;
[136] proposed a POMDP model to find the optimal timing of drug sensitivity testing
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for patients on first-line tuberculosis treatment. In terms HIV applications, [132] ap-
plied an MDP model framework to decide the optimal time to initiate HIV treatments.
However, none of these studies have addressed the impact of disease transmission in
monitoring policy optimization in chronic disease management. There is also a line of
work addressing patient heterogeneity in different context into the medical decision-
making framework. For example, [107] considered patient heterogeneity in treatment
effectiveness in treating chronic diseases like multiple sclerosis. [13] and [137] consid-
ered patient heterogeneity in screening and treatment adherence accordingly. Our study
shares similarity to the aforementioned studies. Nevertheless, most studies defined de-
fined “non-adherence” as non-compliance (i.e., losses of follow-ups), where we address
the partial non-adherence of missing pills, but not completely losses of follow-ups.
3.2 Model framework
We formulate a discrete time, infinite horizon stochastic model on decision epoch
t = 1, 2, · · · ,∞, to capture HIV disease progression on (first-line) ART, in which a single
decision maker (henceforth DM) (e.g., a physician) is aiming at maximizing the total
discounted expected patients’ health benefit by making decisions on the optimal time
interval (denoted by N) to perform HIV VL test at each decision epoch. We do not
consider optimizing monitoring intervals for patients on second-line ART since detection
of virologic failure could not help further improve patient health outcome. We assume
patient adherence behavior is heterogeneous: the probability of being adherent (denoted
by θ) at each month is patient-specific. We prove the exact distribution, existence and
significance of considering patient adherence heterogeneity in Section B.2.
We assume the patient adherence type is fully revealed to the DM prior to treatment
initiation, and the frequency of clinical visits does not affect patient adherence behavior.
We also simplify the health state space to track only the viral load status (i.e., whether
the patient is virally suppressed, or in virologic failure). CD4 cell count is another an
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important biomarker that indicates HIV patients health states. In Appendix Section
B.2, we discuss the reason why we selected viral load as our health state instead of CD4
cell count.
At time t, if the patient has a VL test, and VL failure is detected, he or she would
switch to a second-line regimen and quit the decision process by receiving a termi-
nal reward (denote by R). Otherwise, the patient continues the decision process if
virologic failure was not detected. In addition, we estimate the number of secondary
infections/transmissions at each month based on the patient’s health state (patients
in virologic failure have a much higher chance of transmitting HIV to others). We
summarize the notations used in the model as follow:
• Time: t ∈ T = {0, 1, 2, ...,∞}, discretized in month.
• Decision times: k = 0, 1, 2, .., N . We assume that the k-th screening and monitor-
ing decisions are made at the time tk. We define t0 = 0.
• Action Nk ∈ N = {1, 2, ...,∞}: ak represents the decision on the VL monitoring
interval (i.e., time for the clinical visit, tk+1 = tk +Nk+1)
• Adherence state At ∈ A: Patients could either be adherent (A+) or non-adherent
(A−) at each month. Adherence state At will be revealed to DM if there is a
clinical visit at month t. The probability of being adherent is determined by the
patient-specific adherence type θ: P (A+|θ) = θ. We assume θ is fixed and given.
• Core Health States: Xt ∈ S = {s1 : virally suppressed; s2 : virologic failure; s3 :
dead} . Upon failure detection (in state s2 and performed VL test), the patient
will be switched to a second-line regimen. Death (s3) is an absorbing state. Living
states {s1, s2} are observable during clinical check-ups visits by performing a VL
test, and not observable in between monitoring intervals.
• P (Xt+1|Xt, At): health state transition probability. The probability that a patient
will be in state s′ ∈ S at time t+1, given that he or she was in state s at time t and
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his or her adherence state At. Denote the transition probability matrix (TPM)





We have p11,A+ > p11,A−, and p12,A+ < p12,A−. That is to say, the monthly
probability of virologic failure is higher for a non-adherent patient. We let P(θ)
represent the expected TPM given adherence type θ, which is computed as P(θ) =
θPt(A+)+(1−θ)Pt(A−). We denote the space of all possible transition probability
matrices as P.
• et ∈ {0, 1} = E : At any month t, an HIV-infected patient could induce secondary
infections (i.e., et = 1) or no transmission (i.e., et = 0). Even though we do
not tend to explicitly model HIV transmission in our framework, we estimate the
number of secondary infection given patient health status at each month [122,
164]1. We denote P (et = 1|Xt), for Xt ∈ {s1, s2} as the probability of having a
secondary infection at time t, conditioning on the patient’s health state.
• rewards space R, which contains all possible rewards and costs including monthly
rewards, VL test cost, and the terminal reward.
– r(Xt, et): reward between time t to t+ 1, given patient health state Xt, and
et ∈ E .
– r(Xt): expected reward gained between time t to t+ 1, given patient health
state Xt. We have r(Xt) =
∑
e∈{0,1} r(Xt, et)P (et|s).
– VL test cost : c > 0
– R: terminal reward received upon failure detection (estimated cumulative
1We recognize that theoretically, e can be large than 1 (i.e., more than one secondary infections per
month). However, as we will see in Section 3.5, e is generally less than one in reality.
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rewards when a patient switched to a second-line regimen). Without loss of
generality, we assume R is non-negative.
• (monthly) discount factor: 0 < δ < 1
We use the tuple (T ,N ,A,S,P, E ,R) to summarize the parameters used in the
stochastic model. We write infinite state sequence as X = {X0, X1, X2, ...} and action
sequence as N = {N1, N2, ...},then, the Decision Maker (DM)’s goal is to find an action
sequence N such that the total expected discounted rewards EP r(X,N) is maximized:












In Equation (3.1), P is the transition probability matrix (which determines the state
sequence X), and N is the controllable action sequence such that tk+1 = tk +Nk+1.
3.3 Model Analysis
We first provide an overview of this section. In this section, we first rewrite the
objective (Equation 3.1) in a recursive manner, and provide structural analyses including
the quasi-concavity of the objective function (Theorem 3.3.1), and structure of the
optimal policy (Proposition 1). In particular, the optimal policy can be derived by
solving a simple exponent equation (Equation B.8 in Theorem 3.3.1). The analysis
requires a few mild assumptions to hold, including the relative order among the event
probabilities, and rewards (Assumption 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3). In addition, we assume
the state transition probabilities have the “increasing failure rate” property (which is
equivalent to totally positive of order 2 for finite, discrete state transition matrix, see
Definition B.1.1): patients in “better” health states have a higher probability of moving
to any particular health state or better (Definition B.1.1, and Lemma B.1.3). To simplify
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notation in our proofs, we suppress the parameter θ whenever possible (since in our non-
learning model, it is assumed to be known). We defer the some of the auxiliary lemmas,
propositions, and definition details, and all proofs in Appendix Section B.1.










where r(Xtk ,Nk) is the reward mapping function given the truncated state sequence
starting from Xtk Xtk = {Xtk , Xtk+1, ...} and the truncated action sequence Nk =
{Nk+1, Nk+2, ...}. Given any state and action sequence Xtk and Nk, one can construct
a recursive expression of total expected rewards using Equation (3.2). The recursive
formula can be applied to any of the health states defined earlier. Nevertheless, by the
model assumption, virologic failure will be detected during clinical visits, by performing
VL test (and thus switched to a second-line regimen).. That is, in reality, the patient
cannot start with state s2 (virologic failure). Death (s3) on the other hand, is directly
observable at beginning of each time t. Since the time horizon is infinite, we focus on
finding stationary policies {Nk = N}k≥1 for some N (such that tk+1 = tk + N , for all
k = 0, 1, 2, ...) that maximizes the objective (Equation 3.1). Also, we can always reset
the beginning of time to t = 0 in the infinite time horizon case. Given Equation 3.2, we












We can further express the objective in Equation 3.3 as follow using Lemma B.1.2:




































+ δNPN12(θ)R− δNc(PN11(θ) + PN12(θ))
1− δNPN11(θ)
(3.4)
The first equality follows by moving the expectation operator into the bracket, and
Lemma B.1.2. The second equality follows by moving Er(X, N) to the left-hand side.
Before we proceed to the formal analysis of the optimal solution, we first make a
few mild assumption and the orders of rewards, event probabilities.
Assumption 3.3.1. Relative orders among rewards and probabilities.
• ∀e ∈ E , r(s1, e) > r(s2, e) and r(s3, e) = 0;
• ∀s ∈ {s1, s2}, r(s, e = 0) > r(s, e = 1) and P (e = 1|s1) < P (e = 1|s2).
• p13 < p23.
The first point of Assumption 3.3.1 states that given the same event, patients in a
healthier state (i.e., virally suppressed) should always receive higher one-time reward per
month. Patients in state s3 (dead) receive zero health benefit. The second statement
means that one-month reward is larger with less severe for any given state s, and
the probability of “bad” events happening is smaller for healthier patients. The last
point of Assumption 3.3.1 states that the probability of death is smaller for healthier
patients. Using Assumption 3.3.1, and the definition of periodic reward rt(s), we have
the following lemma, stating that the expected period reward is higher if the patient is
virally suppressed.
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Lemma 3.3.1. rt(s1) ≥ rt(s2).
Assumption 3.3.2. r(s1)1−δ ≥ R− c ≥
r(s2)
1−δ .
Assumption 3.3.2 states that if possible to stay as virally suppressed, then it is better
for a patient to stay in state s1 up to time infinity (but at with a monthly discount rate
δ), rather than perform a VL test and receive the terminal reward. Similarly, the second
part of Assumption 3.3.2 states that it is better for a patient to perform the VL test,
and receive the terminal reward rather than staying in virologic failure forever. Next,
we would like to investigate the structural properties of the objective function (i.e.,
quasi-concavity, and monotonicity in terms of θ).
Corollary 3.3.1. Properties of the TPM.
1. Pt(θ) is TP2, for any t ≥ 0.
2. Let p11 = θp11,A+ +(1−θ)p11,A− and p12 = θp12,A+ +(1−θ)p12,A− (we suppressed


















0 pt22 1− pt22
0 0 1

Corollary 3.3.1 implies that sick patients has a greater chance of moving to a sicker
state (i.e., patients in state s2 has a higher chance of death than patients in state s1.
In addition, Corollary 3.3.1 also provided an explicit expression for the t-step TPM.
For notational convenience, denote q11 = δp11, q12 = δp12, and q22 = δp22, and denote
V (N) = Er(X, N) as the expected reward gained for monitoring a patient every N time.
We then try to refine our objective equation 3.4 to make it more explicit. We express
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The first equality follows from Corollary 3.3.1, the second equality follows by doing a
change-of-variable representation using q’s to replace δ and p’s, and summing up the
periodic reward terms.
To further analyze the structure of the objective in Equation (3.5), we first relax the
feasible region of the decision varaible N . Instead of N ∈ R+, we now assume we first
construct a relaxation of V (N), such that the decision variable N ∈ R+ instead of Z+.
It is a relaxation because we kept the same objective function, but enlarged the feasible





> (p12 + p22 − p11)c.
Assumption 3.3.3 states that the “expected” reward gained from failure (i.e., the
LHS) should be larger than the “expected” cost spent for detecting failure (i.e., the
RHS). We also verified in the Numerical Study (Section 3.5) that our condition is
satisfied using Uganda demographic information.
In the following theorem, we proof that V (N) is quasi-concave if N ∈ R+. This is
one of the key theoretical results that guarantees the existence of one unique optimal
solution.
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Theorem 3.3.1. Let Assumptions 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 hold. Then, V (N) is quasi-
concave in N if N ∈ R+.
The next proposition presents comparatives static analysis of the optimal monitoring
interval N∗, solved from Equation 3.4.
Proposition 1. Let all premises in Section 3.3 hold. Then, the following properties of
the optimal monitoring interval N∗ hold.
(a) as patients become more adherent (i.e., θ increases), N∗ increases.
(b) as the failure rate increases (i.e., q11 increases), N
∗ decreases.
(c) as the terminal reward increases (i.e., R increases), N∗ decreases.
3.4 Extension: incorporating Opportunistic Infections
Opportunistic Infections is one of the HIV-specific events that could happen to pa-
tients. Pathogens (bacteria, viruses and fungi) take advantage of the weakened immune
systems of HIV patients, and may develop serious complications. Current practice as-
sumed that patient will present to the clinic, and been prescribing for HIV VL test
([106]). This clinic self-referral process may render the disease progression model with-
out OI inaccurate. Moreover, we would like to construct a mathematical model that
could measure the performance status quo: Is VL test necessary if the doctor observes
OI? Should patient switch to an alternative ART regimen if OI was observed? With
these questions in mind, we reformulate the same problem as a semi-Markov decision
process (SMDP) in Section 3.4.1. An SMDP formulation is appropriate in this setting
because the transition probability matrix is naturally adapted to a discrete-time Markov
chain, and our decision variable is the time interval for VL monitoring. The base model
(presented in the main report) can be equivalently formulated as a simpler SMDP. To
further characterize the optimal policy structure, we reformulated the SMDP into a
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) in Section 3.4.2. We discuss
the relationship among different models in Section 3.4.3.
43
3.4.1 SMDP formulation
The action space, time, decision epoch is the same as in the base model. In addition
the the health state space defined in Section 3.2, we consider an observation space as fol-
low: at a particular time (month) t, depending on his/her true health state, the patient
may experience an OI, and have self-referral to clinics, looking for the corresponding
treatments for any specific OIs (but no immediate VL test prescribed). The OI ob-
servation might reveal valuable information to the decision maker on the probability of
patients true health states. At time t, if the patient has a VL test, and virologic failure
is detected, his or her true health state will be updated.
In addition to nations, and model parameters (reward space, action space, state
space) defined in Section 3.2, we summarize the new notations for the observation space
as follow:
• o ∈ {OI,OI} ≡ O: Opportunistic Infection is a special event associated with HIV
patients. We let OI represent the compliment of OI, (i.e., no OI). We assume
when OI happens, patients will show up to the clinic to for the corresponding OI
treatment (but no immediate VL test). We denote by P (o = OI|s), for s ∈ {s1, s2}
as the probability that an opportunistic infection happens at time t, conditioning
on the patient’s health state. We assume that P (OI|s1) < P (OI|s2). For notation
consistency, we define P (OI|s3) = 1 and P (OI|s3) = 0 although no observation is
made in state s3.
• State Evolution: we define the health state and observation pair (s, o), ∀(s, o) ∈
(S ×O) as the augmented “state”. We order the states in the following manner:
(s1, OI)  (s1, OI)  (s2, OI)  (s2, OI)  (s3, OI)  (s3, OI), (3.6)
where we call (s1, OI) the “best” health state, and (s3, OI) the “worst” health state.
Here, we abuse the notation for the death state (s3) since dead patients could not
44
make actions. We did this for national consistency, and for further structural property
development.The corresponding state distribution at time t, denoted by πt, belongs to
the following 5-dimensional unit simplex:
{πt ∈ R6 : 1Tπt = 1, 0 ≤ πt(i) ≤ 1, i ∈ S},
where πt(i) is the probability of being in state i ∈ (S × O) at time t. Note that the
transition between observations are independent among the transition among health
states. We then construct the transition probability matrix Q (for a given adherence
type θ) as:

p11,θP (OI|s1) p11,θP (OI|s1) p12,θP (OI|s1) p12,θP (OI|s1) p13P (OI|s1) p13P (OI|s1)
p11,θP (OI|s1) p11,θP (OI|s1) p12,θP (OI|s1) p12,θP (OI|s1) p13P (OI|s1) p13P (OI|s1)
0 0 p22P (OI|s2) p22P (OI|s2) p23P (OI|s2) p23P (OI|s2)
0 0 p22P (OI|s2) p22P (OI|s2) p23P (OI|s2) p23P (OI|s2)
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1

(3.7)
Similarly, we can define a t-step transition probability matrix Qt, and denote Qt(j|i)
as the t-step transition probability from state i to state j. We then update our state
distribution as πt+1 = (πt)
TQ. Similarly, we revise the monthly expected reward r(s)
defined in Section 3.2 to incorporate the observation o: we define r(s, o) as the monthly
expected reward gained given a patient current health state s, which is calculated as
rt(s, o) =
∑
e∈E rt(s, e, o)Pt(e|s). Moreover, we can easily show that the enhanced TPM
is of TP2, which is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4.1. The augmented transition probability matrix Q is TP2.
We use the tuple (N ,O,A,S,P, E ,R) to summarize the parameters used in the
stochastic model. Now, let V (s, o) denote the optimal value function for patients in
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state (s, o), and let v(s,o)(N) denote the total expected rewards when a patient starts in
state (s, o), waits for N periods/months for next VL monitoring, and adopts an optimal
policy afterwards. We express v(s,o)(N) as







V (s′, o′), (3.8)




0 if N = 0,






pr(s′,o′)(N − 1) otherwise
(3.9)
Then, the optimal value function obeys the following optimality equation:
V (s, o) = max{ max
1≤N≤∞
v(s,o)(N), 1s 6=s3(R− c)}, (3.10)
which says that the optimal action is either to wait for N months, or to switch to a
second-line regimen and receive a terminal reward (i.e., quit the decision process). We
note that only living patients could select the second option. Patients who are dead
will receive zero terminal reward if he/she “decided” (in reality, dead patients cannot
make any decisions) to terminate the process. Before we proceed to the statement
of the optimal reward function and its structural analysis, we provide the following
assumptions (on the relative order of rewards), that will be used in the proof of analytical
properties of the model.
Assumption 3.4.1. Relative order among rewards:
• ∀e ∈ E and o ∈ O, r(s1, o, e) > r(s2, o, e) > r(s3, o, e), and r(s3, o, e) < 0
• ∀s ∈ {s1, s2}, r(s,OI, e∅) > r(s,OI, e∅) > r(s,OI, eSI) > r(s,OI, eSI)
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• r(s1, OI) ≥ r(s2, OI), and
∑
o r(s1,o)P (o|s1)




The first point in Assumption 3.4.1 states that given the same event and observation,
patients in a healthier state (i.e., not in failure) should always receive higher one-time
reward per month. Moreover, we assume that dead patients receive negative monthly
rewards if they are still on the decision process. Although No more decisions can be
made for dead patients, we make this assumption to facilitate our analysis. The second
point in Assumption 3.4.1 says that one-month reward is larger with less severe (or no)
events or observations for any given health state s. The last assumption was a stronger
condition, which tries to order the enhanced state (s, o) such that even when a healthier
patient (in s1) is having an OI, the expected rewards is still better than a failure patient
(in s2) not having OI. As we numerically proved in [106], both the negative impact
and severity of an HIV transmission (i.e., SI) is higher than an opportunistic infection
(OI). The second part states that, if possible, being virally suppressed forever, is better,
rather than perform a VL test and receive the terminal reward. Similarly, we assume
that it is better for a patient to perform the VL test, and receive the terminal reward
rather than being in virologic failure forever. We assume that R− c is non-negative.
In the next Lemma and Proposition, we prove that periodic reward pr(s,o)(N), opti-
mal value function V (S, 0) are decreasing as the health state (s, o) deteriorates. In the
meantime, both pr(s,o)(N) and V (S, 0) are higher for adherent patients.
Lemma 3.4.2. For any given time period N , we have the following properties of the
periodic reward pr(s,o)(N):
• pr(s,o)(N) is decreasing in (s, o) (i.e., the periodic reward decreases when started
from a “worse” state)
• pr(s,o)(N) is increasing in θ (i.e., as patients becomes more adherent, the periodic
reward increases).
Proposition 2. The optimal value function V (s, o) satisfies the following two proper-
ties:
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• V (s, o) is decreasing in (s, o).
• V (s, o) is increasing in θ for a given state (s, o).
From this lemma, we having the following theorem on the structure of the optimal
monitoring interval:
Theorem 3.4.1. There exists an optimal policy in the following form (for a fixed, but
unknown threshold state K):

N∗(s, o) for (s, o)  K,
0 for (s, o)  K,
and N∗(s, o) is decreasing in
(s, o). Further, K  (s2, OI)
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. The proof is straightforward given Lemma B.1.5 and B.1.6.
Theorem 3.4.1 implies an order of the optimal monitoring policies for all states: as
the health state deteriorates, the optimal monitoring interval becomes smaller; once the
patient was identified in failure (regardless of whether OI was observed), they should be
switched to a second-line regimen immediately. However, Theorem 3.4.1 does not fully
answer the question of whether an OI observation in the healthy state (state s1) would
trigger an immediate VL monitoring. Theorem 3.4.1 states that, if OI was observed,
the monitoring interval should be smaller than not observing OI. To characterize the
optimal policy more precisely, We reformulate the problem as a POMDP in the next
Section.
3.4.2 POMDP reformulation
We reformulate the problem as an infinite-horizon, partially observable Markov de-
cision process. In this section, we assume patient adherence type θ is given. We omit
θ whenever possible for notational clarity. We summarize our POMDP as a tuple
(N ,O,A,S,P, E ,R) defined similarly in the SMDP model. The key differences are:
48
first, instead of determining monitoring interval, the action set in the POMDP formula-
tion is binary at each month: N = {Wait, Peform VL test}. Also, instead of augment-
ing the health state space with the observation space, we treat them separately. Recall
that we defined the observation space in Section 3.4.1 as o ∈ {OI,OI} ≡ O and the
probability matrix PO has the dimension as the state transition probability matrixp:
|S|×|S|.
Then, we express the state distribution to a two-dimensional unit simplex (we omit-
ted time t for clarity):
{ß ∈ R3 : 1Tπ = 1, 0 ≤ π(i) ≤ 1, i ∈ S},
where πt(i) is the probability of being in state i ∈ S at time t. Since death state s3














If the patient was alive, and performed VL test at current month, the updated belief
is: [1, 0, 0]T if in state s1; [0, 1, 0]
T if in state s2. At any time t, if the patient died, the
updated belief for observing death is [0, 0, 1]T , if the patient was not prescribed with
VL test (and alive) at time t, we compute the updated belief vector as TPAPo, given
adherence measurement A, and observation o. Similarly, we could compute the updated
belief vector conditioning on the patient’s adherence type θ as πt+1|A, o = Tt PθPo.
To get the updated belief πt+1, we normalize the updated belief vector using Bayes
rules. If the physician was given a prior πt, adherence measurement A ∈ {A+, A−} and
observation o ∈ {OI,OI}, the updated belief is given by
′(j)| o, A =
∑





j |si, A)P (o|si)
(3.12)
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Similarly, given a patient adherence type θ, we express the updated belief as
′(j)| o, θ =
∑





j |si, θ)P (o|si)
(3.13)
We have the following Corollary which states that the updated belief of being in virally
suppressed in higher if no OI was observed.
Corollary 3.4.1. ′(1)| OI, θ ≥ ′(1)| OI, θ
We let V ∗(π) denote the value function that gives the optimal rewards when the
patient is in health belief state πt (and adherence type θ). The decision maker is
trying to find the optimal action N∗(π) (a function of belief state π) to maximize
the discounted total reward, which is represented as a recursive optimality equation
as V ∗(π) = max {V w(π), V v(π))} ,where V w(π), V v(π) represents the optimal rewards


































P (s′|s,A)P (A|θ)P (o|s)
}
(3.14)
Since the belief distribution is a truncated two-dimensional simplex, we can further
simplify our state to only track the probability of being in state s1. In the following
lemma, we show that we can simplify the Equations 3.14 by tracking only state s1 and
applying the total expectation formula over θ (V1 ≡ V ([1, 0, 0]T )).
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P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)
}
(3.15)
Next, we show that our optimal policy follows a control-limit rule.
Theorem 3.4.2. For two belief vector π1 and π2 such that π1(1) ≥ π2(1) (i.e., π1 ≤r π2





























(a) If N∗(π1) = Monitor, then N
∗(π2) = Monitor,
(b) If N∗(π2) = Wait, then N
∗(π1) = Wait.
From Theorem 3.4.2 we know that the optimal policy is a threshold-type policy. We
could further compare the frequency of monitoring using the following corollary:
Corollary 3.4.2. Let the primitives in Theorem 3.4.2 hold. Then, Monitoring is more
frequent for less-adherent patients.
Corollary 3.4.3. Let the premises in Theorem 3.4.2 hold. Then, there is only one such
threshold π∗.
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3.4.3 Summary of Models
We use the following Venn Diagram to illustrate the relation among the base model
(Section 3.2), the Semi-Markov Decision Process (SMDP) model (Section 3.4.1), and the
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) model (Section 3.4.2). In the
base model, we did not consider the important part of HIV disease, the opportunistic
infection. In the SMDP reformulation, we incorporated the event of opportunistic in-
fections into the stochastic model, and relaxed the assumption that patients in virologic
failure (i.e., s = s2) will be moved to a second-line regimen upon failure detection (i.e.,
by performing VL tests). However, as we have seen in Section 3.4.1, under some reason-
able assumption, we showed that it is optimal to move failure patients to a second-line
regimen. Lastly, We propose an POMDP reformulation of the same problem. wAt the
beginning of each month, the patient either undergoes a VL test (Monitor) or is sug-
gested to Wait for another month. If the patient undergoes a VL test, the DM collects
the adherence state from the patient. For all the three models introduced, we assume
the frequency of clinical visits does not affect patient’s adherence behavior, and the
adherence is known prior to treatment initiation. As part of our future (ongoing) work,
we propose to study the adherence learning problem as an extension.
Figure 3.1: The relationship among different models introduced in Section 3.2 and 3.4
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3.5 Numerical Study
We illustrate our framework with a case study in Uganda, a typical resource limited
setting where GDP per capita in 2016 is only $615 USD [167]. Moreover, Uganda’s HIV
prevalence is as high as 2.61% among adults [145]. Also, the cost of VL test increased a
lot in the last decade in Africa [20, 75], while certain African countries’ GDP per capita
growth rate is much lower than the rise in cost [167]. It becomes paramount to optimize
monitoring policies, quantify the potential benefit of adherence type differentiation for
HIV infected patients in resource limited settings like Uganda.
In Section 3.5.1, we first present the stochastic micro-simulation model which cap-
tures HIV patients disease progression, and transmission (through secondary infection).
In Section 3.5.2, we present the optimized monitoring policy using the model framework
we developed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.4. We then conclude this section by quan-
tifying the total gain in terms of costs saved, and qualify-adjusted life years (QALYs)
gained by comparing our optimized policy with a status quo policy (i.e., no adherence
typ differentation). We provide a summary of each parameter values in Table B.1.
3.5.1 Simulation Model
We developed a stochastic simulation model to capture HIV disease progression
and transmission. We used the model to optimize monitoring intervals at different
willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds, for any given patient demographics information.
The WTP threshold indicates the upper bound of societal resources that are generally
considered affordable to gain one qualify-adjusted life-year (QALY).
We simulated patients with Uganda demographic data over a 100-year time horizon.
A long time horizon resembles the infinite horizon setting in the Modelling Section.
On the other hand, we only optimize the monitoring policies up to 10-years. We did
this for two reasons. First, the remaining rewards estimation would be similar over a
longer time horizon. Second, we could then better capture the gain of adherence type
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differentiation within a reasonable time horizon. In a decade, there might be other more
effective treatment available.
Model Parametrization
data source and population Our primary source of model inputs came from a
previously well-calibrated disease progression model parametrized using demographics of
HIV-infected patients in Uganda [106]. In our setting, we simulated a cohort of 600,000
individuals given Uganda’s HIV-infected population profile over a 100-year time horizon.
As reported in [106], cohort average age is 36 years old, of which 61% are women, and
25% are considered higher education and beyond.
ART adherence and virologic failure. [106] model monthly patient adherence sta-
tus using a mixed effect logistic regression, as a function of a few patient demographic
info, time between measurements, etc. However, this specific parametric form is not an-
alytically tractable. We thus, modelled adherence heterogeneity effect using a Bayesian
hierarchical model. Our results show that adherence heterogeneity can be equivalently
modelled using beta distribution, where its mean (i.e., adherence type θ) depends on the
patient age, gender, and education level. We defer the details of Bayesian formulation,
and proof of existence, statistical significance of the model in Appendix Section B.2,
CD4 cell counts and HIV viral load are the two most important biomarkers of HIV
disease progression. Most HIV studies only report health utilities and costs related to
patient current CD4 cell counts. Since VL and CD4 cell counts are highly correlated,
we assumed CD4 cell count of 200 cell/mm3 for patients in virologic failure (s = s2),
CD4 cell count above 550 cell/mm3 for virally suppressed patients s = s1. Although
CD4 cell count could be as high as 1200 cell/mm3, most studies report the same cost
and health utilities above 550 cell/mm3 threshold [106]. We track our simulated cohort
starting at the first month of ART initiation. All patients receive one VL measurement
at 6 months on ART.
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Similar as in [106], in our simulation model, if virologic failure is detected during
clinical visit (for patients on the first-line ART), patients return to the clinic next month
for a follow-up VL test. If no spontaneous resuppression occurred, patients will then
switch to the second-line ART. As we briefly discussed in Section 3.2, we did not model
regimen switching for patients on second-line ART, since detection of virologic failure
cold not help improve patient health outcome.
age-specific mortality rates We modelled mortality similarly as in [106]. The
monthly probability that a patient dies depends on the patient’s gender, age, and viro-
logic failure status.
Opportunistic Infections Patients in any living states can develop opportunistic
infections, in which case they will present to their clinic and will be monitored. We use
the state-specific OI rates reported in [106]. and shown in Table B.1.
Outcome Measures The simulation model tracks the health utility (Quality-adjusted
life years, QALY) and health costs of a patient in a given month depends on the health
state of the patient during that month, and whether the patient is on first-line or second-
line regimen.
Secondary infections. We estimate the number of secondary HIV infections in the
community per month as a function of patients’ gender, sexuality, VL and the average
number of sex acts per month ([164]). We acknowledge that it is a simpler, and poten-
tially less accurate estimate than the one we used in [106], however, this simplification
enables us to estimate number of infections monthly, without tracking the the entire
time horizon.
To estimate the loss in QALYs and gain in cost per secondary infection, we assume
the newly infected patients will be placed on ART and been treated as an “average”
adherence type patient (i.e., θ = Eθ) as follows: first, we estimate the costs and QALYs
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for a healthy individual (assuming a health utility of 0.9) up to Taverage as
QALYNoHIV = 0.9(1 + δ + ...+ δ
Taverage)
where Taverage is the average time spent alive by the HIV-infected patients in the sim-
ulation, and δ is the discount factor. Similarly, by denoting caverage as the average cost





caverage(1 + δ + ...+ δ
Taverage)
Then, we calculate the average QALYs for a patient in the simulation model (denote as
QALYinfected); and the average costs for a patient with θ = 0.5 in the simulation model
(denote as COSTinfected). Wee then estimate the loss in QALYs as
QALYloss = QALYNoHIV −QALYinfected
and costs gained as
COSTgained = COSTinfected − COSTNoHIV
respectively.
Optimizing monitoring intervals We simulate a few benchmark fixed monitoring
strategies, where patients are monitoring every 1,3 ,6, 12, 24 months. We use our
optimization model developed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.4 to optimize the monitoring
interval given patient characteristics, including time since ART initiation, adherence
type, age, and gender.
We instantiate reward parameters for each subpopulation (given adherence type,
age, gender, etc) by following the classical approach in health economics to combine the
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two objective (costs, QALYs gained) into a single net monetary benefit (NMB) objective
using a willingness-to-pay(WTP) threshold per QALY gained as follow:
NMB = QALY ×WTP − costs,
where WTP indicates the amount of societal resource that are considered affordable
to gain one QALY, usually taken to be one times or three times a country’s GDP per
capita as a baseline [158]. In our simulation, we consider three times Uganda’s GDP
per capita in 2016 as a benchmark, where we set WTP threshold as multipliers (three
times, six times, ten times, 30 times, 60 times and 100 times).
To estimate the remaining rewards for patients switched to a second-line regimen, we
instantiated the simulation model with patients starting on the second-line regimen. We
terminate the simulation when every patient is dead. We then calculated the discounted
lump sum rewards.
3.5.2 Optimization Results
We computed the optimal monitoring intervals using the SMDP model formulated
in Section 3.4.1. We select a few representative patient demographic and plot the
corresponding optimized monitoring intervals. We only show the results for patients who
start the decision process with a virally suppressed health state s1, and no O.I. observed
(i.e, OI). As we have shown in Section 3.4.1, for patients in virologic failure, the optimal
decision is to monitoring immediately, and switch regimen to second-line (i.e., N∗ = 0).
In the meantime, Observe from Table B.1 the probability of opportunistic infection
is extremely low for virally suppressed patients. One single observation of OI largely
increase doctor’s belief that the patient is in virologic failure s2. As a consequence,
given our model parameters, numerically we always have N∗(s1, OI) = 0.
Figure 3.2 depicts the optimal monitoring strategy for male patients at 20 years
old, 40 years old, and 60 years old respectively. We fixed the WTP to be three times
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Figure 3.2: Optimal monitoring strategy for male patients at different age. WTP =
$1845/QALY
of Uganda’s GDP per capita. First, we observe that monitoring intervals are smaller
for adherent patients at all ages. This confirms our theoretical finding in Proposition
1. Second, if patients stay longer on the first-line ART, we observe the optimal mon-
itoring intervals increases. This is because the longer the patients stays on first-line
regimen, the more stable their viral load could be. When time on ART is 10 years (120
months), optimal monitoring interval again increased for male patients at age 60. This
phenomenon is caused by the estimation error of remaining rewards (see Figure B.4a
and B.4b). Age-specific mortality rate is on a five-year basis. As a consequence, the
remaining reward estimations “jumps” every five years. This led to the sudden increase
in the monetary interval on month t = 121. This finding is consistent with Proposition
1.
We then turn our attention to Figure 3.3. We focused on 30-year-old female patients
when analysis the impact of different WTP, where we vary the WTP per QALY gained
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to three times, ten times, and thirty times of Uganda’s GDP per capita. Similar as
in the previous Figure, we observe that monitoring intervals are smaller for adherent
patients at all ages. Second, as WTP increases, monitoring intervals shortens. This is
consistent with our theoretical finding in Proposition 1.
Figure 3.3: Optimal monitoring strategy for 30-year-old female patients at WTP/QALY
gained
To quantify the gain of adherence type differentiation (on expectation,), we com-
puted the optimality gap by comparing the weighted optimal value function, V ∗d , to the
value function evaluated at a weighted average policy, V ∗f at all WTP levels for a few
pre-specified adherence type distribution (i.e., a beta distribution):
V ∗f − V ∗d
V ∗f
× 100%
The results are shown in Figure 3.4. Based on our assessment on adherence type dis-
tribution in Section B.2, we use gender-specific adherence type: for male patients,
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α = 0.151 and β = 0.251; for female patients, α = 0.129 and β = 0.207. The re-
sulting plot look very close to the plot of α = β = 0.2 in Figure 3.4. For clarity, we did
not add them into the Figure. Observing from Figure 3.4, the optimality gap decreases
as WTP per QALY gained increases, for all pairs of α′s and β′s. This is because, as as
WTP increases (i.e., the societal resources becomes less limited), the cost of VL test is
less likely to be the barrier of frequent monitoring. As a result, the optimal monitoring
interval becomes smaller (for all adherence types) as WTP increases. As a result, the
maximum difference in optimal monitoring interval between an always-adherent, θ = 1
patient and an always-nonadherent, θ = 0 patient shrinks as WTP increases. Thus, the
benefit (in terms of optimality gaps) of differentiating adherence types at high WTP
levels becomes smaller.
Figure 3.4: Optimality Gap with different adherence distribution
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3.5.3 Simulation Results
We apply our optimized policy into stochastic disease progression model. To better
understand the impact of adherence type differentiation, we first consider a smaller
cohort with homogeneous demographics (i.e., same age, gender, and education level)
over a 10-year time horizon. Studies have shown that male adolescent and young adults
(15 - 30 years old) contributed nearly 50% nonadherence on ART ([169]), and 48%
new cases of sexually transmitted diseases annually ([157]). We quantify the total gain
from adherence type differentiation (i..e, QALYs improved, cost saved) in a specific sub-
population of 20-year-old male HIV-infected patients. We then consider patient cohort
with a attributes (We then provided the weighted cohort results to match the profile of
Uganda’s HIV-infected population.
The final cost-effectiveness plots are shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, respectively.
The data points colored in red are the average QALYs and cost by simulating differen-
tiated policies optimized at different WTP levels. The data points colored in blue are
the average QALYs and costs simulating fixed policies (fixed monitoring intervals).
A few themes emerge from Figure 3.5. First, all optimized policies at different WTP
thresholds are on the cost-effectiveness frontier, achieving higher QALYs at reasonable
costs. Notably, for WTP thresholds equal to six times and ten times Uganda’s GDP
per capita, the optimized health outcomes are dominating Monitoring every 6 month,
and every 3 months respectively. In other words, with adherence type differentiation,
optimized policies resulted in higher QALYs and less costs compared to similar fixed
policies. Monitor every months achieves the highest expected QALYs gained per patient,
but at a much higher costs. Alternatively, the opimized policy using a WTP equals to 60
times Uganda’s GDP capita resulted in very similar QALYs (difference of 0.026 QALYs)
but saving more than $5,000 USD per patient.
We then analyze the resulting cost-effectiveness plot by consider a representative
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Figure 3.5: Cost Effectiveness Plot for 20-year-old male HIV-infected patients. Abbre-
viation: QALY, quality-adjusted life-year
cohort of Uganda’s HIV-infected population, results shown in Figure 3.6. For the pop-
ulation average plot, we did not show the error bar because the variance becomes ex-
tremely small for a cohort of N = 600, 000 HIV-infected patients. First, we observe
from Figure 3.6 that
From this plot, we conclude that there is a significant improvement in the transmission-
adjusted patient health outcome to differentiate patients by their adherence types.
For the population averaged QALYs and costs, all optimized policies are on the cost-
effectiveness frontier. For WTP thresholds equal to one times, and three times Uganda’s
GDP per capita, the optimized health outcomes are dominating Monitoring every 12
month, and every 6 months respectively. For richer-resource settings such that WTP
threshold per QALY gained is about 30 to 100 times of Uganda’s GDP per capita, the
opimized policy resulted in very similar QALYs (difference in QALYs: 0.06 - 0.01) but
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saves about $4,700 - $3,300 USD per patient.
We conclude from Figures 3.5 and 3.6 that adherence type differentiation brings
significant improved HIV-infected patient health outcome.
Figure 3.6: population average cost-effectiveness plot. Abbreviation: QALY, quality-
adjusted life-year
3.6 Conclusion and Discussion
Designing efficient treatment plans while patient adherence is heterogeneous remains
one of the most challenging problems for modern medicine. In this work, we formulated a
stylized stochastic disease progression model that captures key features of HIV disease
progression, and characterize a few useful and insightful structural properties of the
model. In particular, we present an exact equation where the optimal solution can
be directly computed. Notably, we also studied an extensions of the base model, by
incorporating OI into the model framework.
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We present a case study to numerically quantify the total gain from adherence
type differentiation, using the demographic profile representing Uganda’s HIV-infected
patients. We observe a significant improvement in cumulative health outcome. In par-
ticular, for settings such as Uganda, optimized monitoring interval considering adher-
ence type heterogeneity outperforms fixed 12-month and 6-month intervals with higher
QALYs and less costs. In higher-resource settings, optimized monitoring intervals could
lead to significant cost savings with minimal QALYs loss. In setting with WTP thresh-
old of $18,000 - $60,000 USD per QALY gained, we estimate that $ 3,300 to $4.700
could be saved for each patient on ART using the optimized monitoring intervals.
Our model has several limitations. First, our disease progression model and the
optimization model do not explicitly capture HIV transmission or changes in adherence
behavior arising from prolong time on ART, or varied monitoring intervals. Second, our
model assumed patient adherence type is fully revealed to decision makers prior to ART
treatment initiation. Our POMDP formulation can be extended to a learning model by
collecting patient adherence measurment during clinical visits, or phone calls.
Our study provide better informed decision on when to perform VL test of HIV-
infected patients. We quantify the improvement in patient health outcome for adherence
type differentiation. Related future work could utilize our model results for adherence
learning.
Chapter 4
No Panic in Pandemic: The
Impact of Individual Choice on
Public Health Policy and Vaccine
Priority
4.1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the highly infectious SARS-CoV-2 virus, has
been the most urgent global healthcare threat since its outbreak in 2019. As of January
29, 2021, it has caused more than 101 million confirmed infections and 2 million deaths
in 237 countries and regions worldwide [160]. While effective treatments and vaccines
were absent in the early stage of COVID-19, various public health interventions were
implemented to contain the pandemic in countries around the globe. In early 2020,
U.S. federal and state authorities announced the social distancing policy, which required
people to maintain a physical distance from others and ordered businesses to adjust their
practices to restrict the number of people present in the same space [26, 99]. As the
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pandemic developed, U.S. state authorities announced a more stringent lockdown policy
in March 2020. This policy ordered people to stay at home except for essential activities
and mandated public place closures, including schools and nonessential businesses (e.g.,
restaurants and gyms) [104, 148].
As two of the most widely-implemented COVID-19 mitigation measures, lockdown
and social distancing policies have effectively reduced infections and deaths in the
COVID-19 pandemic; however, this was not without a cost [70]. These two policies
have caused significant disruption to regular economic activities. The U.S. entered a re-
cession in February 2020 after the longest-in-history period of economic expansion (128
consecutive months), attributed to “the pandemic and the public health response” [105].
In April 2020, the unemployment rate increased to 14.7%, reaching both its highest rate
in history and reflecting largest monthly increase (10.3%) in history, due to the effects
of the “pandemic and efforts to contain it” [18]. Lockdowns and social distancing have
also caused significant social impacts. As of April 1, 2020, 1.48 billion students (84.3%
of all students) worldwide were affected by school closures [146]. People have also been
suffering from mental health issues associated with social isolation and loneliness caused
by these policies [91, 116].
The substantial socioeconomic cost highlights the urgent need for a strategic imple-
mentation of the lockdown and social distancing policies to contain infectious disease
outbreaks and minimize their socioeconomic impact. This requires that government au-
thorities optimize policy timing and stringency according to the disease dynamics (e.g.,
the number of infections and infection rates) and the socioeconomic impact [163]. On
the one hand, an intervention that is initiated too early, lasts for an extended period, or
is too stringent could cause excessive socioeconomic burden [90, 171, 153]. On the other
hand, an intervention that comes too late, lasts for a short period or is too weak may fail
to contain the pandemic and cause an unaffordable disease burden. For example, if the
U.S. had begun social distancing measures one week earlier, it could have avoided 56.5%
of infections and 54.0% of deaths as of May 3, 2020 [117, 109]. Many U.S. states that
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rushed to reopen their businesses against warnings in the summer of 2020 experienced
a second wave of the pandemic [155, 37].
“How individuals respond . . . will be as important as government actions, if not
more important.”
— [10] in the Lancet
Moreover, government authorities should consider people’s responses when planning
lockdown and social distancing policies [10]. First, an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) report shows that individuals may voluntarily reduce their social interactions
because of the fear of being infected [72, 73]. This is also evidenced by the fact that
U.S. individuals traveled, dined out, and visited businesses less frequently even when
there were no public health interventions [60, 108]. Second, individuals may change their
behavior according to public health policies. For example, after the social distancing
policy was enacted, U.S. consumers’ visits to nonessential businesses (e.g., bars and
restaurants) declined [60, 39, 5]. Without considering these responses, public health
interventions could be “misguided,” or even be “detrimental” [6].
Previous discussions highlight a critical research question in the design of public
health interventions to contain an infectious disease outbreak like COVID-19. How
should government authorities determine the optimal timing and stringency of lockdown
and social distancing policies considering their socioeconomic impacts and individual
responses? To answer this question, we use multinomial logit choice models to charac-
terize individual reactions to the risk of infection and public health interventions and
integrate it into a repeated Stackelberg game with the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
(SIR) disease transmission dynamics. Structural properties of equilibrium individual
responses and optimal interventions reveal interesting results on the optimal timing and
effectiveness of public health policies. Moreover, we propose dynamic programming and
gradient descent algorithms to optimize these policies to alleviate their socioeconomic
loss while effectively mitigating the pandemic. These algorithms enable us to derive ad-
ditional insights in our numerical experiment based on representative COVID-19 data
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from Minnesota.
Furthermore, we investigate another urgent question faced by global policymakers:
how to prioritize the administration of vaccines when supply is limited [162, 28]? Given
the limited vaccine production capacity, global health authorities have recommended
that the elderly should get the vaccines first since they are at higher risk of severe illness
and mortality [162, 24, 98]. However, it has been shown that youth and adults are more
socially active and thus have a higher risk of spreading the disease [170, 130]. Thus,
vaccinating the elderly first may have a limited impact in slowing down transmission
in the general population [22, 102]. Therefore, vaccine prioritization is still in question
considering both population heterogeneity and individual reactions.
To address this challenge, we modify our analytical framework to incorporate hetero-
geneity in age-stratified population groups. We show that it is critical to tailor vaccine
prioritization plans under different vaccine capacity, mortality rates, and disease trans-
mission rates. Moreover, we suggest that the social distancing policy should be enforced
in parallel with vaccine administration to contain the disease transmission and should
be more strict when the elderly group is prioritized to receive the vaccine.
Our work contributes to the literature in four major ways. First, our study is among
the first to examine public health interventions considering the disease transmission dy-
namics, socioeconomic impacts, and individual reactions in a pandemic. Second, we
derive theoretical properties and provide analytical results on the impact of individual
reactions and the timing of public health interventions. Third, we propose dynamic
programming and gradient descent algorithms to optimize the implementation of pub-
lic health interventions that balances the economic loss caused by the policies and the
healthcare burden resulting from the disease transmission. Fourth, our numerical re-
sults provide unique insights on the effectiveness of public health interventions under
economic constraints and favorable vaccine prioritization plans when vaccine production
capacity is limited. Our findings address urgent public health challenges that the world
is facing in this pandemic.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an
overview of related literature. Section 4.3 describes the modeling framework, and Sec-
tion 4.4 provides theoretical analysis and presents policy optimization models and al-
gorithms. Section 4.5 presents numerical results on lockdown and social distancing.
Section 4.6 presents a heterogeneous model and provides insights on vaccine prioritiza-
tion. Section 4.7 concludes this paper.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section, we review a few streams of literature that are most relevant to our
work among a great influx of COVID-related papers. The first stream of research
predicts epidemiological and socioeconomic outcomes of public health interventions
in the COVID-19 pandemic. The majority of studies in this stream adopt the dy-
namic compartmental models introduced by [79] to describe population-level disease
progression. Some use Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) or Susceptible-Exposed-
Infected-Recovered (SEIR) models to predict the epidemiological outcomes (e.g., cu-
mulative numbers of infections and deaths) under different public health interventions
[168, 121, 84, 124]. Others use simulations to numerically evaluate the trade-off between
epidemiological outcomes and the socioeconomic impact of public health interventions
[171, 3, 8]. These studies focus primarily on predicting outcomes of pre-defined policies,
and do not consider individual responses or policy optimization.
The second stream of literature focuses on optimal intervention design in epidemics.
[33] consider the impact of test capacity on disease dynamics in a variant of the susceptible-
infected (SI) model. [34] study the impact of hospital admission and the Fangcang
shelter system on reducing deaths from COVID-19 and its implication for the lockdown
policy. [32] derive optimal antibiotic treatment policy considering drug resistance. [43]
and [47] study testing queue management in COVID-19. Unlike [93, 54] and [71] that
study vaccine procurement contracts and vaccination scheduling problems, we discuss
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the implications of our model on vaccination priority. [31] and [115] model public health
policies (e.g., lockdown) as controls on the disease dynamics in SIR or SEIR models and
seek for optimal policies. Our work differs from this stream of studies by incorporating
individual responses to the pandemic and public health policies.
The third stream of studies considers individual responses in the pandemic. Sev-
eral studies conduct equilibrium analysis considering individual responses to the risk
of infection from COVID-19 [94, 58, 51, 55, 6, 17, 44]. These studies model individual
utility or disutility related to staying home, essential/nonessential social activities, and
risk of infection and study the equilibrium of individual activity level. They investi-
gate the impact of individual activity level on social welfare, which could guide public
health interventions. [77] and [21] model the impact of public health interventions on
individual utility and their equilibrium activity level, and conduct simulation-based in-
vestigations. Our study differs from these previous studies, as they mostly focus on
equilibrium analysis to describe individual behavior. Instead, we model lockdown and
social distancing policies as decision variables and investigate individual reactions to
these policy decisions. Moreover, we characterize structural properties of optimal inter-
ventions and propose dynamic programming and gradient descent algorithms to derive
optimal public health policies.
The fourth stream of literature focuses on resource allocation and priority assign-
ment in healthcare. For example, [86] propose several heuristic policies for treatment
resource allocation in the Ebola outbreak. [74] study the optimal priority assignment in
emergency response. Our work contributes to this stream of work in that we optimize
vaccine priority by considering individual response, infectious disease dynamics and lim-
ited vaccine capacity. Mostly relevant to our work, [170] conduct equilibrium analysis
on individual decisions on whether or not to receive vaccines and study vaccination
priority strategy in a static setting without vaccine capacity constraint. Our results for
a dynamic setting are consistent with [170]’s results that Elderly first vaccination strat-
egy could result in more infections when vaccine production capacity is large. However,
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when vaccination capacity is limited, we show that Elderly first vaccination strategy
may result in similar infections but much fewer deaths.
Lastly, we use multinomial logit (MNL) models to capture individual activity level
in the equilibrium analysis. MNL models have been widely used to model individual
discrete choices, where choices are not bang-bang (e.g., either everyone stays at home or
everyone goes out). Distinct from most classic MNL models, our MNL model captures
the network effect among individuals due to their social interactions and risk of infection.
[152] and [48] present MNL model with network effect but focus on revenue management
and assortment pricing problems. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
that captures individual behavior using a network MNL model to find optimal public
interventions for infectious disease outbreaks.
4.3 Model Framework
We consider a central planner (CP), such as a federal or state government authority,
who aims to contain the pandemic by implementing public health policies within a fi-
nite time horizon. The CP is interested in minimizing the overall sum of disease burden
(healthcare-related costs) and policy implementation cost. In analyzing the hypotheti-
cal CP’s approach, we focus on two widely-implemented policies: lockdown and social
distancing. We propose integrated analytical frameworks to optimize these policies,
including the SIR model, game-theoretical models, and discrete choice models. Specif-
ically, we formulate a finite horizon, repeated two-stage Stackelberg game as follows.
Every day, the CP announces their policy decision; and then each individual decides
the probability that they would like to go out or stay at home as a reaction to the risk
of infection and the public health policy. Instead of using a bang-bang choice, we model
the individual decision by a multinomial logit choice model, which is consistent with
the true mobility pattern in the pandemic [25].
We first introduce a baseline case without any public health intervention in Section
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4.3.1. Then, we introduce the case with lockdown and social distancing policies in
Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Baseline Case without Public Health Interventions
The baseline case models the epidemic dynamics and individual activity level when
no public health intervention is implemented.
Disease model
To capture the disease transmission and progression dynamics, we adopt a discrete
SIR model by discretizing the time horizon into days (We use day t and time t in-
terchangeably throughout the paper), which is consistent with epidemiology literature
[e.g., 7, 121]. In the SIR model, an individual’s health condition is classified into three
states: 1) susceptible state S, in which individuals are not infected; 2) infectious state
I, in which individuals are infected and can infect others through contacts; and 3) re-
covered state R, in which patients have recovered from the infection, and are assumed
to be immunized from re-infection. We denote S(t), I(t) and R(t) as the proportion of
population in each state at the beginning of day t, and normalize the size of the popu-
lation to 1 (i.e., S(t) + I(t) + R(t) = 1 for any t). We call I(t) the disease prevalence
on day t.
On a given day t, we assume that a susceptible individual becomes infected with a
probability βα(t)I(t) (referred to as the risk of infection), which depends on a known
infection rate β ∈ (0, 1) of the disease, the societal average activity level α(t) ∈ [0, 1]
and the disease prevalence I(t). Note that for a given disease prevalence I(t), the risk
of infection is higher when α(t) is larger. Every day, infectious individuals recover at a
known rate r ∈ (0, 1). We do not consider births, deaths, or aging due to the relatively
short time horizon used in this study, which is consistent with the literature [121, 168].
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Thus, the discretized SIR model can be written as follows:
S(t+ 1)− S(t) = −βα(t)I(t)S(t)
I(t+ 1)− I(t) = βα(t)I(t)S(t)− rI(t) t = 1, ..., T − 1.
R(t+ 1)−R(t) = rI(t)
(4.1)
Individual/societal activity level
On each day, individuals decide whether they would like to go out or stay at home.
Assume that each individual stays at home with probability 1−αB(t) and goes out with
probability αB(t). Staying at home interrupts people’s daily routine and may cause a
utility loss. Let u(stay at home) = −b0 < 0 be the expected utility of staying at home.
The utility of staying at home can be written as
U(stay at home) = u(stay at home) + ε, (4.2)
where ε captures individual-specific idiosyncrasies. Building on the model introduced in
[94], we express the expected utility gained by an individual from going out as follows:
uB(go out, α(t)) = b1 + b2α(t)− b3α(t)βI(t).
Note that uB(·) has three factors. First, an individual can gain utility (denoted as
b1 ≥ 0) from necessary activities to maintain a living (e.g., grocery shopping and doctor
visits) or activities without interactions with others (e.g., walk dogs alone). Public
health interventions introduced in later sections generally do not impact the accessibility
of these activities (hereafter referred to as essential activities). Second, additional utility
(b2 ≥ 0) can be gained through social interactions (e.g., attending social entertainment
events). An individual’s utility gain through these social interactions (hereafter referred
to as nonessential social interactions) b2α(t) depends on the societal average activity
level α(t). That is, this utility increases (decreases) as more people go out (stay at
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home). Nonessential social interactions will be subject to the impact of lockdown or
social distancing policies. Third, individuals may experience utility loss (b3 ≥ 0) due to
infection. The term b3α(t)βI(t) represents the disease burden associated with the risk of
infection if going out, which increases as more people are going out or are infected. We
provide utility parameter estimation details in Supplement C.2. Similar to the utility
of staying of home, we write the utility of going out as follows:
UB(go out, α(t)) = uB(go out, α(t)) + ε.
We assume the population is homogeneous in their utility parameters in the base model
and will extend it to heterogeneous population in Section 4.6. As a result, all individuals
adopt the same strategy (i.e., the same αB(t)) in the base model. Hence, the societal
average activity level α(t) is equal to αB(t) (i.e., α(t) = αB(t)). We can write the
expected utility of going out uB(go out, αB(t)) as follows:
uB(go out, αB(t)) = b1 + b2αB(t)− b3αB(t)βI(t). (4.3)
As in the standard MNL model, we assume all ε’s are independent Gumbel random
variables. Then, by results of MNL modelling [48, 15], the probability of an individual
choosing to go out on day t can be written as:
αB(t) =
exp(uB(go out, αB(t)))
exp(u(stay at home)) + exp(uB(go out, αB(t)))
. (4.4)
The value of αB(t) affects the utility of going out, which in return affects the probability
of going out, i.e., the value of αB(t). We say α
∗
B(t) is an equilibrium point if it satisfies
Eq.(4.4). Without loss of generality, we assume b0 = 0. Analytical results for b0 > 0 is
equivalent to those for b0 = 0 and b
′




1 + exp(uB(go out, αB(t)))
. (4.5)
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Next, we extend the baseline case to consider how an individual changes his/her
activity level according to lockdown and social distancing policies.
4.3.2 Lockdown Policy
When the CP implements the lockdown policy, public places like schools and nonessen-
tial businesses (e.g., restaurants and gyms) close [104, 148]. As a result, the utility gained
from nonessential social interactions is eliminated. However, as discussed in Section 4.1,
implementing the lockdown policy could cause socioeconomic loss. Therefore, the CP
aims at configuring a lockdown policy which optimally balances total disease burden
(e.g., treatment costs if infected), and direct socioeconomic impact/burden of lockdown
implementation (e.g., nonessential businesses shutdown).
We denote the CP’s lockdown decision on day t as a binary variable A(t), where
A(t) = 1 when the CP implements the lockdown policy and A(t) = 0 otherwise. The
CP’s lockdown policy in a time horizon T is denoted as A = (A(t))T−1t=1 . Let d1 and
d3 be daily socioeconomic burden associated with lockdown implementation, and the
expected disease burden associated with each infection, respectively1. The CP’s total




A(t) + d3[S(1)− S(T )], (4.6)
where [S(1)−S(T )] computes the cumulative number of infections. If both the CP and
individuals are risk-neutral, then d3 = b3. We will compare different choices of d3 is
Section 4.5. On day t, given the CP’s lockdown decision A(t), individuals decide whether
to go out. If the CP selects A(t) = 0, people are more likely to go out. As a result, the
number of infections could increase, potentially changing the CP’s decisions to lockdown
in the following days. We model this interplay between the CP and individuals as a
1We have ignored the cost of suspending and re-opening businesses in d1 and could have underes-
timated the cost of lockdown implementation. However, in Section 4.5, we show that lockdown is not
cost-effective even with this underestimated cost.
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repeated two-stage Stackelberg game, where the CP announces A(t) on day t followed
by individual responses, from t = 1 to the end of time horizon.
We denote an individual’s probability of going out to be αA(t), as a response to
the lockdown policy. Similar to the baseline model, the societal average activity level
α(t) is equal to αA(t) since all individuals adopt the same strategy (i.e., α(t) = αA(t)).
We express the utility and expected utility for individuals to go out on day t under a
lockdown decision A(t) as follows:
ULD(go out, αA(t)) = uLD(go out, αA(t)) + ε, and
uLD(go out, αA(t)) = b1 + b2αA(t)(1−A(t))− b3αA(t)βI(t). (4.7)
When A(t) = 1, no utility is gained from nonessential social interactions, i.e., b2αA(t)(1−




1 + exp(uLD(go out, αA(t)))
. (4.8)
4.3.3 Social Distancing Policy
Under a social distancing policy, the CP can limit individual activity level. For
example, Minnesota limited indoor gatherings for each household to under ten people
at maximum; and required gyms and restaurants to open at 25% and 50% capacity in
December 2020 [99]. To reflect these practices, we follow previous literature’s modeling
approach [153], and model the CP’s social distancing policy decision on day t as κ(t),
where κ(t) represents the activity reduction through social distancing. In other words,
1−κ(t) sets an upper bound for an individual’s activity level α(t) such that the feasible
region of α(t) becomes [0, 1 − κ(t)] on day t. We denote the CP’s social distancing
policy in a time horizon T as κ = (κ(t))T−1t=1 . The CP can choose κ(t) ∈ [0, κmax], where
κmax < 1 represents the maximum contact reduction through social distancing and is
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estimated to be 50% in previous literature [168].
Similar to the lockdown policy, implementing the social distancing decision κ(t)
incurs a socioeconomic burden denoted as q(κ(t)). As it is much more costly to im-
plement a more strict social distancing due to a greater socioeconomic loss, we adopt







where qmax is the cost of implementing the maximum social distancing decision κ(t) =
κmax, and φ ≥ 0.




q(κ(t)) + d3[S(1)− S(T )], (4.10)
where the first term is the amortized daily socioeconomic loss due to social distancing
policy implementation, and the second term is the total disease burden.
We denote an individual’s probability of going out under the social distancing deci-
sion κ(t) to be ακ(t). The societal average activity level α(t) is equal to ακ(t) since the
population is homogeneous (i.e., α(t) = ακ(t)). Thus, the utility for individuals to go
out on day t can be written as follows:
USD(go out, ακ(t)) = b1 + b2ακ(t)− b3ακ(t)βI(t). (4.11)
As will be shown in Theorem 4.4.2, the individual equilibrium activity level under a
social distancing policy, i.e., α∗κ(t), is jointly determined by an individual’s baseline
equilibrium activity level α∗B(t) and social distancing policy decision κ(t). Specifically,




B(t) ≤ 1− κ(t), and α∗κ(t) = 1− κ(t) otherwise. That
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is,
α∗κ(t) = min(1− κ(t), α∗B(t)). (4.12)
4.4 Theoretical Results and Public Health Policy Opti-
mization
In this section, we investigate structural properties of the equilibriums under dif-
ferent policies. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all individuals go out
with the same probability. We first show the properties of the baseline case in Section
4.4.1. We then present the equilibrium analysis, formulate mathematical optimization
models for the policy optimization, propose solution algorithms, and derive structural
properties of the optimal policy decisions for both the lockdown policy (Section 4.4.2)
and the social distancing policy (Section 4.4.3), respectively. We include all proofs in
Supplement C.3.
4.4.1 Baseline Case
We define the aggregate individual welfare on day t as the weighted sum of expected
utility of all individuals. Then, the aggregate individual welfare can be written as:
uaw(α(t)) ≡ (1− α(t))× u(stay at home) + α(t)× u(go out, α(t))
= α(t) [ b1 + b2 α(t)− b3 α(t)βI(t) ] . (4.13)
We denote α∗B(t) as the equilibrium of αB(t) being the solution to Eq.(4.5), and write
α∗aw(t) as the socially optimal activity level that maximizes u
aw(α(t)). We compare the
individual equilibrium activity level with the socially optimal activity level. We have
the following result.
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Proposition 4.4.1. The inequality α∗aw(t) < α
∗
B(t) holds for any t ∈ {1, · · · , T − 1} if










Figure 4.1: Comparison of the socially optimal daily activity level α∗sw(t), and the self-
interested activity level in equilibrium α∗A(t) by varying the disease prevalence I(t).
The condition in Proposition 4.4.1 translates to I(t) > 0.013 numerically. Model parameters are estimated based
on the COVID-19 data in Section 4.5 and can be found in Table C.1.
Proposition 4.4.1 indicates that the socially optimal activity level α∗aw(t) is smaller
than the individual equilibrium activity level α∗B(t) as long as the disease prevalence
I(t) is not too small. The numerical example in Figure 4.1 verifies this theoretical
discovery, which is based on the COVID-19 data in Section 4.5. In particular, the
difference between α∗aw(t) and α
∗
A(t) could be as high as 48% when I(t) is around
1.8%. This is because, when individuals make decisions, they only consider the negative
impact of infection on their own, but ignore the negative externality of their decisions
to others. That is, their activity could increase others’ risk of infection. In contrast,
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socially optimal activity level α∗aw(t) that maximizes the aggregate individual welfare
uaw(α(t)) captures this externality. Therefore, the social activity level is smaller than
the individual equilibrium activity level. Nevertheless, this deviation decreases as I(t)
increases and almost disappears with extremely large I(t) as shown in Figure 4.1. This
is because the additional negative externality imposed by an individual on others is
limited when the pandemic is severe. This observation is important as it shows that the
socially optimal activity level is close to the individual equilibrium activity level when
the disease prevalence I(t) is very high. Thus, policy interventions, including both
lockdown and social distancing, should focus more on the case where I(t) is moderate.
4.4.2 Lockdown Policy
Equilibrium Analysis in the Lockdown Policy
Under a lockdown policy, the government shuts down nonessential businesses and the
utility of nonessential social interaction is eliminated for all individuals when A(t) = 1.
Theorem 4.4.1 presents the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium α∗A(t) specified
by Eq.(4.8) on any day t.
Theorem 4.4.1. Under a lockdown policy sequence A ≡ (A(t) )T−1t=1 , there exists a
symmetric, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium α∗A(t) on each day t. Further, α
∗
A(t) is
uniquely determined by I(t) and A(t).
Next, we present comparative static analyses of the equilibrium activity level α∗A(t).
We use α∗A=i(t) to denote the equilibrium activity level when the CP’s lockdown decision
is A(t) = i on day t, where i ∈ {0, 1}.
Proposition 4.4.2. For any t ∈ {1, · · · , T − 1}, the following two properties hold.
(a) α∗A(t) is increasing in b1 and b2, and is decreasing in b3 and I(t) for a given lockdown
decision A(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
(b) α∗A=1(t) ≤ α∗A=0(t), i.e., α∗A(t) is smaller when lockdown is enacted.
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As expected, Proposition 4.4.2 shows that individual activity levels are directly
related to b1, b2, b3 and I(t). In addition, individuals are more likely to stay at home
when the lockdown policy is enacted.
Lockdown Policy Optimization
We formulate the CP’s lockdown policy optimization as the Lockdown Model. To
reflect that frequent policy changes might result in great cost of suspending and re-
opening businesses, we assume that the CP is only allowed for a maximum number L
of lockdown initiation (from open to closed status).
We define the decision variable z(t) as the number of lockdown initiation till day t.
S(1), I(1), andR(1) are known parameters about the disease prevalence at the beginning
of the planning horizon. We show that the disease trajectory {(S(t), I(t), R(t))}Tt=1 is
a function of the time sequence of the societal activity level α ≡ (α(t) )T−1t=1 in Lemma
C.3.1 in Supplement C.3.4. Therefore, according to Lemma C.3.1 and Theorem 4.4.1, it
can be easily verified that αA(t) and the disease state trajectory {(S(t), I(t), R(t))}Tt=1
is uniquely determined by A(t). The objective in Eq.(4.14) is to minimize the overall
cost of a lockdown policy as defined in Eq.(4.6). Disease dynamics and individual choice
are modeled in Eq.(4.1), Eq.(4.7), Eq.(4.8), and Eq.(4.17). Constraint (4.15) computes
z(t) and Constraint (4.16) limits the total number of lockdown initiation in the planning








d1A(t) + d3[S(1)− S(T )] (4.14)
s.t. Eq.(4.1), Eq.(4.7) and Eq.(4.8)
z(t+ 1)− z(t) = max(A(t)−A(t− 1), 0) t = 1, · · · , T − 1 (4.15)
z(T ) ≤ L (4.16)
α(t) = α∗A(t) t = 1, · · · , T − 1 (4.17)
A(0) = 0;A(t) ∈ {0, 1} t = 1, · · · , T − 1 (4.18)
z(1) = 0; z(t) ∈ Z t = 1, · · · , T. (4.19)
The Lockdown Model is a mixed integer programming model and is nonconvex be-
cause Eq.(4.1) and Eq.(4.8) are nonlinear and nonconvex. To find the optimal solution,
we transform the Lockdown Model into a deterministic dynamic programming (DP)
problem and solve it via backward induction. Note that d3[S(1) − S(T )] in the objec-
tive (4.14) can be written as d3
T∑
t=1
[S(t − 1) − S(t)] + d3[S(1) − S(0)] where we define
S(0) = 0. Thus, the second term d3[S(1) − S(0)] is a constant and can be omitted in
the optimization problem.
We define the state on day t as O(t) ≡ (S(t), I(t), S(t−1), z(t), A(t−1)). Notice that,
O(t) contains all information on day t−1, including number of susceptible S(t−1), and
lockdown decision A(t− 1). O(t) also specifies the population disease status in the SIR
model since R(t) = 1−S(t)−I(t). Due to Constraint (4.16), if z(t) = L and A(t−1) = 0,
the admissible action set on day t is Ât = {A(t) = 0}; otherwise, Ât = {A(t) ∈ {0, 1}}.
Given the action A(t) ∈ Ât, the state transition is determined by constraints in the
Lockdown Model, and the deterministic transition matrix is T (O′, A,O) = T (O(t+1) =
O′|O(t) = O,A(t) = A)) ∈ {0, 1}. The immediate reward is G(O(t + 1), A(t), O(t)) =
d1A(t) + d3[S(t)− S(t− 1)]. Define VT (O(T )) = 0 for any terminal state O(T ). Thus,
82




G(O(t+ 1), A(t), O(t)) + E[Vt+1(O(t+ 1))|O(t), A(t)]
)
.
Since S(t), I(t) ∈ [0, 1] are continuous, for computational tractability, we discretize




, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}
}
. With a finite horizon and finite
state and action spaces, we can solve the lockdown policy optimization problem using
backward induction.
Structural Properties of Optimal Lockdown Decisions
In this section, we characterize an important structural property of optimal lockdown
decisions. Intuitively, one may want to institute a lockdown at the peak of an outbreak.
However, as we show in Proposition 4.4.3, this decision may be suboptimal and lockdown
policies are less effective when the disease prevalence I(t) is below a low prevalence
threshold I or above a high prevalence threshold I, where
I ≡
b1 − log( γ1−γ )
b3βγ
and I ≡
b1 + b2δ − log( δ1−δ )
b3βδ
.
Here γ and δ are functions of parameters b2, b3 and β. The specific functional forms
will be given in Supplement C.3.5, where we also prove that I < I.
Next, we omit the day index t and abuse notation for brevity. We denote α∗A=i(I)
as the equilibrium activity level given the lockdown decision A = i (i ∈ {0, 1}), and
disease prevalence I in a day. We present Proposition 4.4.3 based on the above defined
I and I.
Proposition 4.4.3. The following two properties hold:
(a) If I ∈ [0, 1], then for any I1 < I2 ≤ I, the lockdown is more effective at I2 than at
I1, i.e.,
α∗A=0(I1)− α∗A=1(I1) < α∗A=0(I2)− α∗A=1(I2) .
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(b) If I ∈ [0, 1], then for any I2 > I1 ≥ I, the lockdown is more effective at I1 than at
I2, i.e.,
α∗A=0(I1)− α∗A=1(I1) > α∗A=0(I2)− α∗A=1(I2) .
Proposition 4.4.3 sheds light on the timing of lockdown policies by characterizing
when a lockdown policy could effectively reduce individual activity level. As illustrated
in Figure 4.2, it is more effective to enact lockdowns when the disease prevalence I(t)
is moderate, rather than when I(t) is either too high or too low. On the one hand,
implementing lockdown in the early or late stage of a pandemic is not effective in dis-
incentivizing the population to go out, because of the low risk of infection (disease
prevalence). On the other hand, at a high disease prevalence, individuals may choose
to stay at home due to a high risk of infection, rendering a lockdown policy unneces-
sary. Recall from Figure 4.1 that when disease prevalence is moderate, the difference
between socially optimal activity level and the individual equilibrium one is the largest.
Consequently, lockdown is most effective when disease prevalence is moderate, wherein
individual ignorance of their negative externalities imposed on others manifests.
4.4.3 Social Distancing Policy
While the lockdown policy reduces individual activity level by indirectly eliminat-
ing the utility gained from nonessential social interactions, the social distancing policy
directly imposes an upper bound 1− κ(t) on the individual activity level. We examine
the equilibrium under social distancing policies in this section, and discover structural
properties of optimal social distancing decisions.
Equilibrium Analysis in the Social Distancing Policy
In the following lemma, we show that when the social distancing policy is stringent
and requires an activity level lower than individual baseline equilibrium activity level
(i.e., 1 − κ(t) < α∗B(t)) on a given day t, one possible symmetric equilibrium activity
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Figure 4.2: Effective interval of disease prevalence to implement lockdown policy based
on COVID-19 data presented in Table C.1
The blue curve represents disease prevalence if no lockdown is implemented over the entire time horizon. Calcu-
lation of I and I is presented in Section 4.5.2.
level α∗(t) is exactly 1− κ(t).
Lemma 4.4.1. Suppose that the social distancing policy κ(t) on day t satisfies 1 −
κ(t) < α∗B(t), and α−i(t) = 1− κ(t). Then, individual i’s best response activity level is
α∗i (t) = 1− κ(t).
Based on Lemma 4.4.1, we have the following theorem about the equilibrium activity
level α∗κ(t) under a social distancing policy.
Theorem 4.4.2. Under a social distancing policy κ(t) on day t, there exists a unique




B(t) ≤ 1− κ(t);
1− κ(t) otherwise.
Theorem 4.4.2 characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of an individual activity level
under two different circumstances. When the baseline equilibrium activity level α∗B(t) is
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outside the region of [0, 1−κ(t)], individual equilibrium activity level is α∗κ(t) = 1−κ(t).
Otherwise, the equilibrium individual activity level is the same as the baseline setting
α∗κ(t) = α
∗
B(t). In either case, the societal activity level is α(t) = α
∗
κ(t).
Social Distancing Policy Optimization
One can easily show that both ακ(t) and the disease state trajectory {(S(t), I(t), R(t))}Tt=1
are uniquely determined by κ(t) using Lemma C.3.1 and Eq.(4.5). Thus, the trajec-
tory of societal activity level α(t) and the disease states are both functions of κ(t).
Therefore, we formulate the CP’s social distancing policy optimization as the Social
Distancing Model. The objective (4.20) is to minimize the overall cost as defined in








q(κ(t)) + d3[S(1)− S(T )] (4.20)
s.t. Eq.(4.1), Eq.(4.5), Eq.(4.9), and Eq.(4.12)
α(t) = α∗κ(t) t = 1, · · · , T − 1 (4.21)
κ(t) ∈ [0, κmax] t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
The Social Distancing Model is highly nonconvex because Eq.(4.1) is nonconvex.
Unlike the Lockdown Model, the decision variable κ is continuous. Thus, the dynamic
programming solution technique used in Section 4.4.2 cannot be directly applied. We
propose a gradient descent algorithm in Alg. 1 to solve the Social Distancing Model.
Specifically, we derive the gradient of the objective function regarding κ(t) recursively
through t ∈ {T −1, T −2, . . . , 1} using backpropagation (or the chain rule). Eq.(4.12) is
treated as an activation function, where derivatives of S(t+1), I(t+1) and R(t+1) are
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0 if α(t) = α∗B(t). Due to the nonconvexity of the Social Distancing Model, a gradient
descent algorithm may not generate a sequence that converges to the globally optimal
solutions. Therefore, we repeat the gradient descent process with different randomly-
generated initial feasible solutions and select the best solution among multiple restarts.
Algorithm 1: Gradient descent algorithm for the Social Distancing Model
Data: Initial disease status (S(1), I(1), R(1)); parameters b1, b2, b3, d3 β, r, φ,
qmax, κmax; convergence criteria ε > 0; iteration limit N ; step size λ;
number of restarts M
Result: Optimized social distancing policy κ∗
for m← 1 to M do
Randomly select initial feasible κ1; iterator i← 1;
while i < N and ||κi − κi−1||> ε do
for t1 ← T − 1 to 1 do
for t2 ← t1 to 1 do








, ∂R(t1+1)∂κi(j) ) where j ∈ {t2 + 1, . . . , t1} ;















− d3 ∂S(T )∂κi(t1) ;
end
κi+1 = κi − λ∇κig(κi) where ∇κig(κi) = (
∂g(κi)
∂κi(1)




i = i+ 1;
end
κ∗ = arg min(g(κ∗), g(κi)); /* Update κ∗ as the best solution */
end
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Structural Properties of Optimal Social Distancing Decisions
To proceed, we omit the day index t and abuse notation for brevity. We denote
α∗B(I) as the equilibrium activity level without any public health intervention (baseline
case) at disease prevalence I. In addition, we denote α∗(κ, I) as the equilibrium activity
level given the social distancing decision κ and disease prevalence I in a day, and we
denote the corresponding policy cost as q(κ).
Proposition 4.4.4. Given disease prevalence I on a day, the optimal distancing policy
κ∗ should satisfy one of the following conditions: 1) κ∗ > 1− α∗B(I) and κ∗ ≤ κmax. 2)
κ∗ = 0.
Proposition 4.4.4 reveals that CP shall either implement a stringent social distancing
policy that affects individual behavior or no social distancing policy at all, which is
aligned with previous findings without considering individual reactions [90].
Proposition 4.4.5. Suppose disease prevalence I1 < I2,
(a) For the same social distancing policy κ, α∗B(I1)− α∗(κ, I1) ≥ α∗B(I2)− α∗(κ, I2).
(b) If social distancing policies κ1 and κ2 satisfy α
∗
B(I1) − α∗(κ1, I1) = α∗B(I2) −
α∗(κ2, I2), we have q(κ1) ≤ q(κ2).
Proposition 4.4.5 characterizes the effectiveness and cost of the social distancing
policy at different disease prevalence. First, a given social distancing policy is more
effective in changing individual behavior at lower disease prevalence. Second, it is more
costly to achieve the same reduction in societal activity level at a higher disease preva-
lence. This proposition confirms the following intuition: at a high disease prevalence,
people have already reduced their activity level due to the risk of infection so that it is
more costly for the CP to further restrain their activities.
Due to the maximum possible social distancing stringency κmax, when the disease
prevalence is higher than a prevalence threshold Iκ, social distancing policy cannot
effectively change individual activity level. Thus, it is more cost-effective to implement
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the social distancing policy when the disease prevalence is lower than Iκ, where Iκ is a
function of parameters b1, b2, b3, β and κmax, defined as:
Iκ =
b1 + b2(1− κmax)− log(κ−1max − 1)
b3β(1− κmax)
.
Next, we formally present this result.
Corollary 4.4.1. If Iκ ∈ [0, 1], the social distancing policy does not reduce individual
activity level on a given day when the disease prevalence is I ≥ Iκ.
Corollary 4.4.1 and Proposition 4.4.5 shed light on the timing when the social dis-
tancing policy is cost-effective. The social distancing policy is most effective in influ-
encing individual behaviors if the disease prevalence is smaller than the threshold Iκ.
When the disease prevalence is high, an individual’s activity level is low regardless of the
implementation of social distancing policy. Thus, our results highlight the importance
of enforcing the social distance policy even when the disease prevalence is not at its
peak level (below Iκ). It is more effective in reducing individuals’ activity levels and is
less costly than when the disease prevalence is peak. We derive the specific values and
validate the existence of Iκ in our numerical experiments in Section 4.5.2.
4.5 Numerical Experiment
We conduct numerical experiments and derive insights using Minnesota COVID-19
data [98, 100] in this section. In Section 4.5.1, we explain the model parameterization
procedure. In Section 4.5.2, we evaluate the effectiveness of the lockdown policy and
the social distancing policy.
4.5.1 Model Parameterization
We obtain disease dynamic parameters, including infection rate β and recovery
rate r, from public epidemiological data in Minnesota [98] and a validated Minnesota
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COVID-19 micro-simulation model [100]. We quantify the overall health impacts of
COVID-19 using the disability-adjusted life-year and Net Monetary Benefit framework
[159, 57]. Specifically, we estimate the expected disease burden associated with COVID-
19 infection (b3 and d3) as follows:
Disease Burden = (treatment cost + cost per non-fatal case)× symptomatic rate
× clinical confirmation rate + cost per fatal case×mortality rate.
(4.22)
Treatment cost is obtained from [14]. Cost per non-fatal cases consists of: 1) the years
of life lost (YLL) due to disability for being sick [159]; and 2) the productivity loss due
to workdays lost. Cost per fatal case is the monetized YLL due to death.
In the base case, we consider d3 = b3. However, if the CP considers the cost related
to sequelae of COVID-19 as part of the CP’s perceived disease burden of infection, then
d3 could be higher than b3. Moreover, d3 might be higher if the healthcare system is
overloaded (e.g., exceeding ICU capacity). Therefore, we consider an additional scenario
where d3 is 20 times higher than b3 (roughly $500,000 higher), which mimics an extreme
case where the CP’s perceived cost of infection is much higher than an individual’s
disease burden.
Daily costs of lockdown (d1) and maximum-level social distancing (qmax) are esti-
mated based on GDP loss due to public health policy implementation [171, 147, 168].
Personal utility parameters b1 and b2 are estimated based on Minnesota annual average
income [42] and the GDP loss data. The full list of parameters is presented in Table
C.1 in the Appendix. A detailed parameterization is explained in Supplement C.2.
4.5.2 Policy Evaluation
In our experiment, we assume initial disease states S(1) = 0.99, I(1) = 0.01 and
R(1) = 0 [52] over a 365-day time horizon (T = 365). We deploy the Lockdown
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Model and the dynamic programming solution algorithm (with discretization param-
eter N = 7000) in Section 4.4.2 to derive the optimal lockdown policy. Then, we
use the Social Distancing Model and the gradient descent algorithm (with M = 5000
restarts) in Section 4.4.3 to derive the optimal social distancing policy. We evaluate
outcome measures including disease burden, policy cost, and overall cost under differ-
ent scenarios in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.2, and compare their effectiveness and study a
concurrent implementation of both policies in Section 4.5.2. In this section, per-person




















d3 = b3 unlimited lockdown $18747 $18747 $0
d3 = 20× b3 unlimited lockdown $18152 $363046 $4289.2
d3 = 20× b3 one lockdown $18391 $18391 $3119.4
d3 = b3 social distancing $17490 $17490 $555.8
d3 = 20× b3 social distancing $14146 $282919 $11631
Table 4.1: Cost decomposition for different scenarios
As shown in Table 4.1, when an individual’s perceived disease burden b3 is equal
to the CP’s perceived cost of infection d3, the total per-person disease burden (i.e.,
d3[S(1) − S(T )]) is $18747. Also, it is optimal to enforce no lockdown over the entire
time horizon, which leads to a $0 policy cost (Figure 4.3). Note that lockdown reduces
individual activity level, thus indirectly impacting the disease spread. It could be per-
ceived as a costly measure when the CP has a low cost of infection (e.g., d3 = b3).
However, if d3 is much higher (d3 = 20 × b3), the CP will implement lockdown in the
middle to late phase of the outbreak. The resulting per-person disease burden is $18152,
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and the lockdown policy cost is $4289.2 (Table 4.1).
Figure 4.3: Base-case (d3 = b3) lockdown policy model outcome.
Figure 4.4: Alternative scenario (d3 = 20 × b3), and at most one lockdown initiation
allowed.
As we discuss in Section 4.4.2, it might be impractical for the CP to enforce frequent
lockdowns. Therefore, we consider the case where the CP could only initiate lockdown
once. In the base case with d3 = b3, the outcome is the same as that for infinite
lockdowns, as it is optimal to enforce no lockdown. For the case with d3 = 20× b3, we
92
have a per-person disease burden of $18391 and lockdown policy cost of $3119.4 (Table
4.1).
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the changes of disease prevalence and activity level
over time under optimal lockdown decision sequences. There are a few interesting
observations. First, in both figures, the minimum activity level αA(t) coincides with
the highest disease prevalence I(t) over the time horizon. As I(t) decreases, αA(t)
increases. This observation is consistent with the results in Proposition 4.4.2. Second,
when d3 = 20 × b3, we see in Figure 4.4 that αA(t) becomes very close to 1 after day
t = 240. This can be explained by the much larger utility of going out, than that of
staying home, at an extremely low disease prevalence (i.e., b3βI(t) b1 + b2).
Next, we investigate the optimal lockdown period in both scenarios. Using the
same set of parameters, we estimate I = 0.87% and I = 2.10% in Proposition 4.4.3.
From Figure 4.4 (the one lockdown, d3 = 20 × b3 scenario), we observe the lockdown
is generally initiated when the disease prevalence is within the interval [I, I]. This
observation confirms our findings in Proposition 4.4.3 that it is more effective to enact
lockdowns at a moderate I(t) than at extremely high or low disease prevalence. It is also
consistent with the findings from Proposition 4.4.1 and Figure 4.1 that the difference
between the socially optimal activity level α∗aw(t) and equilibrium activity level αA(t)
is larger at a moderate disease prevalence. Consequently, it is more beneficial to enact
lockdowns at a moderate disease prevalence. As shown in Table 4.1, implementing
lockdown once increases the per-person disease burden by $239 but reduces the per-
person policy cost by $1169 compared to the unlimited lockdown scenario. This is
consistent with our discussion on Figure 4.3: lockdown policy could be costly while not
effectively reducing the disease burden.
Social Distancing Results
As shown in Table 4.1, the per-person disease burden is $17490, and the social
distancing policy cost is $555.8 when d3 = b3. Figure 4.5 illustrates the changes of
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activity level and disease prevalence over time under optimal social distancing decisions.
Based on these parameters, we estimate Iκ = 2.51% in Corollary 4.4.1. The observation
from Figure 4.5 is consistent with our analytical findings in Corollary 4.4.1 that social
distancing shall be implemented when the disease prevalence is less than Iκ. It is
also consistent with our findings in Proposition 4.4.5. At a large I(t), individuals may
voluntarily reduce their activity level. Further reducing the activity level by enforcing
strict social distancing would incur a much higher cost. Therefore, we observe that no
social distancing is implemented when individuals are vigilant at high disease prevalence.
In the middle to late phase of the outbreak, as I(t) declines, social distancing be-
comes beneficial. By our model assumption, individuals are myopic and ignore the
negative externality imposed on others. As a result, at a moderate disease prevalence
(e.g., 0.5%−2% people are in the state I), individuals observe a smaller risk of infection
compared to the peak and thus prefer to go out. However, as evidenced by Proposition
4.4.1, the situation might worsen with increased social activities from a societal per-
spective. Therefore, the CP could increase societal health benefits by enforcing social
distancing in the middle to late stage of the outbreak.
Figure 4.5: Base-case (d3 = b3) social distancing policy model outcome.
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Policy Comparison and Concurrent Implementation
In this section, we compare the effectiveness of these two policies and evaluate the
result of implementing both policies simultaneously. Based on the results in Table
4.1, social distancing policy incurs a smaller total cost (i.e., CP’s perceived per-person
disease burden + per-person policy cost) than the lockdown policy in the base case,
where d3 = b3. When d3 = 20 × b3, social distancing policy becomes more effective in
reducing the total infection and thus the per-person disease burden, further increasing
its advantage over the lockdown policy. Therefore, social distancing policy outperforms
lockdown policy in reducing the overall societal burden. This finding is consistent with
the literature without considering individual responses [67, 121, 171].
We also consider a concurrent implementation of both policies. When the optimal
social distancing policy has already been implemented, our experiment results suggest
that no lockdown should be implemented in either scenario d3 = b3 or d3 = 20 × b3.
That is, the social distancing policy dominates the lockdown policy.
4.6 Vaccine Strategies under Social Distancing
Besides lockdown and social distancing policies, vaccination is another effective way
to contain the pandemic. However, due to the limit of production capacity, the CP has
to decide the vaccine priority strategies while maintaining public health interventions.
Much empirical evidence indicates that the elderly has been disproportionately affected
by the pandemic because they are at higher risk for severe illness [24, 98]. As COVID-19
vaccines become available, CDC and many state authorities recommend that the elderly
should be vaccinated first over the general public [24, 97]. However, because the elderly
might engage in less social interaction, their activities would have much smaller negative
impact on others compared to youth and adults [170]. Thus, it is not straightforward
that vaccinating the elderly first is the optimal priority to contain disease transmission.
In this section, we discuss vaccine priorities among individuals with different choices
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of activity level and negative externality imposed to others due to the heterogeneity in
the severity of infection using a similar framework that incorporates individuals’ choice
but with some modifications. Specifically, we investigate the vaccine priority under
social distancing2 and examine how it changes with the vaccine capacity, the disease
transmission rate, and the mortality rate.
4.6.1 SEIR Model with Heterogeneous Individuals and Vaccination
Strategy
As age is one of the critical demographic factors in COVID-19, we stratify the
population into three age groups: Youth (0 - 19 years old), Adult (20 - 59 years old),
and Elderly (60 years old and above). We denote the subscript i ∈ {1, 2, 3} for Youth,
Adult, and Elderly age groups. This age stratification is consistent with practices in
the medical literature [171, 84], allowing model parameterization and validation with
available data.
While the SIR model provides tractable analysis in previous sections and is one of
the most relevant mathematical models to describe the spread of an infectious disease
[2], we extend the SIR model to the SEIR model to capture the long latent phase of
COVID-19 infection and to incorporate the process of vaccination implementation [168].
That is, in addition to the health state Si(t), Ii(t), and Ri(t) for age group i, we use state
Ei(t), Ni(t), and Vi(t) to represent the number of exposed individuals, the total number
of living individuals, and the number of vaccinated individuals in age group i on day t.
Let β be the per-contact transmission rate (instead of infection rate in the homogeneous
model), and a−1 be the average incubation period. Given the mortality rate µi for age
group i, the mortality in each period can be represented by Ni(t+1)−Ni(t) = −µiIi(t).
If an individual in group i is vaccinated, s/he will be excluded from the susceptible state
Si(t), and counted among recovered individuals.
3 We use Ŝi(t) and R̂i(t) to represent
2We have shown that the lockdown policy is dominated by the social distancing policy in Section
4.5.2.
3We assumed that COVID-19 vaccine has 100% effectiveness (i.e., individuals are fully protected from
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the effective number of susceptible and recovered individuals considering vaccination in
age group i. The following two equations describe the vaccination process of age group
i on day t:
Ŝi(t) = max(Si(t)− Vi(t), 0)
R̂i(t) = min(Si(t), Vi(t)) +Ri(t).
(4.23)
In Eq.(4.23), the max and min operators guarantee that the number of daily vacci-
nated individuals Vi(t) is no more than the number of the susceptible individuals Si(t)
in the same age group. Let αi(t) represent the activity level of age group i on day
t. Denote ~α(t) as the collection (α1(t), α2(t), α3(t)) and σi(~α(t)) as the probability of








We update the age-structured SEIR model in the presence of vaccination as follows:
Si(t+ 1)− Ŝi(t) = −σi(~α(t))αi(t)Ŝi(t)
Ei(t+ 1)− Ei(t) = +σi(~α(t))αi(t)Ŝi(t)− aEi(t)
Ii(t+ 1)− Ii(t) = +aEi(t)− rIi(t)− µiIi(t)
Ri(t+ 1)− R̂i(t) = +rIi(t)
Ni(t+ 1)−Ni(t) = −µiIi(t).
(4.24)
The three age groups are different in their disease burden (or equivalently, expected
severity of infection) b3,i, and their normal daily contact (denoted by Cij), which counts
the number of interactions for individuals in a given age category i with age group j
before the pandemic.
COVID-19 if vaccinated). The actual effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccine is more than 95% [119].
One can easily adjust the total “effective” vaccine dosage to reflect the lower effectiveness of a vaccine.
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The utility of going out for age group i can be written as:





Using an MNL model, we have:
αi(t) =
exp(Ui(go out, ~α(t)))
1 + exp(Ui(go out, ~α(t)))
. (4.25)
One can prove that Eq.(4.25) admits exactly one solution using Tarski Fixed Point
Theorem. Still, the CP’s goal is to minimize the sum of per-person disease burden
and per-person policy cost (we focus on social distancing). Thus, the CP’s objective in














4.6.2 Model Parameterization and Validation
We use COVID-19 data from Minnesota as of Dec. 13, 2020, as the starting disease
status in our simulation, which closely matches the vaccination plan timeline in Min-
nesota [97]. We assume that the total infectious cases at t = 1 in our simulation are
equal to the difference between the cumulative number of confirmed infections and the
cumulative number of recoveries as of Dec. 13, 2020. Parameters values are summarized
in Table C.1, and parameterization is detailed in Supplement C.2.
To validate our model, we use the Minnesota COVID-19 data as of Nov. 30, 2020,
as the initial disease state to predict the number of infections on Dec. 30, 2020. Within
this one-month period, social distancing was implemented in Minnesota. We choose one
month as our prediction horizon since prediction for a longer period may be subject
to bias due to Minnesota’s frequently-changing policies [99]. As of Nov. 30, 318763
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confirmed infections were reported in Minnesota. In our model, we assume that con-
firmed cases on Nov. 30 were distributed proportionally to the age distribution. We
test different scenarios where the social distancing policy reduces contact rate by 30%
- 50%, and our model estimates a total of 75781 - 141130 new infections in one month.
These estimates are aligned with 94344 new infections reported between Nov. 30 and
Dec. 30, 2020, in Minnesota.
4.6.3 Results and Sensitivity Analysis
Results
With limited supply of vaccines, we consider the following six vaccination imple-
mentation strategies in the three age groups (in terms of the priority order of receiving
vaccines): 1) youth-adult-elderly (i.e., vaccinate youth first, then adults and the elderly
last); 2) youth-elderly-adult; 3) adult-youth-elderly; 4) adult-elderly-youth; 5) elderly-
youth-adult; and 6) elderly-youth-adult4. In our analysis, we consider a daily vaccine
capacity of 50000 dosages5. We apply the gradient descent algorithm (Alg. 1) to the
heterogeneous SEIR model with vaccine implementation to obtain social distancing de-
cisions.
In Table 4.2, we present key outcome measures of the six vaccination implementation
strategies, including healthcare/social distancing cost, cumulative deaths and infections,
and the average activity level since the vaccination plan is initiated. First, we observe
that prioritizing the Adult group in Strategy 3 and 4 for vaccination results in the
lowest per-person disease burden and social distancing cost. This is the most cost-
effective way to restrict transmission and requires the least strict social distancing policy.
4We have considered mixed vaccination plans (i.e., all age groups start vaccination since vaccines
become available, but have different daily quotas), but the pure strategies outperform them.
5In the first stage, about 250000 vaccine doses would be distributed to Minnesota for people working
in health care settings and long-term care facilities [97]. When this paper is written, around 10000 -
30000 dosages of vaccine is administrated per day. The daily capacity may increase in the later stage
of the pandemic. For simplicity, we assume that the vaccine can be administrated in one shot, but our
analysis can be easily extended to two-shot vaccines.
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Second, prioritizing the Elderly group in Strategy 5 and 6 leads to the lowest number
of deaths. This is because the Elderly group has an excessively large mortality rate
(µ3 = 2.40%) compared to the Youth (µ1 = 0.003%) and the Adult (µ2 = 0.3%) (see
Table C.1). However, prioritizing the Elderly group does not necessarily lead to fewer
infections and must be accompanied by the strictest social distancing policies. This
is because the Elderly group imposes the least negative externality compared to the
other two groups. Thus, prioritizing the Elderly may result in higher healthcare and
social distancing costs than other strategies. Third, if vaccines are available to the Youth
group, prioritizing the Youth group can result in the least cumulative infection (Strategy
1: 4.51%; Strategy 2: 5.00%) because of their high activity level. Finally, under all six
vaccination implementation strategies, social distancing policy should be implemented
with about 15% - 25% contact reduction. Thus, it is important and more effective to
implement both vaccination and social distancing to reduce COVID-19 transmission.
Sensitivity Analysis
The preceding discussions suggest that, besides the mortality risk of specific age
groups, vaccination priority plans should also consider the negative effect imposed on
others by the age group with high activity level (due to their low mortality risk and
a lower disease burden if infected). In this section, we discuss how vaccine capacity,
mortality risk, and per-contact transmission rate could affect the three most important
outcome measures: the cumulative deaths, cumulative infections, and the total cost.
Since all COVID-19 vaccines developed so far primarily target adults that are 19 years
and older [97], we focus on Strategy 3: Adult-Elderly-Youth (referred to as “Strat-
egy Adult” hereafter) and Strategy 6: Elderly-Adult-Youth (referred to as “Strategy
Elderly” hereafter).
First, we increase the daily vaccine capacity from 50000 doses to 300000 doses per
day, with all other parameters remaining unchanged. Similar to the results for 50000-
dose capacity in Table 4.2, Figure 4.6 illustrates that Strategy Elderly results in a
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lower number of deaths but a higher total cost. Not surprisingly, both the number
of deaths and infections decreases with the vaccine capacity. However, as the vaccine
capacity increases, the rate at which infection decreases under Strategy Adult is faster
than that under Strategy Elderly. This is because the Adult group is more active than
the Elderly group, and vaccinating the Adult group could accelerate the reduction of
infections due to their stronger negative externality compared to the Elderly group.
This is consistent with the findings of [170] where there is no constraint on vaccine
production capacity. However, when vaccine capacity is very limited (5000 or 10000
daily capacity), it takes much longer to end the pandemic. Consequently, the majority
of the population, including the Elderly group, are infected under either strategy. As
a result, the number of infections under the two strategies are very close. Therefore,
in contrast to [170]’s findings, Strategy Elderly recommended by CDC becomes more
favorable because it results in similar number of infections but much fewer deaths when
vaccine production capacity is limited.
Second, we reduce the mortality ratio of the Elderly to the Adult group from roughly
6:1 in the base case to 2:1 with the hope that medical treatments for severe complications
of COVID-19 will become more effective. Similar to the results in Table 4.2, Figure
4.7C shows that Strategy Adult dominates Strategy Elderly economically. As expected,
both the number of deaths and infections decreases with the mortality ratio. As the
mortality ratio becomes smaller (closer mortality rate), the negative externality due
to high activity level becomes more salient. Therefore, vaccinating the group with a
higher activity level (i.e., the Adult group) could result in both fewer infections and
fewer deaths, as shown in Figures 4.7A and 4.7B.
Lastly, we examine the impact of increasing contract transmission rate β up to
80% higher than the base case β because some coronavirus variants might be more
infectious [27]. Figure 4.8 shows that, Strategy Elderly poses a lower number of deaths
compared to Strategy Adult because of the Elderly group’s high mortality rate, but a
higher number of infections because of the stronger negative externality imposed by the
101
Adult group. However, Strategy Elderly becomes an economically dominant strategy
with a lower cost compared to Strategy Adult as β increases.
In sum, we find that the trade-off between higher mortality rate and negative ex-
ternality imposed by the active age/risk group is the key to determining the best vac-
cination priority strategy. The change of vaccine capacity, mortality rate, and contract
transmission rate would result in different vaccination priorities. With the current vac-
cine capacity (less than 50000 doses per day), the recommended vaccination priority
(“elderly first”) by CDC [24] leads to fewer deaths and a similar number of infections
compared to alternative priority plans. Although “elderly first” incurs a higher overall
cost in the current situation, it may become more cost-effective than the “adult first”
plan as the coronavirus becomes more infectious.
Figure 4.6: Compare vaccination priority strategies under different vaccine capacity per
day. All other model parameters are kept unchanged.
4.7 Conclusions
We provide both theoretical and numerical analysis to address the urgent problem of
public health intervention design and vaccine prioritization to better contain a pandemic
such as COVID-19.
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Figure 4.7: Compare vaccination priority strategies under different Elderly/Adult mor-
tality ratio. All other model parameters are kept unchanged.
Figure 4.8: Compare vaccination priority strategies under different per-contact trans-
mission rate β. All other model parameters are kept unchanged.
First, we study the strategic planning of lockdown and social distancing policies, two
of the most widely-implemented public health interventions, to alleviate the resulting
disease burden and socioeconomic loss. We use a multinomial logit choice model to
characterize individual reactions to public health interventions and the risk of infection
and integrate it into a repeated Stackelberg game model framework.
103
We derive insightful results from structural properties of equilibrium individual re-
sponses and optimal interventions. We show that the individual equilibrium activity
level is higher than the socially optimal activity level due to an individual’s ignorance of
the negative externality imposed on others, with the largest difference at a middle-range
disease prevalence. As a result, we find that the lockdown policy is more effective when
the disease prevalence is moderate. Similarly, social distancing policy should be more
emphasized after the disease prevalence peak. Numerically, we show that the social
distancing policy is more cost-effective than the lockdown policy, and simultaneous im-
plementation of both policies does not help contain the disease spread: in fact, it may
incur excessive costs.
Second, based on our analytical framework, we investigate the optimal vaccine pri-
ority when vaccine production capacity is limited. Due to the heterogeneity of the risk
of being in critical condition, younger age groups are more socially active and impose
higher negative externality than the elderly. We find that, as a result, vaccine prior-
ity highly depends on factors including the government authorities’ objective, vaccine
capacity, mortality risk and per-contact transmission rate. In particular, our results
confirm CDC’s recommendation [24] that the “elderly first” strategy prevents exces-
sive deaths and achieves similar cumulative numbers of infections to alternative priority
plans due to vaccine capacity constraint. Although the “elderly first” strategy incurs
a higher overall cost in the current situation, it may become more cost-effective as the
coronavirus becomes more infectious. Finally, we recommend that social distancing be
strictly enforced in parallel with vaccine distribution to contain the disease transmission,
especially under the “elderly first” vaccination strategy.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to integrate dynamic compart-
mental models, multinomial logit choice models, game theory, and mathematical opti-
mization into an integrated model framework to study public health interventions for a
pandemic. We have made assumptions that are high-level abstraction from reality and
are ubiquitous in the literature [48, 94]. Nevertheless, our study has several limitations.
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First, our disease progression model only stratifies the population based on age, simi-
lar to previous literature [84, 171]. However, other factors like co-morbidity may also
influence the severity and mortality of COVID-19 infections. Our model can be easily
extended to account for other population demographics as data becomes available. Sec-
ond, we assume that the disease prevalence is known to both the central planner and
the population. Although the exact number of infections might not be known, both
agents could infer and estimate the actual prevalence from publicly available informa-
tion including the number of confirmed infections and test positive rates [123]. Third,
we assume the same utility function for all individuals regardless of their health states
(i.e., susceptible, infectious or recovered) for analytical tractability. Studies have shown
that more than 78% of COVID-19 infections have no symptoms [45] and “80% of infec-
tions are mild or asymptomatic”[160]. As a consequence, the majority of the individuals
are unaware of their true health states and thus do not differ in their decision-making
process for daily activity level. Future work could consider state-specific utility func-
tions using the heterogeneous model developed in the paper. Lastly, we assume that
individuals myopically maximize their daily utility when deciding whether to go out
or stay at home, but some individuals could be forward looking and maximize their
long-term utility in reality. We note that many individual behaviors during COVID-19
are possibly results of myopic decisions, such as holding social events against public
health advice [36]. Also, the development of the COVID-19 pandemic has deviated
from many scientific predictions [135], which complicates individual long-term decision-
















Strategy 1, vaccine Priority in order of youth-adult-elderly
per-person social distancing policy cost: $4029.3
0-19 years old $ 53.45 10.52 3.07% 79.56%
20-59 years old $ 2679.9 4819.8 5.75% 79.56%
60+ years old $ 1339.7 8487.5 3.38% 79.56%
(weighted) sum $ 1694.5 13318 4.51%* 79.56%
Strategy 2, vaccine Priority in order of youth-elderly-adult
per-person social distancing policy cost: $4951.8
0-19 years old $ 53.34 10.50 3.07% 74.45%
20-59 years old $ 3341.5 6009.7 7.16% 74.45%
60+ years old $ 957.00 6062.8 2.41% 74.45%
(weighted) sum $ 1941.2 12083 5.00%* 74.45%
Strategy 3, vaccine Priority in order of adult-elderly-youth
per-person social distancing policy cost: $3240.1 *
0-19 years old $ 446.32 87.86 25.65% 80.35%
20-59 years old $ 1968.7 3540.7 4.22% 80.35%
60+ years old $ 1499.6 9500.4 3.78% 80.35%
(weighted) sum $ 1470.1* 13129 9.58% 80.35%*
Strategy 4, vaccine Priority in order of adult-youth-elderly
per-person social distancing policy cost: $3441.2 *
0-19 years old $ 207.18 40.78 11.91% 80.12%
20-59 years old $ 1912.8 3440.3 4.10 % 80.12%
60+ years old $ 1661.5 10526 4.19% 80.12%
(weighted) sum $ 1418.8* 14007 6.11% 80.12%*
Strategy 5, vaccine Priority in order of elderly-youth-adult
per-person social distancing policy cost: $5374.2
0-19 years old $ 84.70 16.67 4.87% 72.99%
20-59 years old $ 3487.4 6272.2 7.48% 72.99%
60+ years old $ 771.21 4885.8 1.95% 72.99%
(weighted) sum $ 1979.7 11175* 5.51% 72.99%
Strategy 6, vaccine Priority in order of elderly-adult-youth
per-person social distancing policy cost: $4215.5
0-19 years old $ 382.67 75.33 21.99% 76.90%
20-59 years old $ 3121.6 5614.2 6.69% 76.90%
60+ years old $ 772.18 4891.9 1.95% 76.90%
(weighted) sum $ 1869.6 10581* 9.47% 76.90%
Table 4.2: Result decomposition for different vaccination priorities. (Daily Vaccine =
50000 doses. Initial disease status is the epidemiological status as of Dec 13, 2020. ∗
represents the top two choices in the corresponding outcome measure category)
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation presents applications of stochastic progress modeling for optimizing
patient health outcomes in three settings: 1) an acute infectious disease, 2) a chronic
infectious disease setting, and 3) an infectious disease outbreak setting. In Chapter
2, we assess the cost-effectiveness of different test-and-treat strategies for AFI patients
both analytically and numerically. We formulate the problem to balance the weighted
average of antibiotic underuse (short term, and immediate harms) and overuse (long
term side effect of developing antibiotic resistance). We find that empirical treatment
with antibiotics provided the best outcomes if antibiotics overuse is not the primary
concern; otherwise, strategies involving diagnostic tests become cost-effective. PCR-
led strategies (e.g., multiplex PCR test or parallel bacterial PCR tests) are robust
under parameter uncertainty. Earlier hospital presentation can avoid worsened health
outcomes.
In Chapter 3, we introduce a Semi-Markov Decision Process framework for making
monitoring decisions for patients with chronic, and potentially infectious diseases with
heterogeneous adherence behaviors. We provide policy-relevant structural properties
of the stochastic model that allow our framework to be useful in contexts outside the
particular application of HIV management. Our results show that all optimized policies
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are on the cost-effectiveness frontier, and in certain circumstances, dominating the fixed
policies. We conclude that adherence type differentiation could significantly improve
patient health outcomes (from a societal perspective) by improving quality-adjusted
life-years gained, while saving costs.
In Chapter 4, we use a multinomial discrete choice model to characterize an indi-
vidual activity level and integrate it into a repeated game-theoretical model with SIR
disease transmission dynamics to optimize public health interventions. We find that
social distancing is more effective than lockdown. More importantly, an individual ac-
tivity level is higher than the aggregated optimal activity level, due to an individual’s
ignorance of the negative externality imposed on others, with the largest difference at
a middle-range disease prevalence. Therefore, we find that strict social distancing and
lockdown policies should be more emphasized after the disease prevalence peak and is
necessary even when vaccines become available. Lastly, due to the heterogeneity of the
risk of being in critical condition, the youth and adult group would impose a higher
negative externality to the elderly. Thus, vaccine priority can be given to the youth or
adult age group rather than the elderly to reduce the overall disease burden and even
death rates under certain circumstances.
5.1 Future Research Directions
Our work could be extended in several ways. In Chapter 2, we only study a 45-day
time horizon, which is less than all the acute diseases we consider. We can expand our
first stage models to account for the surveillance information obtained from implement-
ing different diagnostic tests. We embed the core disease progression models within a
longer time horizon modeling framework that incorporates seasonality. Unlike the first
stage model that takes the underlying disease prevalence as an input, in this expanded
model, diagnostic tests provide additional information on the disease prevalence. We
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adopt a Bayesian framework for belief updates: at each time step, we update the be-
lief probability of the disease prevalence given the result(s) of the diagnostic test(s)
prescribed in the recently-implemented strategy. This belief update procedure leads
to better prevalence estimates and better decisions for future patients. We formulate
a stochastic control problem to optimize patient health outcome by choosing the best
clinical decision for any given belief of the disease prevalence. To demonstrate the cost-
effectiveness of the optimized surveillance policy, we compare Stage 2 model outputs
(i.e., DALYs, costs, and antibiotic overuse) to the model outputs of the non-surveillance
strategies described in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, our model assumed adherence type is known prior to treatment initi-
ation, which generally does not hold in reality. Meanwhile, our model does not consider
the impact of frequent monitoring on patient adherence behavior. Researchers found
through various studies that adherence intervention programs (i.e., home visits, phone
calls, daily tracking, etc.) that could improve patient adherence behavior ([1], [65],
[66]). Future work could involve adherence learning, and adherence promoting into the
decision-making framework.
In Chapter 4, we focused primarily on motivating the model and developing so-
lution techniques, and made assumptions that are high-level abstraction from reality.
Future work could incorporate more detailed stratification on the disease dynamics by
incorporating hospitalization, inter-state travels, other possible risk group stratification.
Appendix A
Chapter 2 Supplement Material
A.1 Additional Information
DALY Definition and Calculation
DALY, disability-adjusted life years, is a measure of overall disease burden. We first
calculate the Years of Life Lost (YLL) due to premature mortality in the population,
and the Years Lost due to Disability (YLD) for people living with the disease. And
then the total DALY is calculated by taking the sum of YLL and YLD: DALY = YLL
+ YLD. For more details on the YLL and YLD, please refer to WHO official definition
of DALY ([96]).
In our Result Section, we show the per-patient (expected) DALY where we divide
the total DALYs in the population by the population size.
To determine the weights of antibiotic overuse/underuse
For each antibiotic-curable (bacterial) disease, we first computed the difference in
and clinical outcomes of the disease progression model with, or without antibiotic treat-
ment to parameterize the weights (reference: Strategy 1, no antibiotics). We then
followed the classical approach in healthcare economics to combine the two objectives
(incremental costs, DALYs averted) into a single net monetary benefit (NMB) objective
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(which is the weight) on cost scale by associating a willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresh-
old per DALY averted: weights = NMB = WTP∗ DALY averted – incremental costs.
In Thailand setting, we estimated wunder for leptospirosis: 25777 USD, scrub typhus:
25780 USD, and other bacterial: 25765 USD. To better the problem, we assumed a uni-
fied weight (denoted by wunder ) for all antibiotic-curable diseases: the median, 25777
USD for our case study.
For non-bacterial diseases, the health burden of over-prescribing antibiotics was not
captured within the 45-day study horizon. We represented the weight using a monetary
penalty (denoted by wover , and the base value was set to the WTP of wunder) on
every course of antibiotic (over)prescribed to non-bacterial patients. There ha been
investigating the cost of resistance by consuming antibiotics. For example, [134] reported
the estimated economic cost of resistance per standard unit (per course) of penicillin (an
alternative antibiotic to treat bacterial febrile diseases) was $ 0.8 ($ 11.5) in Thailand.
Nevertheless, the model might underestimate the cost of resistance to a considerable
degree. As discussed in their paper, the model does not take transmission and future
medical cost into account. Second, the model only counts a subset of resistant infections,
and one death only results in 10 life years lost. More importantly, their definition of
estimated cost of resistance deviates from our definition of antibiotic overuse penalty:
we only penalize the overused, unnecessary antibiotics prescription, not including those
bacterially infected patients whom should indeed receive antibiotic therapy. A higher
penalty translates to a higher priority in antibiotics reduction by preventing possible
future harm due to antibiotics resistance, not the myopic costs immediately incurred
for patients.
We also computed the test sensitivity requirements for testing strategies to dominate
“no testing” in scenario A and B (by grouping scrub typhus under the “other bacterial”
category). We set wover = WTP = 5,907.91 USD (Thailand GDP per capita in 2016),
and wunder = 25777USD . For Scenario A(bacterial-endemic), we recommend empirical
antibiotics treatment without any test, even if the bacterial test or the viral test has
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100% sensitivity. On the other hand, both “bacterial test” with any sensitivity, and
“viral test” with reasonable sensitivity ≥ 8.76% ,and most tests have sensitivities ≥ 50%
) would be better than empirical antibiotics treatment in Scenario B (viral-endemic).
Data, Sources and Model Calibration
1. Transition Probabilities
Transition probabilities among health states were time-homogeneous. Transition
probabilities for each disease were calibrated to match the reported mean duration
of fever in the mild stage, and mean duration of hospitalization in the severe
state, and mortality rates in the medical literature respectively. We assumed that
antibiotic treatment reduced mean fever duration (mean days of hospitalization)
by half for mild (severe) leptospirosis and scrub typhus patients ([139], [156]).
Transition probabilities for “other” infections not treatable with antibiotics were
assumed to be similar to dengue, and were varied in sensitivity analysis. We
provide a sample Markov trace plot for leptospirosis disease progression in Figure
A.4. Exact values and references for each parameter are provided in Table A.1.
2. Costs, DALYs, test sensitivities and specificities
We obtained test costs, health costs and DALY-related parameters for all five
possible causes of infection from the published literature and WHO life table for
Thailand. Disability weights (DW) for “other bacterial” and “other” infections
were assumed to be of the same magnitude as dengue, leptospirosis and scrub
typhus (i.e., DW in Mild state: 0.2; DW in Severe state: 0.5) ([144], [83]). Sensi-
tivities and specificities of leptospirosis, scrub typhus and dengue diagnostic tests
were reported in various studies ([140] [61], [68], [64], [4], [125]). Detailed refer-
ences can be found in Appendix Table A1. Due to the lack of studies reporting
sensitivity and specificity of multiplex PCR tests in Thailand, we set the sensitiv-
ity and specificity of multiplex PCR diagnostic test (except for the scrub typhus
component ([141])) to be similar (but slightly lower) than values reported for other
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places in the medical literature ([151], [59]).
Sensitivity Analysis
1. Varying Disease Prevalence
We performed sensitivity analysis on the level endemicity of different diseases at
different locations in Thailand (1) (i.e., Set 1 and Set 2 in Table A.4). We then
induced the optimal strategy sequence for Set 1 and Set 2 when patient present
to hospital at their first, fourth and tenth day of illness (Figure A.1). We refer to
the disease prevalence employed in the main content (Scenario A and Scenario B)
as the base-case.
We had the followings observations from Figure A.1. First, the main observations
are consistent with the base-case analysis: Empirical antibiotics treatment to all
patients (Strategy 2) was most cost-effective with small antibiotics overuse penalty.
Depending on the specific disease prevalence and WTP level, the threshold (of its
cost-effectiveness) may vary. Second, as dengue (or equivalently, viral-diseases)
prevalence increases, strategy with single test (i.e., Dengue PCR or Dengue RDT,
or Lepto RDT) had the highest NMB for a wider range of WTP and penalty val-
ues. Third, For WTP equals to Thailand GDP per capita, the optimal strategy
sequence was mostly consistent with the base-case: Empirical Antibiotics to all pa-
tients was cost-effective with zero, and low penalty region, but Strategy 15 (Multi-
plex PCR test) or Strategy 12 (P: Lepto RDT, typhus RDT) became cost-effective
for penalty >= $ 13,000/course, >= 20,000/course, and >=30,000/course for pa-
tients presenting on day one, day four, day ten respectively with disease prevalence
Set 1; and for penalty >=6,000/course, >= 8,500/course, >= $ 15,000/course for
patients presenting on day one, day four, day ten respectively with disease preva-
lence Set 2. Last, when patients present late (i.e. at their tenth day of illness),
strategies with rapid diagnostic tests such as Strategy 4 (dengue RDT), Strategy
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12 (P: Lepto RDT, typhus RDT), Strategy 13 (P: Lepto PCR, typhus RDT) be-
came cost-effective. This is also consistent with our base-case analysis since RDT
is more accurate in the later stage of diseases.
2. One-way Sensitivity Analysis
We performed one-way sensitivity analysis for all other variables over estimated
data ranges (Table A). We kept the disease prevalence the same as in the bacterial-
endemic Scenario A (i.e., 52.8% chance of leptospirosis infection, Table A.1) and
assumed patients present to hospital on their first day of illness. We display
optimal strategies at penalty = $ 0, $ 10,000 and $50,000 USD in Table F. In all
cases, empirical treatment was most cost-effective with respect to pure DALY and
costs incurred (i.e., penalty = $ 0 k).
The results were sensitive to a few variables, including cohort age, the wait time
of tests (time lag), as well as sensitivity and specificity of diagnostic tests. For a
cohort of younger patients, it is more beneficial to apply the “empirical treatment”
strategies in order to avoid high DALYs caused by deaths. For a cohort of older
patients (i.e., 60 years old), Strategy 15 (Multiplex PCR) would be more likely to
cost-effective with a moderate penalty in antibiotics overuse. In bacterial-endemic
Scenario A, our analyses show that strategies consisting of high sensitivity and
specificity leptospirosis diagnostic had higher chance of being cost-effective.
Our results were not sensitive to disease progression probabilities, disability weights
(DWs) and treatments costs or productivity loss costs in either mild or severe state.
This is probably because even though values of DWs, costs, transition probabili-
ties were varied, they were still on different magnitudes for different health states.
Among all variables ranges considered, Strategy 2 (Empirical All), 15 (Multiplex
PCR test) were generally considered cost-effective. The result of sensitivity anal-
yses imply that Multiplex PCR test could be considered as an alternative when
antibiotics misuse/overuse is truly a concern to society/ the Decision Maker.
114
We also observe from Figure 2.3a that empirical antibiotic treatment (Strategy 2)
and Multiplex PCR (Strategy 15) were cost-effective for a wide range of wover and
WTP. We then restricted our attention by comparing the relative cost-effectiveness
of these two strategies (Figure A.2). We found that the empirical antibiotic treat-
ment strategy is always on the effectiveness frontier, and gives smaller ICER com-
pared to Multiplex PCR with younger patient age, lower leptospirosis-component
sensitivity, higher disease-specific mortality rate, and longer test wait time. The
remaining parameters like test and health costs, disability weights were not sen-
sitive to variation. All these conclusions are consistent with the results of the
aforementioned univariate sensitivity analysis.
3. Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis
We conducted a probabilistic sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simulation,
examining the cost-effectiveness of each strategy for each set of sampled param-
eters. The willingness-to-pay threshold is set to be Thailand GDP per capita in
2016: 5907.91 USD. We randomly generated 10,000 problem instances (i.e., 10,000
scenarios with different parameter sets). For each instance, all parameters that
are on a continuous scale were randomly sampled from a triangle distribution with
mode given by the base case value, and lowest and highest values corresponding
to the ranges in Table A.1. The disease prevalence was randomly generated given
the ranges of values reported in [140]. Parameters that are on discrete scales
(i.e., wait time of diagnostic tests) were sampled from either triangle distribu-
tion (rounded to the nearest integer) or uniform distributions. The Monte Carlo
simulation results are shown in Figure A.3. Our analyses indicate that when the
penalty on antibiotics overuse is low ($ 0/course to $ 15,000 /course), empirical
treatment is most likely to be cost-effective, while strategies with single dengue
tests (Strategy 5 Dengue PCR and Strategy 4 Dengue RDT) could be an alterna-
tive substitution to reduce antibiotics overuse. However, as the penalty increases,
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strategies involving bacterial tests dominates. With a moderate and high penalty
(i.e., $ 25,000/course to $ 150,000 /course) Strategy 15 (Multiplex PCR) is most
cost-effective. Other than Strategy 15, Strategy 11 (P: Lepto PCR, typhus PCR)
are more cost-effective than other strategies within a moderate or high penalty
on antibiotics overuse. Similarly in previous analyses, once antibiotic reduction is
prioritized (i.e. penalty >= $ 150,000 course), strategies with single leptospirosis
PCR test (Strategy 7) would eventually become cost-effective. We observe in PSA
analyses, PCR-led strategies dominate RDT-led strategies even though patients’
health seeking behavior (delay) were heterogeneous (min: 0 day, mean: 4 days,
max: 10 days). Observing the descriptive statistics from Appendix Table A.1, we
conclude (qualitatively) that PCR is more accurate (higher sensitivity and speci-
ficity) during the early course of illness, whereas RDT is more accurate in the later
stage of diseases. However, patients gain much more benefit if antibiotics treat-
ment was initiated early (i.e. diagnostic tests were prescribed during the early
course of illness) before they progressed to worsened health states. As a conse-
quence, even though we varied the delay of seeking health in PSA analyses, more
health benefits were accrued from early detection and early antibiotics treatment.
This is consistent with the findings from other papers [78]. Lastly, we observe the
current protocol recommended by WHO can be cost-effective with at most 25%
chance at penalty = $ 15,000/course.
A.2 Tables and Figures





Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable base value Minimum Maximum Source
probability of typhus in-
fection
4.60% [140]






probability of other in-
fection
26% [140]
Cohort Age 40 20 60 assumed
Daily Transition Probabilities: Lepto-related
From mild (with antibi-
otics)
to mild 0.51 [139]
to severe 0 0 0 [139]
to recover 0.49 0.243 1 [139]
From severe (with an-
tibiotics)
to severe 0.833 [156], [138]
to recover 0.146 0.156 0.137 [156], [138]
to death 0.021 0.011 0.029
From mild (without an-
tibiotics)
to mild 0.815 [139]
to severe 0.074 0.067 0.083 [139]
to recover 0.111 0.1 0.125 [139]
From severe (without
antibiotics)
to severe 0.929 [144]
to recover 0.048 0.059 0.039 [144]
to death 0.023 0.012 0.033 [144]
Test Parameters: Lepto
Rapid Test-costs, $ 5.7 3 7 [139]
Sensitivity (<= 4 day of
illness)
62% 41% 79% [61]
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable base value Minimum Maximum Source
Specificity (<= 4 day of
illness)
98% 93% 99% [61]
Sensitivity (>= 5 day of
illness)
81% 69% 90% [61]
Specificity (>= 5 day of
illness)
93% 88% 96% [61]
time lag (days) 1 0 2 assumed
PCR Test costs, $ 14 10 20 assumed
Sensitivity (<= 4 day of
illness)
85.00% 73% 97.50% [125]
Specificity (<= 4 day of
illness)
95.00% 90% 100% [125]
Sensitivity (>= 5 day of
illness)
41.50% 26.70% 57.80% [125]
Specificity (>= 5 day of
illness)
95.00% 90% 100% [125]




2 1 3 [139]
Daily costs in Mild 5.25 5 10 [139]
Daily costs in Severe 48.71 30 70 [139]
DALY: Lepto
DW: Mild 0.21 0.15 0.3 [144]
DW: Severe 0.56 0.4 0.6 [144]
YLL 34.9 [144], [114]
Daily Transition Probabilities: other bacterial
From mild (with antibi-
otics)
to mild 0.625 [139]
to severe 0 0 0 [139]
to recover 0.375 0.063 1 [139]
From severe (with an-
tibiotics)
to severe 0.833 [156], [138]
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable base value Minimum Maximum Source
to recover 0.146 0.156 0.137
to death 0.021 0.011 0.029 [156], [138]
From mild (without an-
tibiotics)
to mild 0.811 [139]
to severe 0.075 0.051 0.148 [139]
to recover 0.113 0.076 0.222 [139]
From severe
to severe 0.929 [142]
to recover 0.048 0.059 0.039 [142]
to death 0.023 0.012 0.033 [142]
Health Costs: other bacterial
doxycycline prescrip-
tion (one-shot)
2 1 3 [139]
Daily costs in Mild 5.25 5 10 [139]
Daily costs in Severe 48.71 30 70 [139]
DALY: other bacterial
DW: Mild 0.2 0.15 0.3 [144]
DW: Severe 0.5 0.4 0.6 [144]
YLL 34.9 [144] [114]
Daily Transition Probabilities: typhus
From mild (with antibi-
otics)
to mild 0.383 [139]
to severe 0 0 0 [139]
to recover 0.617 0.338 1 [139]
From severe (with an-
tibiotics)
to severe 0.833 [156] [138]
to recover 0.146 0.156 0.137
to death 0.021 0.011 0.029 [156] [138]
From mild (without an-
tibiotics)
to mild 0.811 [139]
to severe 0.075 0.076 0.222 [139]
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable base value Minimum Maximum Source
to recover 0.113 0.051 0.148 [139]
From severe (without
antibiotics)
to severe 0.929 [142]
to recover 0.048 0.059 0.039 [142]
to death 0.023 0.012 0.033 [142]
Tests Parameters: typhus
Rapid Test-costs, $ 5.7 3 7 [139]
Sensitivity (<= 4 day of
illness)
67% 41% 79% [68]
Specificity (<= 4 day of
illness)
98% 93% 99% [68]
Sensitivity (>= 5 day of
illness)
80% 69% 90% same as lepto
Specificity (>= 5 day of
illness)
95% 88% 96% same as lepto
time lag (days) 1 0 2
PCR Test costs, $ 14 10 20 assumed
Sensitivity (<= 4 day of
illness)
85.00% 73% 97.50% same as lepto
Specificity (<= 4 day of
illness)
95.00% 90% 100% same as lepto
Sensitivity (>= 5 day of
illness)
41.50% 26.70% 57.80% asame as lepto
Specificity (>= 5 day of
illness)
95.00% 90% 100% same as lepto




2 1 3 [139]
Daily costs in Mild 5.25 5 10 [139]
Daily costs in Severe 48.71 30 70 [139]
DALY: typhus
DW: Mild 0.21 0.15 0.3 [144]
DW: Severe 0.56 0 0.6 [144]
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable base value Minimum Maximum Source
YLL 34.9 [144]
Daily Transition Probabilities: dengue
From Mild (with stan-
dard care)
to mild 0.815 [88] [23]
to severe 0.027 0.061 0.214 [88] [23]
to recover 0.159 0.01 0.036 [88] [23]
From Severe
to severe 0.898 [143] [82]
to recover 0.089 0.095 0.073 [143] [82]
to death 0.013 0.007 0.013 [143] [82]
Test Parameters: dengue
Rapid Test-costs, $ 5.7 3 7 same as lepto
Sensitivity (<= 4 day of
illness)
68% 60% 75% [64] [63]
Specificity (<= 4 day of
illness)
76% 71% 80% [64] [63]
Sensitivity (>= 5 day of
illness)
90% 80% 99% [64] [63]
Specificity (>= 5 day of
illness)
98% 95% 100% [64] [63]
Wait time (days) 1 0 2 assumed
PCR Test-costs, $ 14 10 20 assumed
Sensitivity (<= 4 day of
illness)
85% 51% 100% [4]
Specificity (<= 4 day of
illness)
100% 100% 100% [4]
Sensitivity (>= 5 day of
illness)
50% 30% 70% [4]
Specificity (>= 5 day of
illness)
100% 100% 100% [4]
time lag (days) 2 assumed
Health Costs: dengue
Daily costs in Mild, $ 5.25 5 10 [133]
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable base value Minimum Maximum Source
Daily costs in Severe, $ 59.68 40 60 [133]
DALY: dengue
DW: Mild 0.2 0.15 0.3 [83]
DW: Severe 0.56 0.4 0.6 [83]
YLL 34.9 same as lepto
Real-time Multiplex PCR Parameters
Price, $ 50 30 80 assumed
lepto Sensitivity (<= 4
day of illness)
90% 0.7 1 assumed
lepto Specificity (<= 4
day)
95% 90% 1 assumed
typhus sensitivity (<=
4 day)
87% 74.2 94.4 [141]
typhus specificity (<= 4
day)
100% 97.3 100 [141]
dengue sensitivity (<=
4 day)
90% 0.7 1 assumed
dengue specificity (<=
4 day)
95% 90% 1 assumed
lepto Sensitivity (>= 5
day of illness)
60% 0.4 0.8 assumed
lepto Specificity (>= 5
day)
90% 85% 0.98 assumed
typhus sensitivity (>=
5 day)
55% 0.4 0.8 assumed
typhus specificity (>= 5
day)
97% 85% 0.98 assumed
dengue sensitivity (>=
5 day)
60% 0.4 0.8 assumed
dengue specificity (>=
5 day)
90% 85% 0.98 assumed
Table A.1: Value for model variables
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Strategies / Scenarios Scenario B: Viral-Endemic Scenario B: Viral-Endemic
Cost DALY P(over) P(under) Cost DALY P(over) P(under)
1 No Antibiotics *º 216.166 2.911 0 0.619 138.978 1.258 0 0.171
2 Empirical All *º 47.549 0.239 0.381 0 94.107 0.52 0.829 0
3 Empirical Severe º 130.63 1.323 0.055 0.248 116.784 0.819 0.119 0.068
4 Dengue RDT 104.111 1.034 0.198 0.132 112.024 0.739 0.282 0.036
5 Dengue PCR *º 85.512 0.628 0.197 0 110.094 0.628 0.184 0
6 Lepto RDT *º 137.518 1.576 0.006 0.253 132.471 1.078 0.014 0.112
7 Lepto PCR * 122.619 1.239 0.014 0.131 134.053 1.025 0.029 0.085
8 S: Lepto RDT, typhus RDT º 129.498 1.462 0.011 0.43 129.077 1.036 0.024 0.192
9 S: Lepto PCR, typhus RDT *º 119.643 1.142 0.017 0.216 134.098 0.988 0.037 0.146
10 S: Lepto RDT, typhus PCR 127.176 1.44 0.014 0.387 128.716 1.027 0.031 0.173
11 P: Lepto PCR, typhus PCR 131.534 1.079 0.026 0.097 148.671 0.958 0.057 0.071
12 P: Lepto RDT, typhus RDT 135.543 1.437 0.013 0.222 135.924 1.025 0.028 0.1
13 P: Lepto PCR, typhus RDT 125.833 1.122 0.019 0.106 141.617 0.979 0.041 0.075
14 P: Lepto RDT, typhus PCR 148.592 1.492 0.019 0.186 144.128 1.02 0.041 0.084
15 Multiplex PCR*º 148.696 1.001 0.014 0.08 170.8 0.961 0.029 0.072
Table A.2: Strategy outcomes: patients seeking care on the first day of illness
Strategies / Scenarios Scenario B: Viral-Endemic Scenario B: Viral-Endemic
Cost DALY P(over) P(under) Cost DALY P(over) P(under)
1 No Antibiotics *º 216.166 2.911 0 0.22 138.978 1.258 0 0.06
2 Empirical All *º 149.508 1.72 0.075 0 122.128 0.93 0.163 0
3 Empirical Severe 160.095 1.857 0.055 0.248 124.963 0.967 0.119 0.068
4 Dengue RDT*º 155.717 1.838 0.045 0.004 122.864 0.962 0.038 0.001
5 Dengue PCR 160.426 1.906 0.047 0 124.658 0.981 0.072 0
6 Lepto RDT *º 172.964 2.142 0.005 0.06 133.316 1.147 0.01 0.035
7 Lepto PCR * 196.73 2.548 0.003 0.117 137.11 1.203 0.006 0.041
8 S: Lepto RDT, typhus RDT * 172.399 2.084 0.007 0.099 134.2 1.124 0.015 0.06
9 S: Lepto PCR, typhus RDT 201.927 2.483 0.005 0.203 145.614 1.181 0.01 0.07
10 S: Lepto RDT, typhus PCR 172.814 2.118 0.006 0.096 133.345 1.138 0.014 0.057
11 P: Lepto PCR, typhus PCR 220.263 2.49 0.005 0.107 162.76 1.183 0.012 0.037
12 P: Lepto RDT, typhus RDT* 179.633 2.07 0.008 0.046 142.403 1.117 0.016 0.029
13 P: Lepto PCR, typhus RDT 210.424 2.463 0.005 0.102 153.892 1.173 0.012 0.035
14 P: Lepto RDT, typhus PCR 193.554 2.165 0.006 0.047 151.943 1.138 0.014 0.029
15 Multiplex PCR 233.338 2.332 0.007 0.078 183.249 1.156 0.015 0.032
For each scenario, we identified the strategies that were on the three-dimensional effectiveness frontier, where the
three dimensions are DALY, cost and antibiotic overuse. * = strategies on the cost-effectiveness frontier (econom-
ically efficient) for Scenario A (bacterial-endemic); º = strategies on the cost-effectiveness frontier (economically
efficient) for Scenario B (viral-endemic).
Table A.3: Strategy outcomes: patients seeking care on the tenth day of illness
Prevalence Leptospirosis Typhus Other bacterial Dengue Other
SET 1 0.358 0.209 0.047 0.071 0.315
SET 2 0.076 0.204 0.022 0.222 0.476
Table A.4: Sensitivity analysis of disease prevalence
Values obtained from [140]
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(a) Policies with highest net monetary benefit with by varying willingness-to-pay (WTP) on the y-axis
and penalty (wover) on the x-axis, where we fixed disease prevalence vector as Set 1 in Table A.4
(b) Policies with highest net monetary benefit with by varying willingness-to-pay (WTP) on the y-axis
and penalty (wover) on the x-axis, where we fixed disease prevalence vector as Set 2 in Table A.4
Figure A.1: Policies with highest NMB at alternative disease prevalence distributions
124
Figure A.2: Tornado diagram with variation in selected model parameters.
One-way sensitivity analysis, each row (bar) display the range of Augmented ICER of empirical antibiotic strat-
egy compared with Multiplex PCR strategy (patients present to a hospital on day one). We only displayed
leptospirosis-specific disease parameters, but all other disease categories share the same structure in the range
of ICER change. Augmented ICER = augmented incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, calculated by the ra-
tio of DALY difference and augmented cost difference. Augmented cost = cost + penalty * wover; DALY =
disability-adjusted life year; PCR = Polymerase Chain Reaction tests.
the acceptability curves of the probabilistic sensitivity analysis. We fixed WTP = Thailand GDP per capita.
The most cost-effective strategy for a given penalty, is the strategy with the highest NMB value.
Figure A.3: Results of probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
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Patients enter the model in Mild state, during the 45-day horizon, they could progress to Severe state, become
recovered, or dead.
Figure A.4: Sample Markov trace of disease progression for leptospirosis
Appendix B
Chapter 2 Supplement Material
B.1 Theorems and Proofs
Lemma B.1.1. Given an adherence state sequence A, r(Xtk , N) are equal in distribu-
tion for k = 0, 1, 2, ... almost surely, where A = {A0, ..., At}.
Proof of Lemma B.1.1. Given an adherence state sequence A, we can specify the exact
transition matrix P(A) at each time t. Then, the claim by applying total expectation
formula to Equation (3.2).
Let Pt(A) denote the t-step transition probability function, given an adherence mea-
surement sequence A. In addition, one can easily show by induction that EA[Pt(A)] =
Pt(θ), where P(θ) is defined previously as P(θ) = θP(A+)+(1−θ)P(A−). Denote P tij(θ)
as the t-step transition probability from state i to state j, given adherence type θ. We
further refine Lemma B.1.1 with respect to P(θ) as follow:
Lemma B.1.2. Given θ, r(Xtk , N) are equal in distribution for k = 0, 1, 2, .. with
respect to P(θ) almost surely.




We have the following lemma for r(Xtk , N): Given Lemma B.1.2, w
We first provide a few definitions, lemmas and theorems (on the structure of TPM
P(A)) that will be used in the proof.
Definition B.1.1. Totally Positive of Order 2. A Matrix P is of TP2 if all its second
order minors are non-negative, or equivalently, P (j1|i1)P (j2|i2) ≥ P (j2|i1)P (j1|i2), for
i2 ≥ i1, j2 ≥ j1.
Theorem B.1.1. First order dominance property, cited from [81]: For any two proba-
bility vectors b and b′, we have b′ ≥s b, if and only if for any increasing function f(·),
Eb′ [f(x)] ≥ Eb[f(x)].
Lemma B.1.3. Let P1, and P2 be two TP2 TPM. Then,
• the Hadamard product of P1 and P2 (i.e., P1 ⊗ P2 = [P1(i|j)P2(i|j)]i,j∈S) is TP2.
• the (usual) product of P1 and P2 is TP2.
Proof of Lemma B.1.3. By definition of TP2, we have P1(j|i)P1(y|x) ≥ P1(y|i)P1(j|x),
for x ≥ i, y ≥ j, and P2(j|i)P2(y|x) ≥ P2(y|i)P2(j|x), for x ≥ i, y ≥ j. Then,
P1(j|i)P1(y|x)P2(j|i)P2(y|x) ≥ P1(y|i)P1(j|x)P2(y|i)P2(j|x)
Thus, P1 ⊗ P2 is TP2.
For the proof of the second part, see [111] and [85].
Proof of Corollary 3.3.1. Proof for the first statement. When t = 0, Pt(θ) becomes an
identity matrix, and of TP2. When t = 1, it is trivial to check that P(θ) is of TP2 given
its definition. Now, assume it holds for all t = 0, 1, 2, ...k−1. Then, from Lemma B.1.3,
we know that Pk(θ) = Pk−1(θ) · P(θ) is of TP2.
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Proof for the second statement. By taking the TPM P(θ) to the tth power, and















0 pt22 1− pt22
0 0 1

By computing the sum of geometric series, we have the desired results.
Proof of Corollary 3.3.1. Proof for the first statement. When t = 0, Pt(θ) becomes an
identity matrix, and of TP2. When t = 1, it is trivial to check that P(θ) is of TP2 given
its definition. Now, assume it holds for all t = 0, 1, 2, ...k−1. Then, from Lemma B.1.3,
we know that Pk(θ) = Pk−1(θ) · P(θ) is of TP2.
Proof for the second statement. By taking the TPM P(θ) to the tth power, and















0 pt22 1− pt22
0 0 1

By computing the sum of geometric series, we have the desired results.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1. We start by providing an overview of the proof. To show
V (N) is quasi-concave, V (N) is differentiable with respect to N , we only need to show
∀N1, N2 ∈ (0,∞) (from [19]),
V (N1) ≥ V (N2)⇒
∂V
∂N
(N2) · (N1 −N2) ≥ 0,
We start by analyzing the first order, and second order condition of V (N), and complete
the proof by showing V (N) is unimodal, with a unique peak.
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(q22 − 1)(c − R) − r(s2)
)
, β2 = c. When q11 > q22, we
know β1 < 0 from Assumption 3.3.1 (conversely, if q11 ≤ q22, β1 ≥ 0). Note that
((qN11 − 1)2) > 0 (the denominator of ∂V∂N ), ∀N ∈ R
+. We then focus on figuring out
the sign of its numerator (denoted as f(N)). For the limits of f(N), we can derive
limN→0 f(N) = −β2qN11 log q11 > 0, and limN→∞ f(N) = 0. For a general N that is

















− β2qN11 log2 q11 (B.2)





= −β2 log2 q11, (B.3)
which is always negative. On the other hand, we have limN→∞
∂f
∂N = 0.
We claim that f(N) = 0 has a unique solution for N ∈ R+. To see this, We first


















> (q22 − q11)c (B.6)
The first equivalence follows by replacing p′s with q′s. The second equivalence follows
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by moving the cost term (c) to the LHS. Then, we have:









> 0 if q11 < q22
≤ 0 otherwise.
(B.7)
we rearrange f(N) = 0 in terms of N as follow:
β1 (log q22 − log q11) qN11qN22 + (−β1 log q22) qN22 = −(β1 + β2) log q11qN11 (B.8)
We consider two cases.
Case I: q11 < q22. For this case, the coefficient β1(log q22− log q11) > 0 since β1 > 0 and
q22 > q11. The other two coefficients −β1 log q22 and −(β1 +β2) are also positive. Then,
we know both the left-hand side and right-hand side of Equation (B.8) are non-negative
for N ∈ R+. Moreover, the exponent functions qN11, qN22 and qN11qN22 are monotonically de-
creasing in N Since q11 6= q22, and the three coefficients (β1(log q22− log q11), −β1 log q22
and −(β1 + β2) log q11) are not equal. We further rearrange Eq. (B.8) as follow:
β1 (log q22 − log q11) qN11qN22 + (−β1 log q22) qN22 = −(β1 + β2) log q11qN11 (B.9)
f1(N) + f2(N) = f3(N) (B.10)
Following the preceding analysis, we have f1(N) and f2(N) decreasing in N , f3(N)
is increasing N . The equality can only hold for (at most) one such N∗ ∈ (0,∞).
Combining with the two limits of f(N), limN→0
∂f
∂N < 0, and limN→∞
∂f
∂N = 0, we
conclude that f(N) = 0, hold exactly only once R+. We then conclude that V (N) is a
unimodal function with a unique peak, for q11 < q22.
Case II: q11 ≥ q22. The proof for this case is similar to Case I.
Now, we have for both cases V (N) is a unimodal function with a unique peak. That
is to say, N1 ≥ N2 and V (N1) ≥ V (N2), we know N2 ≤ N∗, thus ∂V∂N (N2) ≥ 0. Further,
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for any N ′ ≤ N∗, we have
∂V
∂N
(N ′) ≥ 0
. We then have ∂V∂N (N2)(N1 −N2) ≥ 0. if N1 ≥ N2 and V (N1) ≥ V (N2). On the other
hand, suppose N1 < N2 and V (N1) ≥ V (N2), similarly as above, we may conclude that
∂V
∂N (N2) ≤ 0, and thus
∂V
∂N (N2)(N1 −N2) ≥ 0.
We have then proved the sufficient and necessary first-order condition for quasi-
concavity to hold.
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider two cases.
Case I: q11 < q22. We first prove part (a) and (b). As θ increases, q11 increases and
q12 decreases (and the sum q11 + q12 is invariant). Let the change in q11 be ∆. Same
as in the proof of Theorem 3.3.1, we define f(N) as the derivative of V (N). Setting
f(N) = 0, we have
β1(q
N
11(1− qN22) log q11 − qN22(1− qN11) log q22) = −β2qN11 log q11
Similar in the analysis of Equation B.8 in the proof of Theorem 3.3.1, we can show that
both sides are non-negative. In addition, as θ increases, β1 increases since:





q12 − (q11 + ∆)
,
The first inequality follows from the last statement of Assumption 3.3.1. The second
inequality holds by some simple algebraic work. Furthermore, we have β2 is invariant
with respect to θ.
Now, we define κ(q11) to be the ratio of the coefficient of β1 over the coefficient of
β2 as in Equation (B.8):
κ(q11) =
qN11(1− qN22) log q11 − qN22(1− qN11) log q22
−qN11 log q11
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We have κ′(q11) =
N(qN11−1)
q11
< 0, ∀q11 ∈ (0, 1). Subsequently, we have κ(q11) is strictly
decreasing in q11. Then, we conclude that as θ increases (i.e., q11 increases), N
∗ increases
(i.e., we need a larger N to balance the increase in β1).







> 0 increases. Setting f(N) = 0, we have
β1(q
N
11(1− qN22) log q11 − qN22(1− qN11) log q22) = −β2qN11 log q11
Similarly, we define κ(N) as the ratio between the multiplier of β1 over the multiplier
of β2:
κ(N) =
qN11(1− qN22) log q11 − qN22(1− qN11) log q22
−qN11 log q11









22, (q11 − q22) qN11 log q22, and q22 (log q22 − log q11) are all strictly positive. Then,
we conclude that as R increases (i.e., β2β1 decreases), N
∗ decreases.
Case II: q11 ≥ q22. The proof for the second case is similar to Case I
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1. We first construct two ancillary matrices Q1 and Q2 as follow:
Q1 =

p11,θ p11,θ p12,θ p12,θ p13 p13
p11,θ p11,θ p12,θ p12,θ p13 p13
0 0 p22 p22 p23 p23
0 0 p22 p22 p23 p23
0 0 0 0 0 1





P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1)
P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1) P (OI|s1)
0 0 P (OI|s2) P (OI|s2) P (OI|s2) P (OI|s2)
0 0 P (OI|s2) P (OI|s2) P (OI|s2) P (OI|s2)
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1

It is trivial to check that both Q1 and Q2 are of TP2 (by definition). Then, we have
Q1(i′, j′)Q1(i, j) ≥ Q1(i′, j)Q1(i, j′), and Q2(i′, j′)Q2(i, j) ≥ Q2(i′, j)Q2(i, j′) whenever
i ≥ i′, and j ≥ j′ (and i, i′, j, j′ ∈ |S×O|). Then, we haveQ1(i′, j′)Q1(i, j)Q2(i, j)Q2(i′, j′) ≥
Q1(i′, j)Q1(i, j′)Q2(i′, j)Q2(i, j′), Then Q = Q1⊗Q2, is also of TP2 (which can also be
shown using the first statement of Lemma B.1.3).
Definition B.1.2. Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) ordering. Let b and b′ denote
any two n-dimensional (and finite) probability vectors. Then b′ dominates b with respect
to the MLR order (i.e. b′ ≥r b) if b′(i)b(j) ≤ b(i)b′(j), for all i < j ∈ S.
Definition B.1.3. First Order Stochastic Dominance. Let b and b′ denote any two n-
dimensional (and finite) probability vectors. Then, b′ is said to first order stochastically





′(i), for all j ∈ S.
It is well-known that MLR ordering of belief vectors implies first order stochastic
dominance (a partial order) of these two belief vectors (i.e., b′ ≥r b→ b′ ≥s b) ([81]).
Furthermore, we can show that MLR order is preserved under Bayes updates:
Lemma B.1.4. MLR order preservation. Given two belief vector b′ and b, and obser-
vation o, denote
Po = diag(P (o|s1), P (o|s2), P (o|s3)),
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(i.e., Po is a 3-dimensional diagonal matrix with the entries P (o|s1), P (o|s2), P (o|s3).




Proof. Applying the definition of MLR ordering, we re-write the RHS as
P (o|i)P (o|j)b′(i)b(j) ≤ P (o|i)P (o|j)b(i)b′(j),∀i < j ∈ S
which is equivalent to b′ ≥r b. Thus proved.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.2. To prove the first statement, we first claim that r(s, o) is de-
creasing in (s, o). To see this, note that r(s, o) =
∑
e∈E rt(s, e, o)Pt(e|s). Then, given
Assumption 3.3.1 and Assumption 3.4.1, we know that:
r(s1, OI) ≥ r(s1, OI) ≥ r(s2, OI) ≥ r(s2, OI)
Without loss of generality, we assume r(s3, OI) = r(s3, OI) ≤ r(s2, OI). Then, we have
the desired results.
We then prove the first point using induction. For N = 1, we have pr(s,o)(N) =
r(s, o), which is decreasing in (s, o). Assume it holds up to N − 1. Then, we have







pr(s′,o′)(N − 1), (B.11)
We know pr(s,o)(N − 1) is decreasing in (s, o), and Q is of TP2. That is to say, the
j-th row of Q MLR dominates the i-th row, for every j > i. Since MLR dominance
implies first order stochastic dominance (Theorem 4.1.3. from [81]), we have for any





k Q(k|j), for any k ∈ (S ×O) (i.e., patient in a “bad” state













pr(s′,o′)(N − 1) is decreasing in (s, o). This
leads us to the conclusion that pr(s,o)(N) is decreasing in (s, o).
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Now, for a given state (s, o), as θ increases, we know p11,θ increases and p12,θ de-





k Q2(k|i), for any k ∈ (S ×O). Then, similar to the proof
of the first statement, we can use induction on N to show that pr(s,o)(N) is increasing
in θ.
Proof of Proposition 2. We can prove both results using induction on the value iteration
algorithm. For any given (s, o) ∈ (S ×O), consider the following recursive formulas:
V 0(s, o) = 0;









V n+1(s, o) = max{ max
1≤N≤∞
vn+1(s,o)(N), 1s 6=s3(R− c)};
When n = 0, for a given state(s, o), we have
v1(s,o)(N) = pr(s,o)(N − 1)− δ
Nc
V 1(s, o) = max{ max
1≤N≤∞
v1(s,o)(N), 1s 6=s3(R− c)};
We have v1(s,o)(N) is decreasing in (s, o) since pr(s,o)(N − 1) is decreasing in (s, o). As
a consequence, V 1(s, o) is decreasing in (s, o). In addition, it also satisfies that V 1(s, o)
increasing in θ since pr(s,o)(N − 1) is increasing in θ (from Lemma 3.4.2). Assume the
the recursive formulas hold up to n− 1. Then, for n, we have:









V n+1(s, o) = max{ max
1≤N≤∞
vn+1(s,o)(N), 1s 6=s3(R− c)};




k Q(k|j), for any k, i, j ∈ (S×O) and i  j (i.e., patient in a “bad” state are more







1. Given the induction assumption, we have V n(s, o) decreasing in (s, o), and together






V n(s′, o′) is decreasing in (s, o).
Given Lemma 3.4.2, we know pr(s,o)(N − 1) is decreasing in (s, o). Now, for the ex-
pression of vn+1(o,N), all terms are either decreasing or invariant in (s, o). Then, we
conclude that vn+1(s,o)(N) (and subsequently, Vn+1(s, o)) is decreasing in (s, o).
The proof for the second point is similar as showing pr(s,o)(N) increasing in θ in
Lemma 3.4.2. For a given state (s, o), as θ increases, we know p11,θ increases and





k Q2(k|i), for any k ∈ (S × O), which implies





V n(s′, o′) is increasing in θ from Theorem B.1.1. From Lemma
3.4.2, we know pr(s,o)(N − 1) is increasing in θ. Then, all terms in the expression of
vn+1(s,o)(N) are either increasing or invariant in θ. Then, we conclude that v
n+1
(s,o)(N) (and
subsequently, Vn+1(s, o)) is increasing in θ.
In the next corollary, we show the optimal monitoring interval (denoted as I∗) follows
a “control limit” fashion. Depending on the exact value of parameters, the threshold
may be at different health state. Nevertheless, given our model assumptions, patients
with state (s2, OI) or “worse”, it is optimal to receive the terminal reward rather than
stay in virologic failure.
Corollary B.1.1. There exists K = (sk, ok) such that I
∗ =

N∗(s, o) = argmax v(s,o)(N) for (s, o)  K
0 for (s, o)  K
.
Further, K  (s2, OI).
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Proof of Corollary B.1.1. Subtract R− c from v(s,o)(N), we have







V (s′, o′)−R+ c
From Lemma 3.4.2 and Proposition 2, we know that v(s,o)(N) − (R − C) is decreasing
in (s, o), which implies the existence of such a threshold state K. To prove the second
claim, we revisit the expression of v(s2,o)(N)









By definition of Q (Equation 3.7), we know that patients can only move towards
“worse” health state s ∈ S, or stay at the current health state. Together with Assump-
tion 3.4.1, Proposition 2 and Lemma 3.4.2, we have
v(s2,OI)(N) ≤ v(s2,OI)(N) ≤ R− c
Then, we know
V (s2, OI) ≤ V (s2, OI) ≤ R− c
Since we know V (s, o) is decreasing in (s, o), we also know that
V (s3, OI) ≤ V (s3, OI) ≤ R− c
This simply because the monthly reward r(s3, o, e) is assumed to be negative for any o
and e, it is better to quit the decision process.
To further analysis the structure of optimal monitoring interval N∗, we first provide
the following lemma for the behavior of difference in v(s,o)(N + 1) and v(s,o)(N). We
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define D(s,o)(N) ≡ v(s,o)(N + 1)− v(s,o)(N). Using Equations 3.8 and 3.9, we have




























− V (s, o) + c (B.13)
Lemma B.1.5. Let the primitives in Corollary B.1.1 hold. Then, b(s,o) ≥ 0 for (s, o) 
K, and b(s,o) ≤ 0, for (s, o)  K.
Proof of Lemma B.1.5. b(s,o) can be interpreted the difference between the “delayed”
reward and the optimal reward. For (s, o)  K, we have
V (s, o) =







V (s′, o′) if N = 1,






v(s′,o′)(N − 1) if N ≥ 2








Then, from Equation B.13 and B.14, we know that b(s,o) is positive. For (s, o)  (s2, OI),
we claim that b(s,o) is always negative given Corollary B.1.1. This completes the proof.
Lemma B.1.6. Let the primitives in Lemma B.1.5 hold. Then D(s,o)(N) changes
its sign at most once in N . When changes occurs, it is from positive (to negative).
Moreover, for states (s, o)  (s′, o′), if D(s,o)(N) ≤ 0, then D(s′,o′)(N) ≤ 0.
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Proof of Lemma B.1.6. First, note that from Lemma B.1.5, it implies that b(s,o) changes
its sign at most once in (s, o), and it occurs from positive. Then, the remaining proof
will be similar to the proof of Lemma 8.2.4 in [111], where the authors utilized the
so-called variation diminishing property of TP2 function. In our context, it says if b(s,o)








b(s′,o′) changes its sign at most once in
N for each (s, o), and in (s, o) for each N . This completes the proof for the first part.
To prove the second claim, first note that Q is a TP2 matrix, and only allows
transition to “worse” health states, not vice versa. We have for (s, o)  (s′, o′),
Q(·|(s, o)) ≤r Q(·|(s′, o′)), and thus Q(·|(s, o)) ≤s Q(·|(s′, o′)). Then, given the ex-
pression of D(s,o)(N) in Equation B.12, and the property of b(s,o) given in Lemma B.1.5,
it is trivially true that if if D(s,o)(N) ≤ 0, then D(s′,o′)(N) ≤ 0.
Lemma B.1.6 states that, for (s, o)  (s′, o′), argmax v(s,o)(N) ≥ argmax v(s′,o′)(N),
which is to say the optimal monitoring interval is larger for “better” patients. Moreover,
Lemma B.1.6 implies that optimal N is unique.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1. This follows since both Pθ and Po is TP2.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3. The belief state πt is the only variable depends on adherence
state At. Then, we could express the updated belief conditioning on θ. Then, the
results follow from by applying the belief update formula Equation 3.13. instead of
Equation 3.12.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. The left-hand side of Equation 3.16 represents the difference in
total health benefit between a healthier (with state distribution π1) and a sicker (with
state distribution π2) patient upon taking action Wait. The right-hand side of Equation
3.16 represents the difference in health benefit between a healthier and sicker patients
upon taking action Perform VL test. Intuitively, Equation 3.16 means that as patient
gets sicker, the reduction in the benefit of watiing is greater than the reduction in the
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benefit of performing a VL test. We prove part (a) and the proof for (b) is similar.
Suppose the converse of the statement is True. Then we have:
V w(π1(1)) ≤ V v(π1(1)) and V w(π2(1)) > V v(π2(1))
By expanding these expressions using equation 3.15 and cancel the monthly rewards



























































P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)
}
















































Since we have π1(1) ≥ π1(2) and from Proposition 4 we know V ∗(π(1)) is monotonically
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P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)
]
Which contradicts condition 3.16, and from which the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.2. Similar as in the proof of Lemma 3.4.2, as patient becomes
more adherent, p11,θ increases. For two individuals given the same starting belief π1 =
π2, after one or more belief updates, we have π1 ≤r π2. Given Theorem 3.4.2, the results
thus trivially follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.3. This statement follows by Theorem 3.4.2 and the fact that
POMDP value function is monotonic (Proposition 4).
Lemma B.1.7. r(s1) ≥ r(s2).
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Proof. The statement of Lemma B.1.7 trivially follows by applying Assumption 3.4.1,
and the definition of r(s).
Proposition 3. V v(π(1)) is increasing in π(1).





































π(s)P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)− δc
= f1(π(1)) + δf2(π(1))− δc
We claim both f1(π(1)) and f2(π(1)) are increasing in π(1) The first part f1(π(1)) is
the expected one-month reward gained (minus cost) given Prob(s = s1) = π(1). It is
trivial to check that if π1(1) ≥ π2(1), the corresponding belief vector follows the MLR







Then, we have for π1(1) ≥ π2(1), f1(π1(1)) ≥ f1(π2(1)). The second part f2(π(1)) is
the expected future rewards. For a given θ, the updated belief vector is TPθPo, From
[81], if matrices Pθ and Po are of TP2, and π1 ≤r π2, then T1 PθPo ≤r T2 PθPo. From










for any o and θ. Combining with T1 PθPo ≤r T2 PθPo, and Theorem B.1.1, we then
have f2(π1(1)) ≥ f2(π2(1)). Lastly, if both f1(π(1)) and f2(π(1)) is increasing in π,
f1(π(1)) + f2(π(1)) is also increasing in π(1). This completes the proof.
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Proposition 4. V ∗(π(1)) is increasing in π(1).
Proof. Given Proposition 3, it remains to show that V w(π(1)) is increasing in π(1),
and thus V ∗(π(1)) = max{V w(π(1)), V v(π(1))} is increasing in π(1), as the maximum
of two increasing function is also increasing. We use mathematical induction on value
iteration algorithm to prove the results. We first let V0 ≥ R, and initialize V w0 (π(1)) =
V v0 (π(1)) = V0, ∀ π. For iteration n = 1, we have











′(1)|o, θ)P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)
}
Where V0(π






′(1)|o, θ)P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s) = V0 (B.15)
Let π1(1) ≥ π2(1), Then, we have
V w1 (π1(1)) ≥ V w1 (π2(1)), ∀ π1(1) ≥ π2(1) (B.16)
Combined with the result of Proposition 3, we conclude that V ∗1 (π(1)) is increasing in
π(1).
Now, assume that V ∗n−1(π(1)) is increasing in π(1) by induction hypothesis. To
facilitate our analysis, we assumed all the rewards are non-negative. Then, similar as
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the proof in iteration n = 1, we have:










































2(1)|o, θ)P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)
}
(B.19)
= V wn (π2(1)) (B.20)
Similarly in the proof for Proposition 3, we have π1|o, θ ≤r π2|o, θ for any o and





2(1)|o, θ). Thus the first inequality follows. The second inequality follows from
Theorem B.1.1 and the fact that π1 ≤r π2.
We now have V wn (π(1)) is increasing in π(1), thus V
∗
n (π(1)) is also increasing in
π(1). Since Vn converges uniformly to V , it follows that V
∗(π(1)) is also increasing in
π(1).
Next, we would like to show the monotonicity of V ∗(π(1)) in θ: adherent pa-
tients should gain larger health benefit (i.e., higher quality-adjusted life years, lower
healthcare-related costs) compared to non-adherent patients).
Theorem B.1.2. V ∗(π(1)) is increasing in θ, for any given π(1).
Proof. We use mathematical induction on value iteration algorithm to prove the result




V v0 (π(1)) = V0, ∀π(1). For iteration n = 1, we have











′(1)|o, θ)P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)
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P (s′|s, θ)P (o|s)
}
Where V ∗0 (π






















V w1 (π(1)), V
v
1 (π(1))
}∣∣∣∣θ1 = V ∗1 (π(1))∣∣∣∣θ1
≥ V ∗1 (π(1))
∣∣∣∣θ2 = max{V w1 (π(1)), V v1 (π(1))}∣∣∣∣θ2, ∀ θ1 ≥ θ2
Now, assume that V ∗n−1(π(1))|θ is increasing in θ by induction hypothesis. We have for
θ1 ≥ θ2:
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}
(B.23)
= V wn (π(1))|θ2 (B.24)
The first inequality follows by induction. Similar as in the proof of Lemma 3.4.2, we
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can show that π(1)|o, θ1 ≥ π(1)|o, θ2. Thus, the second inequality follows.
For a similar reason, we claim the following inequality is true:
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}
= V vn (π(1))|θ2
We now have both V vn (π(1)) and V
w
n (π(1)) is increasing in θ, thus V
∗
n (π(1)) is also





Our previous work in [106] motivated this study, where we studied the cost-effectiveness
of adaptive HIV VL monitoring in resource-limited settings. In that paper, we devel-
oped a microsimulation model that captures HIV disease progression (and transmission)
in order to evaluate both the adaptive and fixed VL monitoring strategies. The model
tracked patient demographics (such as age, gender, education level), CD4 cell counts
(white blood cells), individual adherence status at each month to ART, and presence of
virologic failure. Patient adherence status/measurement at the current month (which
is a binary outcome, defined as whether having missed more than two doses in the
previous month) was modeled using a mixed-effects logistic regression model fitted to a
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longitudinal dataset. In the same dataset, virologic failure was defined as (i) 2 consecu-
tive measurements of a VL >200 copies/mL, (ii) 1 VL measurement >1000 copies/mL,
or (iii) not reaching virologic suppression within 6 months of either ART initiation or
regimen change. Patient failure status (binary) at any month was estimated using a
logit function of adherence status, patient demographics and ART attributes; or a fixed
monthly probability of failure if the patient was on the first-line regimen, or second-line
regimen respectively. In addition, the probability of spontaneous re-suppression after
the first occurrence of virologic failure was also captured in the microsimulation model.
Lastly, CD4 cell count changes were modeled using quantile regression where previous
CD4 cell count, patient demographics and ART attributes.
Notably, the model 1) explicitly considered AIDS-defining opportunistic infections
(OIs), where patients were monitored upon the development of OIs; 2) adjusted health
outcomes by estimate the number of secondary HIV infections in the community, at
each month as a function of the number of individuals in virologic failure.
Due to the level of complexity involved in the simulation model, we did not manage
to develop a globally optimal solution to the problem. Our goal in this project is to
take a step further, by constructing an analytically tractable and analyzable tractable
optimization approach. To do so, we constructed a stylized simulation model based on
the microsimulation model, capturing most of the important features mentioned above.
First, we simplified the model where CD4 cell count is no longer tracked at each month
(Section “Simplified Health State”). In Section “Bayesian reformulation of adherence
heterogeneity”, we provided an equivalent Bayesian representation of the frequentist
adherence model. In Section 3.5, we present and discuss the optimal policies for a
subgroup of patients (with pre-determined patient demographics) given the model, and
we compared our optimal monitoring policies with the status quo (i.e., fixed policies).
Simplified Health State
Both VL, and CD4 cell count are arguably the two most important factor and in-
dex when considering HIV-infected patients health. However, a multi-dimensional state
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space might lose the analytical tractability and required more complex analysis which is
beyond the scope of this project. Subsequently, we decided to develop the model frame-
work in Section 3.2 using one single covariate. We chose VL instead of CD4 cell count
for a few reasons. First, various studies has found highly negative correlation between
VL and CD4 cell count ([149], [95]). We acknowledge that incorporating CD4 cell count
into the state space may give a better prediction on patient health outcome. However,
we feel that either one of them would capture a sufficient amount of patients’ risk and
disease progression (due to the high negative correlation), while providing an analyt-
ically tractable (the base model) and a computationally tractable model (in Section
3.4.1, we extended the model to incorporate AIDS-defining Opportunistic Infections).
Second, identifying the presence of virologic failure in a timely manner is important not
only for the patient, but also for the society at large, since patients in virologic failure
tend to have a much high rate of HIV transmission than those HIV-infected patients
with undetectable VL.
Modelling ART adherence using Bayesian Hierarchical model
In [106], we modeled each patient’s monthly (non)adherence status (adht) using
mixed effect logistic regression as a function of his age at time t (aget), gender (sex),




1 + exp[−(β0 + β1aget + β2sex+ β3edu+ β4(adht−1) + β5∆t+ β6adht−1∆t+ pi]
,
(B.25)
where pi is the random intercept (i.e., heterogeneous pattern) of patient i. However, this
patient-specific intercept term is intrinsically hard to incorporate into an analytically
tractable decision-making framework. We then seek to find an alternative representa-
tion of the mixed effect logistic regression model. Instead of a frequentist approach,
we construct a Bayesian hierarchical model to quantify the heterogeneity effect in HIV
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patients’ treatment adherence. Bayesian hierarchical modeling is a statistical model
written in multiple levels (hierarchical form) that estimates the parameters of the pos-
terior distribution using the Bayesian method [62]. Since our response adht is binary,
we consider a Beta-Binomial hierarchical model (denote by Mb1) and compare to a null
model (Mb0) assuming no heterogeneity effect.
In model Mb1, we assume each patient i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} has his/her own probability
θi ∈ [0, 1] of being nonadherent (i.e., θi 6= θj). On the contrary, in the null model
Mb0, we assume θ1 = θ2 = ...θm, for any patient i. Denote ni is the total counts of
clinical visits for patient i, and yi is the frequency of nonadherence for patient i. For
model Mb1, we sample θ
′
is (independent and identically distributed) from Beta(a, b)
distribution and let D stands for the entire sub-dataset, then we have:
yi ∼ Binomial(ni, θi)
p(θi|yi, a, b) = Beta(a+ yi, b+ n− yi)





B(a+ yi, b+ ni − yi)
B(a, b)





We use the empirical bayes approach to choose a, b. We denote µ = aa+b and S =
a+ b, and apply the “ iterated method of moments” estimator:



















For model Mb0, we assume the probability of being (non)adherent at time t is not
patient-specific (θ1 = ... = θm = θ), let θ ∼ Beta(1, 1). Then, under model Mb0, we
have


















Beta(1 + y, 1 + n− y) (B.28)







To examine the statistical significance of this model, we first create synthetic ad-
herence measurement dataset using Equation B.25 by sampling 10,000 data points for
different age, gender and educational level. For example, We first restrict the categorical
covariate age to be within 20 - 30, sex as male, and high educational level. We also
aggregated age to make sure we have sufficient data points to fit the model. Plugging
the data into Equation B.27, we estimate â = 0.141, b̂ = 0.304. Then, we compute




means the strength of evidence that hierarchical model is superior is decisively strong
([76]). Sub-datasets with different covariate combination also provide evidence with
heuristically decisive Bayes factors (i.e., >= 104, see [76]). We provide the summary
statistics in Bayes factors for all sub-datasets in Appendix Table B.2.
We then conclude that the mixed effect logistic regression model, a frequentist for-
mulation of adherence heterogeneity, can be alternative represented using a Bayesian
hierarchical model.
We denote the mean adherence level as θ̄. In Figure B.1, we plot the mean adher-
ence level with increasing age. We generally observe θ̄ increasing as patients get older.
Excluding the outliers (one standard deviation from the mean), we see the maximum
difference in θ̄ is within 0.25. The maximum difference becomes smaller by further
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differentiating patients by gender (Appendix Figure B.2 and B.3).
Figure B.1: θ̄ with increasing age
By constructing a Beta-binomial Bayesian hierarchical model and compared with
the alternative model where we assume no heterogeneity effect, we conclude that the
adherence pattern is different among patients. While some patients are more likely to
be adherent at each month (i.e., not missing more than 2 pills), other patients might be
always less adherent. From Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3, we generally observe an increasing
trend in mean adherence level θ̄ with age. Moreover, we found the maximum difference
in θ̄ is small.
Although a dynamic, time-dependent adherence type (θt) is more realistic, we feel
it might add an additional level of complexity to our problem. Thus, differentiating
patients by gender, and use the gender-specific mean adherence level might be a better
choice.
We further divided the synthetic dataset into sub-dataset by gender (male, female).
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We adjusted the starting mean adherence level for age 20 to match the figures has been
reported in the literature [157], [169]. In both Figure B.2 and Figure B.3, the maximum
change in terms of mean adherence level in 40 years did not exceed 15%.
Figure B.2: θ̄ with increasing age in male patient
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Figure B.3: θ̄ with increasing age in female patient
B.3 Figures and Tables





pv10, per sex-act transmission rate
male to female 4.3 ∗ 10−5
[122]female to male 2.2 ∗ 10−5
male to male 4.3 ∗ 10−4
monthly sec acts 9 [106]
health utilities
yearly utility, virally suppressed 0.865
[106]
yearly utility in failure s2 0.526
costs
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Description Value Source
c VL test cost $100 USD [75]
yearly cost if virally suppressed $160 USD
[106]yearly cost, first-line ART $120 USD
yearly cost, second-line ART $345 USD
r yearly discount factor 0.03 [106]








Table B.2: Summary of hierarchical modeling Bayes factors (hierarchical models over
null models)
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Figure B.4: Remaining Rewards Comparison: Male Patients
(a) Remaining Rewards Adjusting Secondary Infection
(b) Remaining Rewards not Adjusting Secondary Infection
Appendix C
Chapter 3 Supplement Material
C.1 Tables and Figures
Variable Description Value Source
β
Per-contact transmission rate




Viral infection rate in the SIR
model)
0.3540





b3 An average person $24844.44
b1 Monetized utility term $88.41 Supplement C.2
b2 Monetized utility term $99.02
Parameters of social distancing implementation
φ Shape parameter 1 [128]
qmax




Maximum possible contact re-
duction
50% [168]
Continued on next page
156
157
Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Description Value Source
d1
Daily cost of lockdown per
person
$389.929 Supplement C.2
Health care cost per clinical
confirmed COVID-19 case
$3045 [14]





An average person 66.7%



















Elderly to (Youth, Adult, El-
derly)
0.99, 2.55, 1.52
C Average daily contacts 12
a−1 Average days in incubation 5.2
[100]
r−1
Average days in infectious
state
7.8










Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Description Value Source





µ An average person 0.75%
Table C.1: Parameters and data sources.
C.2 Model Parameterization
In this section, we detail our estimation of parameters on disease dynamics, disease
burden and socioeconomic loss of policy implementation.
C.2.1 Disease Dynamics Parameters
We obtain disease dynamic parameters, including infection rate β, recovery rate
r, and initial disease states S(1), I(1), R(1) using public epidemiological data in Min-
nesota [98] and a validated Minnesota COVID-19 micro-simulation model [100]. We
obtain the per-contact transmission rate of 0.0295 (for the homogeneous model, β =
0.0295 · C, where C = 12 is the average daily contacts in Table C.1), recovery rate
r = 0.1282 and the average incubation period a−1 = 5.2 days from [100]. We extrap-
olate the initial disease prevalence I(1) using the difference between total confirmed
COVID-19 cases and total recovered cases R(1) from [98]. In the heterogeneous model
Eq.(4.24), no immediate data is available to parametrize E(1). We assume E(1) = I(1).
We have tested that our model outcome is not sensitive to the value of E(1) when
E(1) ≤ 2× I(1).
We aggregate the contact information from [100] to estimate the contact matrix
as follows (subscript 1, 2 and 3 corresponds to the Youth, Adult and Elderly group):
C11 = 8.74, C12 = 4.48, C13 = 0.74, C21 = 2.77, C22 = 9.46, C23 = 0.86, C31 = 0.99,
C32 = 2.55, C33 = 1.52, and the age-proportional average daily counts C = 12.
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We obtain the mortality rate by taking the multiplication of the symptomatic mor-
tality rate of (0.01%, 0.55%, 5.61%) and the symptomatic infection ratio of (30.3%,
67.5%, 42.8%) for the Youth, Adult and Elderly group, respectively [171]. We calculate
the population average symptomatic infection ratio as 52.2% and population average
mortality rate as 0.75% based on Minnesota age distribution. We obtain clinical con-
firmation percentage over symptomatic cases as (9.5%, 81.9%, 100%) for different age
groups [171] and calculate a population average clinical confirmation rate as 67.7%.
C.2.2 Disease Burden
We quantify the overall health impact of COVID-19 and personal utility parameters
related to infection using the disability-adjusted life-year (DALY), and Net Monetary
Benefit (NMB) framework [159, 57]. The overall disease burden associated with COVID-
19 infection includes both fatal and non-fatal cases in Eq.(C.1), which we break down
in the following paragraphs.
Disease Burden =(treatment cost + cost per non-fatal case)× symptomatic rate
× clinical confirmation rate + cost per fatal case×mortality rate.
(C.1)
Net Monetary Benefit Following the classical approach in healthcare economics,
we combine different outcome measures into a single NMB objective based on willingness-
to-pay (WTP) and DALYs. DALYs reflect the years of life lost (YLL) due to premature
mortality associated with a given health condition, and the years lost due to disability
(YLD) resulting from the condition. DALYs can be converted to a cost scale by multi-
plying an appropriate WTP. WTP is typically estimated to be 1 - 3 times of GDP per
capita [158] and the GDP per-capita in the U.S. in 2019 is $65118 [165]).
Fatal cases The YLL due to a single COVID-19 death is calculated by taking the
difference between life expectancy and the average age of each age group in Minnesota.
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Given Minnesota age composition [100], we calculate the mean age to be 9.58, 39.35, and
71.01 years old for the Youth, Adult, and Elderly group, respectively; and the population
mean age as 39.22 years old. Then, based on a population average life expectancy of
78.5 years [161], we calculate YLL as 68.92, 39.15, and 7.49 for the Youth, Adult, and
Elderly group; and the population average as 39.27 YLL. The cost per fatal case of
COVID-19 is then calculated as the corresponding WTP × YLL.
Non-fatal cases The duration of disability and lost workday is assumed to be
60 days [101]. Following the same estimation procedure as in [171], we calculate the
temporary productivity loss as the multiplication of WTP per day, average number of
lost workdays, and the age-specific productivity weights (0.15 for Youth, 0.8 for Adult,
0.1 for Elderly and 0.469 for the population average ).
Productivity loss = WTP/day × workdays lost × productivity weight.
To calculate YLD due to COVID-19 infection, we follow the standard approach in the
COVID-19 medical literature [e.g., 110]. A disability weight of 0.133 is adopted to
account for lower respiratory tract infection. The cost per non-fatal case of COVID-19
is calculated as follows.
Cost per non-fatal case = WTP × YLD + temporary productivity loss.
This monetary disease burden only applies to clinically confirmed cases (moderate to
severe), as undetected mild cases are assumed to result in a negligible number of YLD.
The cost of supportive treatment of a clinically confirmed (moderate to severe) and
symptomatic case of COVID-19 is estimated to be $3045 - $14366 [14].
Combining preceding calculation, we calculate the overall disease burden associated
with COVID-19 infection using Eq.(C.1). We estimate the overall health cost as b3 =
72381.16 for the homogeneous model, and b3,1 = $1740.189 , b3,2 = $46640.377 , b3,3 =
$39638.333 for the Youth, Adult, and Elderly group, respectively.
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C.2.3 Socioeconomic Loss
In this section, we estimate the socioeconomic cost of implementing social distancing
and lockdown and associated personal utility parameters.
Cost of policy implementation We estimate the socioeconomic loss due to social
distancing and lockdown. In the U.S., different control measures have been implemented
simultaneously, which makes it difficult to decompose the cost of lockdown and social
distancing. China, on the other hand, implemented city-wise lockdown in the epicen-
ter Wuhan, and strict social distancing in other regions during COVID-19 outbreak.
Therefore, we assume a similar GDP decline percentage between the U.S. and China
due to control measures, and hence estimate their costs in the U.S..
China implemented city-wide lockdown in Wuhan, and mandated social distancing
in other regions from Jan 23, 2020 till the end of March or April. GDP loss in China
was 12.8% in 2020 Q1 compared to 2019 Q1 [171]. We assume this loss is mainly
due to the mandated strict social distancing. Meanwhile, Wuhan saw a 40.5% GDP
decline in 2020 Q1 [171], which we assume is a result of lockdown. The duration of
lockdown in Wuhan and social distancing in other regions in 2020 Q1 was 69 days [171].
Therefore, we estimate a 40.5%/69 = 0.5869% daily GDP loss for lockdown institution,
and 12.8%/69 = 0.1855% daily GDP loss for mandated strict social distancing. We
assume that this daily 0.1855% GDP loss is caused by a strict social distancing with a
maximum possible contact reduction κmax = 0.5 [168].
We assume that implementing lockdown and social distancing would cause the same
GDP decline percentage in the U.S. as in China. We observe that the GDP loss in the
U.S. was 31.4% [147] in Q2 2020, where different states implemented social distancing
and lockdown periodically. Thus, our estimation of GDP loss percentage is aligned with
the underlying value in U.S.. Given Minnesota 2019 Q1 GDP of 378047.3 million [147],
we estimate the social distancing cost as qmax = 123.25 per person per day for a strict
social distancing with κmax = 0.5. Similarly, we estimate the daily cost of lockdown
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$2218.7 Million and the lockdown cost as d1 = $389.929 per person per day.
Utility parameters We estimate parameters b1 and b2 in the utility functions. We
use the annual average income in Minnesota in 2019 [42] to estimate the total economic
gain of going out and having normal social activities and estimate b1 + b2 = $187.43
per day per person. We estimate that b2 contributes to 52.83% of this daily economic
gain, since lockdown results in a daily decline of 0.5869% in the quarterized GDP and
thus a total decline of 0.5869% × 90 = 52.83% in a quarter. Therefore, we estimate
b2 = 52.83%× 187.43 = $99.02 and b1 = 187.43− 99.02 = $88.41.
C.3 Theorems and Proofs
C.3.1 Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
Proof. Proof: We first prove the “only if” part. We omit t in α∗aw, and I for simplicity.
We write b̂2 ≡ b2 − b3βI. In the quadratic function uaw(α) = α(b1 + b̂2α), if b̂2 ≥ 0
or equivalently I ≤ b2
b3β
, uaw(α) is increasing in α ∈ [0, 1] and thus α∗aw = 1 > α∗B.






= b1 + 2b̂2α.






= 0. If b̂2 < 0 and αU ≥ 1, or equivalently,
b2
b3β
< I ≤ b2 + 0.5b1
b3β
, uaw(α) is increasing in α ∈ [0, 1] and thus α∗aw = 1 > α∗B. If
b̂2 < 0 and αU < 1, or equivalently, I >
b2 + 0.5b1
b3β
, uaw(α) attains its maximum at
α∗aw = αU .






− b1 − b̂2α.
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− b̂2 > 0 for α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, if b̂2 < 0 and αU < 1, α∗aw = αU < α∗B if
and only if h(αU ) < 0. We note that


























Combining all conditions, if α∗aw < α
∗











We omit the “if” part of the proof, which directly follows from the previous proof. 
C.3.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4.1
Proof. Proof: To prove Theorem 4.4.1, we only need to show that for any t = 1, · · · , T−1,
given I(t) and A(t), there exists a unique equilibrium activity level α∗A(t). If it holds,
there are only finite possible values of A. We can obtain that there must exist one
optimal solution A∗ of the lockdown model. Thus, given any A and initial states S(0),
I(0) and R(0), we can recursively compute α(t) based on (4.8), and then compute
S(t+ 1), I(t+ 1) and R(t+ 1) from the dynamics (4.1). By doing this we could obtain
α∗A(t) for all t = {1, · · · , T}.
Consider any t ∈ {1, · · · , T}. We write α(t), I(t) and A(t) as α, I and A for






− b1 − b̂2α = 0. (C.2)
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Obviously, h is continuous on (0, 1). We also have
lim
t↓0
h(t) = −∞− b1 = −∞ and lim
t↑1
h(t) = +∞− b1 − b̂2 = +∞.
It then follows from the intermediate value theorem that there must exist α∗A ∈ [ε, 1−ε]
for some sufficiently small positive scalar ε such that h(α∗A) = 0. Next, we prove the
uniqueness of the solution for Eq.(4.8). We consider two cases.




− b̂2 > 0, i.e., h(α) is strictly increasing
on (0, 1). Hence, there exists at most one α∗A such that h(α
∗
A) = 0.







∈ (0, 1). We may observe the following two facts: 1) h is strictly decreasing on
[α−, α+] and strictly increasing on (0, α−] ∪ [α+, 1); 2) h(ᾱ−) < 0, and lim
t↓0
h(t) = −∞.
Putting them together one may obtain that h(α) < 0 for all α ∈ (0, α+], which further
implies that there exists at most one α∗A such that h(α
∗
A) = 0.
Since t is arbitrarily chosen from {1, · · · , T}, the proof of this theorem is thus com-
pleted. 
C.3.3 Proof of Proposition 4.4.2
Proof. Proof:
Following the notation in the proof of Theorem 4.4.1, we consider any t ∈ {1, · · · , T}
and write b̂2 ≡ b2(1−A)−b3βI without explicitly spelling out t. To establish the stated
results in the proposition, it suffices to show that α∗A is increasing in both b̂2 and b1. It is
known from the proof of Theorem 4.4.1 that h′(α∗A) =
1
α∗A(1− α∗A)
− b̂2 > 0. Therefore,
we know from the implicit function theorem that α∗A satisfying Eq.(4.8) can be taken
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as a single-valued function of b1 and b̂2 such that
(α∗A)








The above inequality shows that α∗A is an increasing function in both b1 and b̂2. The
stated results of this proposition thus hold. 
C.3.4 Lemma C.3.1
Lemma C.3.1. Given any nonnegative initial disease state (S(1), I(1), R(1)) satisfying
S(1) + R(1) + I(1) = 1 and a societal activity level time sequence α, the following two
properties hold:
(a) The disease state (S(t), I(t), R(t)) at any time t ∈ {1, 2, .., T} are non-negative and
bounded.
(b) The trajectory of disease states is uniquely determined by α.
Proof. Proof: It follows from the disease dynamics in (4.1) that for any t ∈ {1, · · · , T−1},
S(t+ 1) +R(t+ 1) + I(t+ 1) = S(t) +R(t) + I(t) = · · · = S(1) +R(1) + I(1) = 1.
Therefore, to prove part (a), it suffices to show that (S(t), I(t), R(t)) are nonnegative
for all t. Notice that Eq.(4.1) can be reformulated as

S(t+ 1) = [1− βα(t)I(t)]S(t)
I(t+ 1) = (1− r)I(t) + βα(t)S(t)I(t)
R(t+ 1) = R(t) + rI(t).
Recall that in the above equations, α(t) ∈ (0, 1), β < 1 and r < 1. By induction, one
could easily obtain the nonnegativity of all (S(t), I(t), R(t)). Part (b) on the uniqueness
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of {S(t), I(t), R(t)} given α can be seen easily from the above disease dynamics. 
C.3.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4.3
To prove this proposition, we first show the following lemma by treating lockdown
decision A as a continuous variable A ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma C.3.2. For 0 ≤ I1 < I2 ≤ 1, the following two properties hold:









< 0 at any A ∈ [0, 1];









< 0 at any A ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Proof of Lemma C.3.2 Based on Eq.(4.8), the equilibrium activity levels α∗A(I) ∈
(0, 1) at given lockdown decisions A are solutions to the following equation:
b1 + b2(1−A)α∗A(I) = log(α∗A(I))− log(1− α∗A(I)) + b3βIα∗A(I).





< 0. It follows from







b3βI + b2A− b2 + (α∗A(I))−1 + (1− α∗A(I))−1
< 0.
Denoting g(α) ≡ − b2α
b3βI + b2(A− 1) + α−1 + (1− α)−1
, we may derive that
g′(α) = −b2
[
b3βI + b2(A− 1) + (2− 3α)α−1(1− α)−2
(b3βI + b2(A− 1) + α−1 + (1− α)−1)2
]
.




decreasing for x ∈ (0, 1).
167
For statement (a), if b3βIL +
2− 3α∗A=1(IL)
α∗A=1(IL)(1− α∗A=1(IL))2
≤ 0, we have for any A ∈
[0, 1] and I ∈ [I1, I2],
b3βI + b2(A− 1) +
2− 3α∗A(I)
α∗A(I)(1− α∗A(I))2







Therefore, g′(α) ≥ 0 for α ∈ [α∗A(I2), α∗A(I1)] at any A ∈ [0, 1], where the equality could









at any A ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly for statement (b), if b3βIH − b2 +
2− 3α∗A=0(IH)
α∗A=0(IH)(1− α∗A=0(IH))2
≥ 0, we have
for any A ∈ [0, 1] and I ∈ [I1, I2],
b3βI + b2(A− 1) +
2− 3α∗A(I)
α∗A(I)(1− α∗A(I))2
≥ b3βI1 + b2(A− 1) +
2− 3α∗A(I1)
α∗A(I1)(1− α∗A(I1))2




Therefore, g′(α) ≤ 0 for α ∈ [α∗A(I2), α∗A(I1)] at any A ∈ [0, 1] , where the equality could






at any A ∈ [0, 1]. 
Next, we show that I > I. One can verify that I and I are the only real roots to














= 0 and −b2 +
2− 3δ
δ(1− δ)2




















































is decreasing for x ∈ (0, 1), we have α∗A=0(I) < α∗A=1(I). Since
α∗A=1(I) < α
∗




A=0(I), we have I > I by Proposition 4.4.2.
Now we proceed to prove Proposition 4.4.3.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4.4.3 We only prove the first statement. The proof of the

































α∗A=1(I2)− α∗A=0(I2) < α∗A=1(I1)− α∗A=0(I1) < 0.
Rearranging the terms in the above inequality, we can obtain the first statement of this
proposition. The second statement can be proved similarly and we omit the details
here. 
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C.3.6 Proof of Lemma 4.4.1
To proceed, we write ui(go out, α−i(t)) as the expected utility gain for the individual
i that chooses to go out when all others hold the same activity level α−i(t), i.e.,
ui(go out, α−i(t)) = b1 + b2α−i(t)− b3α−i(t)βI(t). (C.3)
By definition, the feasible region of αi(t) is as follows:




1 + exp(b1 + b̂2α−i(t))
, (C.5)
where the right side comes from the logit model Eq.(4.5) except that the utility term
is replaced by ui(go out, α−i(t)). We note that Fi(α−i(t)) could be outside the feasible
region of αi(t) given in Eq.(C.4). It can be easily verified that the function Fi(·) in
Eq. (C.5) is increasing in b̂2. Moreover, Fi(·) is increasing in α−i if b̂2 ≥ 0, and decreasing
in α−i if b̂2 < 0.









B(t) > 1 − κ(t) from the






− b1 − b̂2α−i(t). (C.6)
From the proof of Theorem 4.4.1, we have h(α−i(t)) < 0 for any α−i(t) ∈ [0, α∗B(t)).
170
With some simple algebraic work, we have:
α−i(t) < Fi(α−i(t)), for any α−i(t) ∈ [0, α∗B(t)).
Thus, we have individual i’s best response to α−i(t) = 1−κ(t) is larger than 1−κ(t) (i.e.,
Fi(1−κ(t)) > 1−κ(t)). That is, Fi(1−κ(t)) is outside the feasible region of αi(t), defined
in Eq.(C.4). Thus, under the social distancing constraint such that α∗B(t) > 1 − κ(t),
the best response to α−i(t) = 1− κ(t) is 1− κ(t). The proof is thus completed. 
C.3.7 Proof of Theorem 4.4.2
Proof. Proof: We consider two cases.
Case I: α∗B(t) ≤ 1− κ(t). Since α∗B(t) ∈ [0, 1− κ(t)], we know from Theorem 4.4.1 that
α∗B(t) is unique (by setting A = 0).
Case II: α∗B(t) > 1− κ(t). From Lemma 4.4.1, we know ακ(t) = 1−κ(t) is a symmetric
equilibrium solution. Suppose there exists another symmetric equilibrium solution α
′
κ(t)
such that 0 < α
′
κ(t) < 1−κ(t). Set α−i(t) = α
′










κ(t). This contradicts the definition of a symmetric equilibrium. Thus, ακ(t) =
1 − κ(t) is the unique symmetric equilibrium (under Case II condition). The proof is
thus completed. 
C.3.8 Proof of Proposition 4.4.4
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4.4.4 Given a disease prevalence I, a social distancing policy
κ ≤ κmax can affect the disease dynamics on a day if κ > 1 − α∗B(I) and cannot if
κ ≤ 1 − α∗B(I). Moreover, if κ ≤ 1 − α∗B(I), social distancing policy does not change
the epidemiological outcome but may incur social distancing cost q(κ). Given q(κ) is
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an increasing function in κ, it is better to have κ = 0 instead of 0 < κ ≤ 1 − α∗B(I).
Therefore, the optimal social distancing policy is either 1) κ∗ > 1−α∗B(I) and κ∗ ≤ κmax,
or 2) κ∗ = 0. 
C.3.9 Proofs of Proposition 4.4.5 and Corollary 4.4.1
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4.4.5: We first prove the first statement. From Eq.(4.12),
we have α∗(κ, I) = min(1 − κ, α∗B(I)). Based on Proposition 4.4.2 (by setting A = 0),





α∗B(I1)−α∗(κ, I1) = max(α∗B(I1)−1+κ, 0) ≥ max(α∗B(I2)−1+κ, 0) = α∗B(I2)−α∗(κ, I2).




B(I1)− α∗(κ1, I1) =
α∗B(I2) − α∗(κ2, I2) ≥ 0, we have α∗(κ1, I1) > α∗(κ2, I2). If α∗B(I1) − α∗(κ1, I1) =
α∗B(I2)− α∗(κ2, I2) > 0, from Theorem 4.4.2 and Proposition 4.4.4, we have κ2 − κ1 =
[1− α∗(κ2, I2)]− [1− α∗(κ1, I1)] > 0. If α∗B(I1)− α∗(κ1, I1) = α∗B(I2)− α∗(κ2, I2) = 0,
from Theorem 4.4.2, we have κ2 = κ1. Given that κ2 ≥ κ1 and q(κ) is increasing in κ,
the result is thus proved. 
Proof. Proof of Corollary 4.4.1 By plugging Iκ into Eq.(4.3) and Eq.(4.5), one can verify
that α∗B(Iκ) = 1− κmax. Thus, the result follows from Proposition 4.4.4. 
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